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The thesis explores the relationship between citizenship education and identity in 
conflict-affected societies, by comparing the teaching of citizenship across different 
schools in Northern Ireland and Israel.  In both societies, citizenship education addresses 
issues that are deemed controversial, such as the recent or ongoing conflict, citizenship, 
racism, and sectarianism. The theoretical framework brings together (neo) Marxist, post-
colonialist, and critical pedagogical approaches to citizenship education and identity.  
Fieldwork was carried out in four different schools (Catholic, Protestant, Jewish-Israeli 
and Arab-Palestinian), using individual interviews, focus group interviews, observations, 
and document analysis.  
The major findings suggest that citizenship education at the policy, school, and 
classroom level is permeated by an avoidance of controversial issues related to the 
conflict and identity. In both societies, dominant narratives about the conflict glorify and 
justify violence, preventing a more critical examination of the conflicts. Additionally, 
educational policies promote a neoliberal/managerialist culture that censors the critical 
potential of citizenship education by determining that the priority for schools is academic 
standards and performativity. This limits teachers’ ability to develop students’ critical 
political thinking, to address controversial issues, and to challenge racist and sectarian 
views. However, the data also point to the employment of transformative forms of 
citizenship education, which became particularly evident among minorities.  
The thesis contribution is threefold: first, drawing on a (neo) Marxist and postcolonial 
theoretical framework facilitates a structural examination of the state of citizenship 
education through the lens of power relations. Second, the multi-level study shows how 
processes of avoidance and censoring trickle down from the policy level into schools and 
into classrooms. Third, since citizenship education is permeated by sidestepping and 
censoring, it is at risk of reproducing the conflict, structural sectarianism and racism, and 
socio-economic inequalities. The thesis concludes with the assertion that there is a need 




to provide teachers and schools with political and institutional support through offering 
training programmes; guidance and more time during the citizenship lesson to teach 
about controversial issues related to the conflict and identity. It also points at the need to 
further research pedagogies of critical teachers, who are able to promote transformative 
citizenship even in an uncongenial political environment that subtly promotes avoidance 
and censoring.
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We should be masters and mistresses of our identities rather than letting them master us 
(Kwame Anthony Appiah) 
Educators, policymakers and activists argue that education takes an important role in 
contributing to the transition to peace in conflict-affected societies (Harris, 2004), by 
facilitating a better understanding of the nature of conflict (McEvoy et al., 2006). Yet, 
Bush and Saltarelli (2000) maintain that education can also be manipulated, being used to 
preserve privilege, to promote intolerance or as a form of cultural repression. According 
to them, education can be both a constructive and destructive force in conflict-affected 
societies. Controversial issues such as belonging and ownership of the land, the conflict’s 
history or unresolved questions regarding collective rights and self-determination can 
complicate political education in these societies.  




Indeed, at the time of writing this thesis, citizenship and identity remain ‘buzzwords’ in 
Northern Ireland and Israel. The ‘exit’ of the United Kingdom from the European Union 
was decided on 23 June 2016, even though the majority of Northern Ireland’s population 
voted against it. At the heart of the complex issues raised by this decision is the question 
of the land border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The removal of 
the physical border was part of the peace negotiations between the different parties in 
Northern Ireland and its return would undermine the Good Friday Agreement from 1998 
(Castle, 2018). Whilst this decision threatens the peace process in Northern Ireland, it also 
occurred in an atmosphere of increasing populism expressed through a public discourse 
and verbal and physical (racist) violence towards minorities across the United Kingdom 
(Burnett, 2017). Virdee and McGeever (2017) argued that the political debate about the 
Brexit reactivated “long-standing racialized structures of feelings about immigration and 
national belonging” (p.3), expressed through nostalgia for the British imperial project and 
a fear of the decline of ‘Britishness’. Burnett (2017) further claimed that the referendum 
and other national policies (towards immigration) have in a sense provided a legitimisation 
of racist violence in the eyes of the perpetrators.  
This trend has also affected schools throughout the United Kingdom. Cole (2017) 
explained that there has been an increase in racist incidents in schools along with demands 
for the need of education against racism by teachers who complain that there is a lack of 
political support. Similarly, in Northern Ireland, a poll conducted by the largest Teachers 
Union found that 67 percent of the teachers believed that sectarianism is a problem in their 
school, leading the union to complain that educational policies fail to address issues of 
sectarianism and racism since the education budget has been eroded (NASUWT, 2018). 
Consequently, according to the teachers and the union, there is lack of political support 
and funding for anti-racist education and education against sectarianism during a time 
when racism against minorities is on the rise and the peace process in Northern Ireland is 
threatened.  
There are some parallels between the situation in Israel and Northern Ireland. Issues of 
citizenship and belonging have recently cropped up in Israel by the decision of the 
government to deport refugees to third countries against their will and against the protest 




by humanitarian organisations in Israel and abroad (Bob, 2017). This decision is an 
example of the right-wing policy under the current government that generally promotes 
an ethnic-nationalist agenda (Mustafa and Ghanem, 2010). With the election of a new 
government in 2009, the citizenship curriculum became more nationalistic and religious 
under the current Education Minister Naftali Bennett (Cohen, 2017). Bennett promotes a 
stronger focus on the study of Jewish identity across different subjects, including 
citizenship education (Kashti, 2015).  
One of the controversies that indicated this shift to the right in educational policies was 
the dismissal of the former citizenship coordinator of the Ministry of Education, Adar 
Cohen. Educators, academics and politicians denounced his dismissal as a political 
decision because members of the ministry perceived him as not being supportive enough 
of its ethnic-national agenda and the new controversial civics textbook (Nesher, 2012). 
Another controversy occurred in 2014 when the Ministry of Education reprimanded 
citizenship teacher Adam Verta, who was accused of expressing “extreme left” political 
views and “incitement against the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF)”1 in class and eventually 
lost his job (Gravé-Lazi, 2014; Raved, 2014). These controversies point to a trend of 
silencing views that are critical of the government’s educational agenda.  
Besides these two controversies, the most recent dispute erupted around the review of the 
official citizenship textbook. The old textbook, which provided the basis for the new 
curriculum (Barak, 2005), was removed from circulation, claiming that it requires revision 
because it presents views that are too critical towards Israel (Skop, 2013). The revised 
chapters, published in 2013 promote the notion of Israel as a Jewish state while neglecting 
its democratic character and prioritising an ethnonational model of citizenship (Pinson, 
2013). Additionally, Pinson (2013) criticised the fact that the collective national identity 
of the Arab-Palestinian minority is omitted since they are only described as religious and 
cultural subgroups in Israel. She also referred to the change in its pedagogical approach, 
                                                             
1 In newspaper articles he was cited as calling the IDF immoral and accused it of using violence against 
civilians, he expressed his support for the party Hadash (considered left-wing with roots in the 
communist party) and stated that he considers Israel as not belonging to the Jews (Gravé-Lazi, 2014; 
Yashar, 2014). 
 




which has shifted from encouraging critical thinking and discussion of controversial issues 
towards memorisation. Despite these concerns, the revised citizenship textbook “To be 
citizens in Israel: a Jewish and democratic state” and a pamphlet2 for the final examination 
(bagrut) were released in 2016. Academics, educators, activists and the High Court of 
Justice resisted the release of the pamphlet primarily due to the lack of recognition of 
Palestinians as a collective group and their historical existence in the land (Skop, 2016). 
 
Similar to the developments in the UK and Northern Ireland, the shift to the right in Israel 
is accompanied by a lack of support for education against racism. A report from the state 
comptroller on coexistence education argued that over the last 20 years, and mainly under 
the previous and current education ministers, the education ministry “has consciously 
chosen to bury the issue of education toward coexistence and prevention of racism” 
(Kashti, 2016:1). According to Kashti, the report also draws a connection between the 
lack of political will to fight racism and the manifestation of racist, anti-democratic and 
stereotyped views among school children.  
Across both societies, the concern emerges that citizenship education does not address 
issues of diversity, racism, sectarianism and the conflict. In contrast, the current 
educational policies might be an expression of the continuation of conflict, since they 
avoid tackling these issues, in particular in Israel, where educational policies emphasise a 
national-religious understanding of citizenship over a democratic one (Agbaria, 2016; 
Agbaria, Mustafa and Jabareen, 2015; Pinson, 2013). Therefore, it is not surprising that 
some researchers expressed scepticism about the potential of citizenship education to 
contribute to conflict transformation. They suggest that citizenship education is permeated 
by an avoidance or censorship of discussing alternative narratives about the conflict. For 
example, Nets-Zehngut, Pliskin and Bar-Tal (2015) found that members of institutions in 
Israel that provide educational historical resources self-censor themselves from providing 
more accurate and alternative narratives about the conflict that might challenge the 
                                                             
2 The process of drafting the new textbook and booklet for the civics matriculation examination did 
not include any Arab-Palestinian experts. The contributions by those experts who intended to 
strengthen democratic education were eventually removed or changed, which led some of the authors 
to demand their names to be removed (Hai, 2016; Newman, 2016). 




dominant mainstream narrative. Similarly, Cohen (unpublished) argued in a recent study 
that teachers tend to avoid controversial public issues due to a culture of fear that has been 
heightened by the case of Adam Verta. According to Cohen, this culture refers to the fear 
of losing the job, of not fulfilling the school's expectations, of social isolation and 
sanctions due to being considered disloyal. In Northern Ireland, McEvoy (2007) warned 
that the citizenship curriculum leaves schools and teachers at liberty to decide whether to 
address controversial aspects of the conflict and sectarianism. This concern was further 
reinforced by research conducted by Loader and Hughes (2017) who found that 
controversial issues related to the conflict or discrimination are avoided in Shared 
Education programmes3. 
 
In general, research across conflict-affected societies has raised concerns that citizenship 
and peace education can do more harm than good, if it serves to cover-up structural 
violence, racism and sectarianism (Bekerman and Zembylas, 2012; Davies, 2005; 
Gilborn, 2006). These findings point to two major issues: firstly, citizenship education is 
at risk of being permeated by avoidance and censorship of controversial but important 
issues. Secondly, the vacuum that is created through sidestepping might be exploited by 
identity politics that draws on nationalist and religious ideologies to promote particular 
political interests that are not countered or challenged.   
 
In the light of these concerns, there is a need to investigate processes of avoidance and 
censorship in greater depth by tracing the impact of educational policies on citizenship 
education in schools and classrooms. This study seeks to address the gap in current 
research about citizenship education in conflict-affected societies, by looking at how 
citizenship is practised in the classroom by teachers and students in these societies. The 
ongoing tensions in Northern Ireland and Israel as well as recent political developments 
that manifest racism and sectarianism as serious problems demonstrate the importance of 
researching the relationship between identity politics and citizenship education.  
                                                             
3 Shared education (SE) is a cross-community education policy that became statutory in 2016. Its 
purpose is to facilitate relationship building and collaboration between schools and teachers from 
different communities.   




To explore this relationship between citizenship education and identity in policies, 
schools, and classrooms practices, the thesis draws on a theoretical framework bringing 
together (neo)-Marxist, post-colonialist and critical pedagogical approaches. Critical 
literature in the field of education, political theory and cultural studies provides a lens that 
can shed light on the complex relationship between identity and citizenship education 
because it focuses on deeper, structural issues. The theoretical framework is mainly guided 
by Gramsci’s theoretical concept of cultural hegemony that situates citizenship education 
and identity in the context of power structures. Critical educators (Apple, 2004; Freire, 
1970; Giroux, 1997; 1980; Ladson-Billings, 1996) also refer to the work of post-
colonialists to explain the connection between identity and education. For example, Banks 
(2004) argued that citizenship education tends to foreground majority group interests, 
identities, cultures and narratives while it omits those of minorities. Similarly, Giroux 
(1980; 1984) and Apple (2004) warned that cultural hegemony dominates through the 
curriculum by preserving the cultural capital of socio-economic elites. These processes 
are at risk to undermine education against racism (Banks, 2008; Gilborn, 2004) and critical 
pedagogy (Giroux, 1997). Drawing on this critical literature facilitates a deeper structural 
understanding of the relationship between identity and citizenship education in conflict-
affected societies. Moreover, this theoretical framework provides explanations for the 
recent political developments, which indicate a failure of educational policies to address 
structural racism and sectarianism as well as to confront students with more balanced and 
complex understandings of the conflict. 
 
Therefore, the thesis sets as its research objectives: to establish how cultural hegemony, 
framed as identity politics and neoliberalism is mediated through educational policies; to 
describe how citizenship is taught and understood in different classrooms; to analyse how 
contested issues related to the conflict and identity are addressed and finally to compare 
the challenges for citizenship education in the context of a conflict-ridden society (Israel) 
to a post-conflict society (Northern Ireland).  
The study is driven by three research questions: firstly, it seeks to investigate how this 
theoretical framework applies in the context of citizenship education in Northern Ireland 




and Israel, by looking at how cultural hegemony manifests itself in educational policies, 
schools and classrooms. Secondly, it compares the context of two different schools in each 
society that constitute the largest cultural or national groups in each country, which 
represent also the main groups affected by the conflict. This comparison facilitates an 
exploration of how different groups respond to cultural hegemony and how they construct 
identity, citizenship and the conflict. Thirdly, the literature referred to earlier suggests that 
citizenship education can only have a limited impact on conflict transformation. The thesis 
further examines if and how citizenship education can counter the continuation of conflict.  
Since the main focus of the study is to explore structures and processes, it uses a qualitative 
approach (Bryman, 2012), by conducting a comparative case study of four schools in 
Northern Ireland and Israel (Catholic, Protestant, Jewish-Israeli and Arab-Palestinian). 
For the purpose of triangulation, I decided to use a multi-method approach (Flick, 2014), 
which combines individual interviews; focus group interviews, observations and 
documentary analysis. The literature on qualitative research emphasised the importance 
of reflexivity and self-positioning on part of the researcher (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011; 
Harding, 1987; Lincoln and Guba, 2000). The motivation to embark on this study emerged 
from the experiences I have gained in a previous research project with citizenship teachers 
in Israel and a long-term interest in conflict transformation across different societies. The 
fact that I am an outsider in both Northern Ireland and Israel (despite having lived for 
more than two years in both countries) has influenced the conduct and analysis of the 
research. Therefore, I have dedicated a detailed section in the methodology about my 
personal background, my experiences and relationships with the participants in both 
contexts. Being an outsider has meant not only to become familiar with the research topic 
in different contexts but also to experience and learn about two societies that I did not 
grow up in. While the outsider role has posed various challenges along the journey, 
perhaps it has also contributed fresh insights and a different perspective to the research.  
The major contribution of the thesis is that it investigates the practice of citizenship 
education in different classrooms in conflict-affected societies, by drawing on the critical 
literature about identity and citizenship education that focuses on structural issues and by 
being attentive to the particularities of each context.  




The thesis starts by introducing the reader to the two contexts of Northern Ireland and 
Israel. It provides a brief discussion of the conflict and dominant political ideologies that 
underpin it, the education systems in both societies and the educational policies in the field 
of citizenship education. The goal is to show how citizenship education and the education 
system are affected and structured by the legacy of the conflict. After defining the 
challenges of citizenship education in these societies, the second Chapter outlines the 
theoretical framework of cultural hegemony, identity, citizenship, and citizenship 
education. Whilst different theoretical approaches to identity and citizenship are 
discussed, the thesis’ framework is primarily influenced by (neo)-Marxist approaches, 
post-colonial understandings of identity and critical pedagogy. This frame gives rise to 
the research questions that examine how cultural hegemony is expressed through the 
curriculum, how different schools respond to educational policies and finally how 
citizenship education can contribute to conflict transformation. The Methodology Chapter 
outlines the conduct of the study, accompanied by a reflection on my background and its 
impact on the findings. Finally, Chapter four and five discuss the data, presenting the two 
major themes of avoidance and censoring in citizenship education in each society and how 
each school (Catholic, Protestant, Arab-Palestinian, and Jewish-Israeli) 4  responds to 
cultural hegemony. The thesis closes with a concluding Chapter that links the findings to 




                                                             
4 In the remainder of the thesis the communities will be referred to as ‘Catholic’ and ‘Protestant’, ‘Arab-
Palestinian’ and ‘Jewish-Israeli’ since this is how members of both communities that I have encountered 
during the study tended to identify themselves first and foremost. While I am aware that the participants 
might view themselves in a plurality of different identities, the focus of this study on citizenship and the 
conflict singles out these identities as the most relevant or dominant ones.  
 




CHAPTER 1: CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN NORTHERN 




The thesis starts with an introduction to the two contexts, in which the study is situated. 
Both societies, Northern Ireland and Israel are characterised by a legacy of violence and 
conflict that continues to endure. Identity politics, fuelled by internal and external 
interests, left their marks on both societies, which share a history of colonialization by 
European imperial powers (see for example McGarry and O’Leary, 2004; Ruane and 
Todd, 1996; Yiftachel, 1999). At the centre of the conflict in both societies remain 
different narratives and claims of ownership of the land, belonging, and self-
determination.  
Since the definitions of citizenship and citizenship education in each of these societies 
pose questions related to identity, it is not surprising that citizenship education is a 
complicated and controversial matter. The purpose of this Chapter is to outline the central 
issues that emerge in citizenship education in these societies by introducing the reader to 
the settings, their historical development with a focus on charting the emergence of 
conflict as well as the development of education systems and citizenship education 
policies. The Chapter depicts the historical and current role of the education systems and 
their policies as a response to conflict and identity. It is argued that in both societies 
identity politics shapes explanations and understandings of the conflict, citizenship and 
belonging. This has implications of how the conflict is addressed in the political discourse 
and educational policies. In both countries, separate education systems have developed 
with the consequence that there is only limited exposure to narratives, identities and views 
of the other community or/and minorities.  
In Northern Ireland, this issue has been partly addressed by contact initiatives, but it is 
argued that these educational approaches focus on cultural-psychological and ethnic 
explanations of the conflict. They do not sufficiently address structures of inequality and 




sectarianism that have sustained the conflict. In Israel, encounters between Jewish-Israelis 
and Arab-Palestinians students based on contact theory have been hardly encouraged by 
official educational policies. Yet, these encounters are criticised on the same grounds by 
the literature, claiming that they fail to introduce participants to structural explanations of 
the conflict.  
In both countries, the citizenship curricula represent a more structural approach since they 
provide opportunities to address the political and historical context of the conflict. 
However, the Chapter concludes by raising concerns that the citizenship curricula in both 
contexts can provide an educational response to the conflict and the issues that sustain it.  
NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
While the purpose of this thesis is not to discuss and analyse the origins and reasons of 
the conflict in Northern Ireland, the conflict plays an important part in shaping the 
understandings of citizenship and identity in post-conflict Northern Ireland. The recent 
violent political conflict lasted for thirty years, during which about 3,700 people were 
killed and many more injured. The transition to a more peaceful society was marked by 
the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, which was negotiated between different political 
parties as well as the governments of Ireland and the United Kingdom. It succeeded a 
peace process that began in the early 1990s, accompanied by a ceasefire in 1994. The 
Agreement defines the constitutional status of citizenship in Northern Ireland, as it states 
to 
recognise the birth right of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify 
themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose, 
and accordingly confirm that their right to hold both British and Irish citizenship 
is accepted by both Governments and would not be affected by any future change 
in the status of Northern Ireland. (The Agreement 1998, Article 1 (4)) 




As a consequence, Morrow (2017) has argued that after the Good Friday Agreement 
citizenship in Northern Ireland offers “national identity as a matter of choice between 
equals rather than sacred obligation” (p.110), referring to the typical understanding of 
nationalistic citizenship as an obligation towards the sacred authority of the state and 
breaking the traditional link between territorial sovereignty and citizenship. Thus, 
citizenship in Northern Ireland is not linked to the territory itself but rather to a community 
of choice, which is a result of the historical legacy of the conflict.  
There are different perspectives on the causes for the violent conflict: a cultural-
psychological or ethnic explanation that focuses on the divisions between Catholic and 
Protestant communities (Connor, 1994; see Ruane and Todd, 1996; 2005 for more 
examples) and a structural explanation that focuses on political and economic inequalities 
as the root of the conflict. Ruane and Todd (1996) argued rightfully that these explanations 
are interwoven since communal divisions are shaped by actual structural experiences of 
access to political and economic goods. Yet, without considering the structural dimension 
of the conflict, the ethnic or cultural-psychological explanation is simplified to an inherent 
antagonism and “otherness” of Northern Ireland, which the British press described as “an 
incomprehensible “religious war” between remnant “Catholics and Protestants” (Morrow, 
2017:107). Instead, the communal divisions need to be understood against the background 
of the political context, Britain’s imperial interests, and policies as well as Irish resistance 
and nationalism. Fulton (1991) maintained that whereas the early tensions between the 
two communities on the island were shaped by economics between dominant feudal lords 
and the natives, religion became more and more a political force and ideology to justify 
control and superiority over the other community. The following two sections trace back 
the development of each community’s identity in relation to political and economic 
interests.  
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROTESTANT IDENTITY: FROM DOMINATION TO CRISIS? 
 
Ireland was Britain’s first colony, stretching back to the reign of Elizabeth I when Britain 
sought to control the island to serve its imperial and economic interests (Clayton, 1998; 
Miller, 1998). Part of this control was exercised through the establishment of colonies and 




‘plantation’ on land that was confiscated from the native people on the island (Clayton, 
1998), with the goal to outnumber the natives with settlers from England and Scotland, 
who were loyal to the Crown (Buckland, 1981). As in other colonies, the colonisation of 
Ireland was justified on grounds of civilising a pagan (although Roman Catholic) and 
culturally inferior people (Clayton, 1998); refusing to become loyalist Protestants as the 
Tudors envisioned (O’Leary and McGarry, 1993)5. Religion was and would remain an 
important marker of difference since it was connected to political status on the island 
(O’Leary and McGarry, 1993).  
Protestants from different denominations formed the social, economic and political elite 
in Ireland until the early 20th century (Buckland, 1981). Increasingly, Protestant religion 
became associated (although not exclusively) with an elite settler society on the one hand, 
and Catholic religion with a marginalised native population on the other. During the 
plantation of Ulster, this settler society adhered to a civic unionism that constructed itself 
as civilised, liberal and tolerant (Nic Craith, 2003), as “agents of civilization as well as the 
true Christians” (Fulton, 1991:33). It promoted the idea that the British colonial 
intervention has brought prosperity and modernity to an economically backward Ulster 
and claimed that Ireland has benefited in general from this intervention (Buckland, 1981). 
British identity is seen by unionists6 as a political identity, threatened in an environment 
of the cultural particularity of an Irish national state and the possibility of an Irish-
nationalist takeover (Nic Craith, 2003). Thus, there was (and remains) a sense of 
precariousness inherent in this identity, which also explains the opposition of some 
unionists to the idea of Ireland as a separate historic nation (Buckland, 1981).  
With the Home Rule debate, unionists’ fear of losing their political power as well as their 
civil and religious liberties increased (Buckland, 1981). Thus, they raised awareness for a 
strategic need for unity in terms of political power to control the Catholic minority in 
                                                             
5 It also needs to be noted that settlements took place long before the ‘plantation’ of the 17th century, when 
Scottish and English settlers came to Ireland autonomously (Clayton, 1998; O’Leary and McGarry, 1993). 
6 According to Fulton (1991), it needs to be noted that the Protestant planters were not a cohesive group 
since they consisted of different religious sects.  While these sects had their internal disputes, they were 
united by their class interest, because the loss of the land to Ireland would have meant the loss of their 
wealth, freedom of religion and could have been paid with the price of their lives (Fulton, 1991). 




Ulster (O’Leary and McGarry, 1993). Since the support from London became increasingly 
fragile and Home Rule more probable, Protestants realised that they would need to sustain 
their dominance from within (Fulton, 1991). While the Protestant gentry could identify 
with the British nation through their class and status, Protestant working classes were 
increasingly alienated and experienced insecurity in the capitalist system, being left 
without a strong sense of national identity (Ruane and Todd, 1996). Yet, according to 
Ruane and Todd (1996), they were integrated through the ideologies of orangeism7, 
loyalism and unionism as bearers of identity and religion. Fulton (1991) further outlined 
that a Protestant culture developed, based on traditional values, annual celebrations that 
connected past events with contemporary problems (for example through marches) and 
with the goal to protect the economic interests of the working class, by defending British 
imperialism. 
After partition, the northern state was founded through an alliance between the British 
imperial interests and Protestant-loyalists, who wanted to preserve their status quo as 
ruling class and as a religious majority, in the face of being a minority on the island of 
Ireland (Fulton, 1991). The policies that served to maintain the subordination of the 
Catholic population were the abolishment of proportional representation in elections, 
gerrymandering of electoral boundaries, a police force dominated by Protestants from the 
former Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) 8  and special police powers such as detention 
without trial (Hewitt, 1981; 1983; O’Hearn, 1983; O’Leary and McGarry, 1993). Through 
these strategies, the unionist party consolidated its domination and emerged as the central 
political organisation in the northern state, which was characterised by the 
institutionalisation of discrimination between Protestants and Catholics in terms of 
housing, wealth, employment and political opportunities (Fulton, 1991).  
                                                             
7 Orangeism refers to the political ideology and culture of the orange order, viewed by some 
Protestants as a unifying guardian of the different Protestant denominations and defending 
Protestant superiority (McKittrick and McVea, 2012). On the island of Ireland, orangeism is 
associated with unionism, a political ideology that promotes the union with Britain.  
8 The UVF forms a loyalist paramilitary group that was involved in armed campaigns during “the 
Troubles”. It is named after the former UVF, which was founded in 1912 in opposition to Home rule.  
 




During the peace process in Northern Ireland, the unionist community reacted to the Irish 
cultural revival movement with their own cultural reflection (McCall, 2002). Unionism 
has not embraced a form of nationalism, other than their citizenship affiliation with 
Britain, which connected to an “imagined community” (Anderson, 2006/1983) of Great 
Britain. Moreover, in the aftermath of the suspension of the Stormont government in 19729 
and the various agreements between the British and Irish governments, the dissolution of 
Northern Ireland from the UK became possible, in the case of sufficient democratic 
support for reunification. Thus, it was seen as vital by many unionists to portray their 
culture as distinct, to claim recognition for the Ulster-British cultural identity, which 
rested on the pillars of Britishness, orangeism, and Protestantism (McCall, 2002; Nic 
Craith 2003; Porter 1998).  
For many Protestants, their political identity is expressed through their allegiance to 
British citizenship (Nic Craith, 2003). Yet, since it is no longer Britain’s interest to secure 
Northern Ireland as part of the union, this association is challenged, leaving Protestant-
loyalists in a post-colonial phase, in search for an identity that justifies their past 
dominance and their belonging in the North (Fulton, 1991).   
Related to this, there has been a growing concern about the underachievement of young 
Protestant men from a working-class background, which has largely been ignored by 
mainstream unionism (McManus, 2015). Following McManus, the fear that 
“transformation” could imply “Catholic empowerment” has led unionist leaders to hold 
on to traditional values, such as loyalty, orangeism and conservative ideals regarding the 
social order. He claims that this has a negative impact on the educational achievement of 
Protestant working-class youth. While middle-class Protestants continue to benefit from 
academic selection and educational achievement has been comparatively more important 
in Catholic communities, Protestant working-class communities have not witnessed such 
a trend (McManus, 2015). These communities also continue to be affected by paramilitary 
violence, since these groups have retained a stronghold in some Protestant, working-class 
                                                             
9 The government in Stormont was suspended by the British Prime Minister in 1972, who replaced it 
with direct rule, following the events of Bloody Sunday and increasing violence between the two 
communities.  




areas, where many people feel threatened by the paramilitaries who “police” these 
neighbourhoods and engage in territorial battles over criminal activities such as drug 
dealing (Knox, 2002). It is argued that while political leaders generally denounced 
paramilitary violence, at times they were also ambivalent towards it, exploiting tensions 
and hostility within the community as a political strategy (Jarman, 2004; Shirlow and 
McEvoy, 2008). Murtagh (2018) claimed that “ethno-religious differences are also 
socially constructed, driven by economic-political interests that are expressed through 
petty ethnocracy, resource competition and formal and informal policing. Some members 
of the communities also support paramilitaries’ punishments as a way of policing, when 
they do not trust the police to deal with the disorder (Jarman, 2004). According to Jarman, 
this ambivalence towards violence, practised by the political elite and communities 
trickles down to the young people from working-class communities, who tend to be either 
recruited by the paramilitaries or to rebel against them. This achievement gap and 
disillusionment by the peace process make conflict transformation in these communities 
a complicated endeavour.  
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CATHOLIC IDENTITY: FROM DISCRIMINATION TO RESISTANCE 
 
The land expropriation by the settlers left the Gaelic natives in inferior positions, 
essentialising their characteristics in terms of land, class, status, and religion. A prominent 
example of the segregation and oppression of the natives in the settlements are the ‘penal 
laws ‘, which excluded Catholics from religious, social and political establishments 
(O’Leary and McGarry, 1993). In the 18th and 19th century, social mobility among 
Catholics remained blocked by ethno-religious discrimination, yet the Gaelic revival and 
the grievances of the famine among other reasons contributed to the emergence of Irish 
nationalism both in a militant and parliamentary form (O’Leary and McGarry, 1993).  
As part of the general emergence of nationalism across Europe, a national identity grew 
also among the lower classes on the island of Ireland through education (Fulton, 1991). 
Irish nationalism constitutes the Gaelic-Irish people as a nation that is native to the island 




of Ireland and it is based on a nationalist-republican10 and Catholic ideology11, presenting 
an ethnocentric view of history and claim to ownership of the island (Fulton, 1991). Irish 
nationalism developed as a resistance identity under British colonial rule, demanding self-
government from Britain and being concerned about the territorial unity of Ireland 
(Buckland, 1981). While its emergence led in the South to the events of the Easter rising12 
and eventually to the Irish war of independence and the partition of the island, it 
established the Catholic population in the North as a national minority under the rule of 
the Protestant-loyalists (Fulton, 1991). The government in Northern Ireland ruled 
autonomously over law and order, as the Irish Free State was excluded and the British 
withdrew their power deliberatively because it would serve them to blank out the Irish 
question from their own politics in Westminster (O’Leary and McGarry, 1993). The 
legitimacy of the state remained one-sided and constituted itself on the premise of 
Protestant majority rule as a form of hegemonic control (O’Leary and McGarry, 1993), 
underpinned by policies which discriminated directly and indirectly against Catholics in 
realms of housing, employment, political rights and representation as well as the treatment 
by an exclusively Protestant police force (Darby, 1995; McKittrick and McVea, 2012). 
Thus, the nationalist movement kept their focus on injustice, although the commitment to 
cultural nationalism and Irishness associated with the Irish reunification of the Irish nation 
remained a central aspect. Republicans, however, concentrated on the reunification and 
highlighted the importance of territory for the Irish nation and the connection to the land 
(Nic Craith, 2003). 
In their resistance, Catholics hoped for a collapse of the dominance of the unionists in 
Northern Ireland, boycotting its institutions and its leaders (Buckland, 1981). Yet, their 
                                                             
10 Republican nationalism refers to the political ideology of forming a republican nation-state as a political 
entity that is ruled by its citizens through popular sovereignty. This means in the case of Ireland rule by its 
citizens as opposed to British rule (see for example Ward, 2015). 
11 Fulton (1991) has argued that the Catholic or religious aspect of this identity has remained dominant, due 
to the historical links between religion and politics, which have influenced political Catholicism as well as 
Protestantism on the island of Ireland. During times of oppression in Ireland, the church often provided the 
only refuge for Catholics from lower classes, as well as a sense of identity and a form of “spiritual 
leadership” (Fulton, 1991:113). 
12 The events of the Easter rising in 1916 marked an uprising against British rule in Ireland, becoming the 
first stage of the war of independence, which eventually led to the partition of the island of Ireland in 1921.  




political marginalisation left them without means of appeal against discrimination within 
the political institutions (McKittrick and McVea, 2012). Catholic resistance took different 
forms, with the Catholic working-class developing an increasing political awareness in 
the face of violent clashes accompanied by political demonstrations (Buckland, 1981). 
Furthermore, the civil rights movement, spearheaded by the Catholic middle-class and 
students developed the slogan of “equal citizenship”, inspired by the rhetoric of other civil 
rights movements (O’Leary and McGarry, 1993).  While the Social, Democratic and 
Labour Party (SDLP) rejected the notion of an exclusive identity for a nation and 
demanded recognition of the Irish national identity by the British state, Republicans 
conceptualised nationalism through notions of ethnicity and formed their response to the 
inequalities in the north as part of the strategy of reunification (Nic Craith, 2003). 
Additionally, some republicans, such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA 13 ) saw 
reunification achieved through violent means (Nic Craith, 2003); justified as a legitimate 
war against an oppressor, partly portraying Protestant-loyalists as “foreigners with an alien 
culture, and as either a pariah group - the mere instrument of British imperialism – or 
simply not there. Their culture as no rights and no claim to an alternative identity.” 
(Fulton, 1991:104). 
During the peace process and political transformations, the Catholic community largely 
embraced political developments and cultural revival as a means of detaching itself from 
the stigma of an oppressed minority (Nic Craith, 2003). Even predating the agreement, 
Catholics have benefitted from the reforms that were introduced under the pressure from 
the Republic of Ireland and the United States, which allowed them to manifest a better 
political and socio-economic position (Ruane and Todd, 1996). Due to the difficulties in 
finding employment, many young Catholics have strived towards higher education as a 
route out of poverty (Breen, 2001; McManus, 2015). Similar to the loyalist paramilitaries, 
republican paramilitaries continue to police certain working-class neighbourhoods in 
Belfast, controlling “anti-social behaviour” of young people, who are involved in criminal 
                                                             
13 The Irish Republican Army or the Provisional Irish Republican Army is an armed movement that set at 
its goals the end of British rule on the island of Ireland, to establish an Irish republic and finally the 
reunification of Ireland.  




activities such as car theft, joyriding, vandalising etc., which is discounted by the IRA as 
a distraction from the “republican struggle” (Knox, 2002: 176). Knox noted that on both 
sides, paramilitaries take on the role of an alternative justice system, switching between 
the role of 'protector' and 'oppressor'. It is argued that this toleration of low-level violence 
is part of the political responses to the conflict (Jarman, 2004; 2016; Knox, 2002). The 
next section outlines these political responses, such as the community relations approach 
(McEvoy et al., 2006), which has influenced the current position of Catholics and 
Protestant communities in Northern Ireland. 
 
POLICY RESPONSES TO THE CONFLICT: PEACE AT WHAT PRICE? 
 
Efforts to improve the relationship between the two communities in Northern Ireland were 
already initiated during the outbreak of the recent violent conflict. In 1969, the 
Community Relations Act was launched, promoting an agenda based on the paradigm of 
‘community relations’ inspired by existing policies in Britain on racial disharmony (Frazer 
and Fitzduff, 1994). The community relations policy in Northern Ireland referred to the 
aims of increasing contact between Catholics and Protestants, ensuring equal treatment 
and opportunities, promoting mutual understanding and respect for different cultures and 
traditions (Hughes and Donnelly, 2004). McVeigh (2002) criticised the community 
relations approach because it fosters the notion that the conflict emerged between two 
rival communities, constructs symmetry between the Protestant and Catholic violence and 
portrays the Northern Irish state as a neutral arbiter, ignoring its role during the conflict. 
McEvoy et al. (2006) explained that community relations policies focused on improving 
contact and tolerance between the two communities but did not address equality reforms 
and persistent human rights issues. Policies of normalisation, criminalisation, and 
ulsterisation14 directed the focus towards social and economic issues, glossing over the 
                                                             
14 Ulsterisation refers to one aspect of the three-part policy of normalisation and criminalisation on part of 
the British government during “the Troubles”. Ulsterisation implied the devolution of security and policy to 
local forces such as the local Royal Ulster Constabulary or Ulster Defence Regiment and to increasingly 
disengage the British army from Northern Ireland (Flackes and Elliott, 1989). 




political character of the paramilitary activities by concentrating on the nature of their 
activities as criminal (McEvoy et al., 2006).  
A similar agenda was promoted through the Anglo-Irish agreement, signed in 1985 
between the Irish and the British government, establishing a blurry commitment to 
reconciliation and to achieve peace by renouncing violence (Morrow, 2017). Morrow 
pointed out that the concept of reconciliation, imposed by the Irish and British government 
also meant a denationalisation of the conflict by backgrounding the unresolved political 
issues related to the national identity of the country. Thus, these critical political issues 
also remained the most contentious during the negotiations of the 1998 agreement, 
referring to the disarmament of paramilitary organisations, the release of political 
prisoners, policing and the acknowledgement of the victims (Morrow, 2017). McEvoy et 
al. (2006) argued that reconciliation has been successful in a sense that it has reduced the 
level of violence, but it has become synonymous with the term of ‘community relations’. 
According to McEvoy et al., the promotion of “reconciliation” was also shaped by the 
intent of the British government and liberal unionists to gain support from more moderate 
Catholic-nationalists by marginalising support for more extreme republicans such as the 
IRA.  
In the peace negotiations, the British government presented itself as an “honest broker” 
(p.184) and saw its main strategy as encouraging the rival communities to cooperate, 
which also later generated international acceptance of the British intervention (O’Leary 
and McGarry, 1993). Yet, O’Leary and McGarry (1993) maintained that Britain’s self-
proclaimed neutrality is questioned by the involvement of the British Army in the events 
of ‘Bloody Sunday,’ the internment policies and the Hunger Strikes, as the security 
measures were mainly directed towards the Irish minority, which protested against British 
rule. For both the British and Irish government, the reconciliation rhetoric provided a 
comfortable position since it located the problem inside of Northern Ireland and 
independent from their own position and past involvement (Morrow, 2017).  
Related to this policy response in narrowing the causes of the divisions between the 
communities to sectarianism and individual prejudice (McEvoy et al., 2006), the colonial 




legacy is often omitted in academic representations of Northern Ireland, portraying the 
conflict as ethnic, and Northern Ireland as uncivilised and backward (Miller, 1998). This 
focus on identity politics has served to mask the responsibility of the state, both in Britain 
and Northern Ireland for acts of violence and oppression (McEvoy et al., 2006; McVeigh, 
2002; Miller, 1998).  
Thus, three elements dominate political responses to the conflict in Northern Ireland: first, 
the promotion of the image of Britain as a ‘neutral’ actor hides its past colonial interests 
and involvement in violence and oppression (McVeigh, 2002; Miller, 1998). Second, by 
ignoring the historical power asymmetry between the two communities in Northern 
Ireland, it delegitimises to an extent the claims to equality by the Catholic community, 
whose history of oppression is not adequately thematised (McVeigh, 2002). 
Consequently, locating the conflict within the paradigm of community divisions and 
reconciliation glosses over its political character (McEvoy et al., 2006). Morrow (2017) 
stated that the political parties, which represent both communities in Northern Ireland, are 
appealing to “particular narratives of crime and heroism” (p.116), creating a “moral 
economy” (p.116) for themselves, which they are afraid of losing in the face of legal 
processes and investigations or future truth commissions. Third, instead of supporting a 
real investigation of the past, dealing with unresolved issues and questions of guilt and 
victimhood, the political elite in Northern Ireland seems to prefer reproducing a “culture 
of accusation and counteraccusation” (Morrow, 2017:116). 
The history of Northern Ireland exemplifies that identity formations cannot be discussed 
without their connection to power.  Analysing these identities apart from the context of 
power relations, as it is done by the ethnic-conflict paradigm (see Miller, 1998 for 
critique), also essentialises identities. For example, it distracts from the fact that the 
oppression of the Catholic population was facilitated through a repressive state apparatus, 
by problematising Protestant and unionist culture itself (McEvoy et al., 2006). Framing 
oppositional national identities in Northern Ireland as the root cause has led to a certain 
unease, “an implicit antipathy towards expressions of identity” (p.94), as they became 
associated with sectarianism and extremism (McEvoy et al., 2006). However, while the 




reasons for the conflict are certainly not rooted in the notion of “national identities” 
themselves, identities are highly politicised in Northern Ireland, as religious, educational 
and political establishments draw on identities and cultures to promote political interests 
in Northern Ireland (Fulton, 1991). For example, political Protestant-loyalism in Ulster 
has been shaped by a popular belief in the right to violence in order to assert the right to 
autonomy in political and religious terms and “taking the law into their own hands” 
(Fulton, 1991:107). Similarly, some Irish Catholics defend the use of violence based on 
“a just war against an oppressor” (p.129) through national liberation. Thus, while these 
different political ideologies in Northern Ireland are connected to religion, which also 
promotes non-violence, they can also be used to justify the use of violence. Yet, even 
though these identities have sometimes been framed as the core issue in the community 
relations and reconciliation paradigm, they are more accurately viewed as a political 
instrument for the masses.  
At the beginning of the Chapter, it was stated that citizenship in Northern Ireland is linked 
to the community of choice, which is a result of the legacy of the conflict and the 
subsequent peace negotiations. The recognition of both Irish and British citizenship grants 
legitimacy to both communities’ narratives. The next section will introduce the reader to 
the education system and how the political responses to the conflict have shaped 
educational policies and citizenship education.  
EDUCATION AND THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
This section looks at the education system, educational policies and the citizenship 
curriculum in Northern Ireland. It outlines how the cultural-psychological explanation of 
the conflict presented in the last section has mostly dominated educational policies and 
approaches to address the conflict in schools (McEvoy, 2007). Yet, despite its limitations 
resulting from the gap between rhetoric and reality (McEvoy, 2007), the citizenship 
curriculum has been the most promising educational response to conflict transformation 
in Northern Ireland as it was initially based on structural explanations of the conflict which 
go beyond the community relations paradigm. The section starts with sketching briefly 




the historical development of the education system in Northern Ireland and then outlines 
educational responses to conflict and their criticism. An overview of the historical 
development of the education system has the purpose to demonstrate how educational 
policies, including the citizenship curriculum, have been influenced by political interests.  
DEVELOPMENT OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
Whereas traditionally the churches largely administered education on the island of Ireland, 
in 1831 a national system of education was introduced, in co-existence with an 
intermediate, technical and private system (Dunn, 1990; McEwen and Salters, 1993). 
National education in colonial Ireland was characterised by processes of Anglicisation, 
where the British Empire sought to assert its dominance through English language 
education, imposing its understanding of ‘civilisation’ and providing the means for 
citizenship within the British Empire (Nic Craith, 2003:103).  
After partition, the new Ministry of Education in Northern Ireland established a 
committee, known as the ‘Lynn Committee’15 to report on the future of Northern Ireland’s 
education system. This Committee proposed an education system modelled on existing 
systems in England and Wales and was not sympathetic to the Irish culture (Dunn, 1990). 
Essentially, the education system envisioned was to be underpinned by a British culture: 
This culture was perceived in political terms, and it was obvious that the 
curriculum would be British in its cultural emphases, rather than Irish or 
bicultural (Dunn, 1990:58).    
Lynn’s Report informed the 1923 Education Act, which set as its goal to create a national 
education system. To achieve this, it planned to transfer gradually all primary schools 
under the control of the state, creating three different school types, which differed in the 
allocation of funding and level of control by the local authorities. This differentiation was 
based on the idea that the more control was transferred to the local authorities over the 
                                                             
15 It is important to note that the committee was dominated by Protestant and unionist representatives and 
only one Catholic representative, as the Catholic Church refused to be involved in the committee because it 
opposed many of its fundamental ideas.  




school, the more funding would be granted to the school type (Akenson, 1973; Dunn, 
1990). The 1930 Education Act further manifested the separation between the different 
school types as it accommodated the claims by the Protestant clergy for religious 
instruction in Protestant (controlled) schools and by restoring 50 percent funding to the 
Catholic (voluntary) schools, which addressed the claims by the Catholic clergy to retain 
clerical authority over their schools (McGrath, 2000). While ‘controlled’ and ‘transferred’ 
were not designated as Protestant schools in legal terms and ‘voluntary’ schools were not 
defined as Catholic schools, it was presumed by the Committee that Protestants would 
attend schools fully funded by the State and Catholics would attend schools that received 
only a proportion of state funding16 (Dunn, 1990; McEwen and Salters, 1993).  
Although a long-term struggle for equal funding and resource allocation would follow 
(Dunn and Morgan, 1999), the Catholic community in Northern Ireland, together with the 
Catholic Church managed to preserve a degree of autonomy in the field of education to 
preserve its own identity (Murray, 1985). Managed by the church and funded mainly by 
the Northern Irish government, the Catholic community developed its own scouting 
organisations, sport and social clubs, which promoted and preserved Irish culture outside 
of the schools (Fulton, 1991). McGrath (2000) argued that the upholding of autonomy for 
Catholic schools has been vital in preserving the Catholic community’s identity in terms 
of religion and Gaelic culture. Yet, keeping the autonomy and retaining a specifically 
Catholic ethos, clerical control over the schools has also meant to pay the price for unequal 
funding. Historically, the two communities’ identification with the state and its institutions 
has been different among Protestants and Catholics, since the latter tended to be suspicious 
                                                             
16 In the remainder of the thesis I will use the terms of Catholic and Protestant schools, since this is how the 
schools are perceived mainly regarding their background. In his qualitative study of the culture in separate 
schools, Murray (1985) found that the emphasis on Catholicism in Catholic schools was mainly a political 
statement, as this allies them with nationalism and in a wider sense with Catholic Ireland. Thus, the 
Protestants in his study perceived the Catholic symbols, rituals and other expressions of identity in Catholic 
schools as political. In contrast, in state controlled schools, Murray discovered that although these schools 
claim to avoid being seen as exclusively Protestant, they nonetheless reflect and reinforce values and 
attitudes of unionist culture. For example, he explained how Protestant staff at the school perceived the 
Union Jack, which was installed in front of the school as “neutral” and natural since they argued that a state 
school located in the UK would showcase the emblem of the state. Yet, for Catholics the Union Jack is 
equated with Britishness and thus Protestantism and as result they perceive this school as Protestant 
(Murray, 1985).  




and resentful towards the Northern Ireland government, which did not value their 
identities and political aspirations (Murray, 1985). Consequently, Murray (1985) 
described in his study that the Protestant school fostered close relationships and a positive 
attitude towards the Department of Education (DE), whereas the Catholic school 
perceived the Department less as a support system, but rather as an outsider or opposition 
and resented its interference in the affairs of the school.  
However, since 1993 Catholic and Protestant schools in Northern Ireland are equally 
funded by the state, signalling a better relationship between the church and the state. The 
1993 order eliminated the voluntary contribution, while some Protestant and Catholic 
post-primary selective schools contribute 15 percent funding in return for some 
independence (McGrath, 2000). As part of the 1993 order there was a Schedule 1 
agreement between the Church and the Department of Education that in return for a 
governor nominated by the DE on their board, the Church would receive 100 percent 
funding for Catholic schools in the primary and non-selective post-primary sector.  
The separate school system continues to exist in Northern Ireland, securing each 
communities’ and clergy’s control over their schools through separate management 
boards17.  
The Good Friday Agreement included a range of rights or protections that relate to 
collective rights, such as the insurance of proportionality in political representation, the 
protection from discrimination in employment, the right to hold either Irish or British 
citizenship, and the recognition of the importance of minority languages and cultures 
(Gilbert et al., 1998; Jenkins, 2006). Based on the latter, the Agreement has further 
facilitated the increase in integrated and Irish-medium schools, as the respective political 
parties have committed themselves to encourage and facilitate these forms of education 
(Northern Ireland office, 1998). The first Irish-medium school was already established in 
1971, despite reservations by the government, which opposed exclusive instruction in 
                                                             
17 The Council for Catholic Maintained Schools (CCMS) is the managing and employing authority for non-
selective primary and post-primary Catholic schools, while Protestant schools are managed by the Education 
Authority. Representatives from Transferors Representative Council (TRC) are nominated for the Boards 
of Governors of the Education Authority.  




Irish and having to compensate for its own funding. In 1983, the DE started to allocate 
grant-aid status to Irish-medium schools (O’Coinn, 2006). Since then the number of 
schools has increased to 29 and a recent review of the state of Irish-medium education has 
recommended to continue developing Irish-medium post-primary education, which has 
been accepted and endorsed by policymakers (DE, 2014). 
The movement “All children together” emerged initially as a parental initiative with a 
vision of mixed-schooling (Dunn, 1990). The initiative opened the first integrated school, 
Lagan College in 1981 itself (Dunn, 1990; Dunn and Morgan, 1999). In 1989, integrated 
schooling 18  was officially recognised 19  and a legal duty was placed on the DE to 
encourage and facilitate the opening of integrated schools, to encourage their 
establishment through funding and, to help existing schools to transfer to integrated status 
(Dunn and Morgan, 1999). Nevertheless, the integrated sector educates only a small 
proportion of children in Northern Ireland’s education system: by and large, Catholics 
attend Catholic-maintained schools, managed by the Catholic Church and Protestants 
attend state-controlled schools, apart from a small integrated sector that caters for five to 
10 percent of the population (DE, 2013/2014).  
 
 
EDUCATION POLICY RESPONSES TO THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
In the section about the historical development of the conflict it was claimed that there are 
two different kinds of explanations of the conflict, a cultural-psychological or ethnic 
explanation, and a structural explanation (see page 14; Ruane and Todd, 1996). It will be 
argued that some educational responses such as contact initiatives, integrated schools, and 
                                                             
18 The criteria for integrated schools in terms of religious balance are that they must attract eventually 30 
per cent of the students from the minority community (Protestant or Catholic) in the respective area (DE, 
2018). 
19 The movement was successful in pressuring to pass an amendment of the 1972 Education and Library 
Board Order to allow a new school type of ‘Controlled Integrated Schools’. However, due to the lack of 
action on the side of the state, they were forced to open the first integrated school themselves funded by 
charities, foundations and individuals (Dunn, 1990; Dunn and Morgan, 1999). 




Shared Education are based on a conceptualisation of the conflict that is weighted towards 
viewing sectarianism primarily as a result of the lack of contact between the two 
communities and individual prejudice. In contrast, curricular initiatives such as Education 
for Mutual Understanding (EMU) and Local and Global Citizenship (LGC) intended to 
provide a more structural explanation of the conflict, by embedding the conflict and 
sectarianism in its politico-historical context and providing young people with a better 
understanding of the conflict and the ‘other’ community. Yet, it will also be argued that 
there is a danger that these educational responses are diluted, leaving schools and teachers 
at liberty to address controversial but important aspects of the conflict and sectarianism 
(McEvoy, 2007). 
 
CONTACT INITIATIVES, INTEGRATED SCHOOLS, AND SHARED EDUCATION 
 
The separated nature of the education system raised concerns about the lack of contact 
between the different communities and influenced the emergence of inter-group initiatives 
that sought to facilitate contact between Protestant and Catholic children and young people 
(Dunn and Morgan, 1999). Contact initiatives emerged in the 1970s and were influenced 
by the theoretical debates on the ‘contact hypothesis’ (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998), 
undertaken by non-state actors until they were institutionalised through the Schools 
Community Relations Programme (SCRP), funded by the Department of Education 
(Arlow, 2002). Even though researchers found generally a positive impact of these 
initiatives, they argued that the term community relations remained vague to most pupils 
and perceived the programme as being mainly about school trips (O’Connor et al., 2003).  
Both types of initiatives, contact schemes between different schools and integrated 
schooling, were later recognised through the 1989 Education Order (Dunn and Morgan, 
1999). The debate between the proponents of integrated education, who demand that the 
state should invest in integrated schooling and those in favour of contact schemes between 
separate schools in the form of shared education remained (Smith, 2014). Recently, the 
attention of policymakers has shifted towards shared education (Hughes, 2014). In 2015, 




the Department of Education introduced a policy for shared education20, which passed 
legislation in 2016, providing a statutory definition of ‘Shared education’21. The purpose 
of Shared Education is “to deliver educational benefits to children and young persons; to 
promote the efficient and effective use of resources; to promote equality of opportunity; 
to promote good relations; and to promote respect of identity, diversity and community 
cohesion.” (NI assembly, 2016:1). It is argued that Shared Education can facilitate 
relationship building and collaboration between schools and teachers that allows the 
sharing of resources and addresses to some extent the separate nature of education in 
Northern Ireland (Gallagher, 2016; Loader and Hughes, 2017). However, research by 
Loader and Hughes (2017) on existing shared education initiatives demonstrated that more 
controversial issues related to discrimination and conflict tend to be avoided for the sake 
of keeping the “fragile harmony” (p.128).  
Since the 1970s debates around whether the separate school system has contributed to a 
misunderstanding between the communities and reinforced community divisions (Dunn 
and Smith, 1995) have gained momentum. Yet, in-depth research has demonstrated that 
issues around identity and difference are rarely discussed in integrated schools (Donnelly, 
2004a; 2004b; 2008; Donnelly and Hughes, 2006). Donnelly’s research documents a 
culture of sidestepping or silence in integrated schools, where teachers are reluctant to 
address controversial issues about identity and focus on preserving a harmonious 
environment. She argued that apparent harmonious relationships between different groups 
in integrated schools are uncritically taken as evidence that these schools promote 
tolerance and mutual understanding. Thus, the educational approaches presented in this 
section do not provide a structural explanation or response to the conflict, since they focus 
on inter-group contact and individual prejudice. Instead, drawing on Donnelly’s research, 
                                                             
20 The ‘Shared education signature project’ with the purpose of bringing different schools together runs until 
2019 and is funded by the Atlantic Philanthropies. 
21 The policy addresses “those of different religious belief, including reasonable numbers of both Protestant 
and Roman Catholic children or young persons; and those who are experiencing socio-economic deprivation 
and those who are not” (NI Assembly, 2016), thus cutting across the religious as well as the class divide in 
Northern Ireland. 




there is a danger that these intergroup encounters and settings are dominated by a culture 
of avoidance that is accepted.  
 
CURRICULAR RESPONSES: EDUCATION FOR MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND LOCAL AND 
GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP  
 
A different type of educational initiative emerged also at the height of the conflict, which 
provided a structural response as it facilitates political discussions about the conflict in 
schools. Initially, and despite the responsibility of the Department of Education, curricular 
initiatives were mainly developed by individual practitioners during the 1970s, supported 
by higher education, individual schools or voluntary organisations (Emerson and 
McCully, 2014). As Emerson and McCully maintain, the Department of Education was 
sceptical about early initiatives, including the Northern Ireland Schools Curriculum 
Project (Crone and Malone, 1979) and the Schools Cultural Studies Project (Robinson, 
1981). Murray (1985) found that this project, which encouraged students to clarify cultural 
and social values instead of taking them as static and unalterable was rather embraced by 
Catholic than Protestant schools. Catholic schools were more open to question dominant 
societal values and norms, whereas Protestant schools saw this as an attack on the status 
quo and the dominant Protestant position and thus tended to oppose or ignore this project 
(Murray, 1985).  
In 1989, two cross-curricular themes, Education for Mutual Understanding (EMU) and 
Cultural Heritage (CH), which were intended to foster “the improvement of relations 
between the two communities” (p.3), became part of the common curriculum within the 
1989 Education Order (Smith and Robinson, 1992). Initially, there was suspicion around 
EMU among both communities that it presented a form of “social engineering driven by 
a desire to dilute cultural identity.” (Arlow, 2004:280). Officially, EMU and CH consisted 
of building respect and relationships with others, understanding the conflict and culture in 
Northern Ireland (Arlow, 2004).   




EMU was criticised on various grounds. Besides problems with implementation, a review 
of EMU found that there was a lack of clarity in terms of what EMU was about and there 
was a wide perception among schools that EMU was mainly about contact (Smith and 
Robinson, 1992). McEvoy and Lundy (2007) argued that the initiative did not address the 
political nature of the conflict and failed to engage with issues of human rights and 
equality. Finally, Emerson and McCully (2014) contend that the statutory establishment 
of curricular initiatives was problematic mainly because they lost their “hard edged 
practice” (p.9) and thus their impact was diluted in a way that reference to social injustices 
were largely avoided by teachers (Smith and Robinson, 1996). Whereas EMU is seen as 
offering a strategy for addressing individual prejudice, it did not develop ways for young 
people to critically examine issues of justice and discrimination at a structural level 
(McEvoy, 2007).  
The political transformations in Northern Ireland and evolving citizenship education 
policies in other countries, such as the Crick Report in the UK, created an environment 
where the development of citizenship education was reconsidered. The Council for 
Curriculum Examination and Assessment (CCEA) started to review the existing 
curriculum and proposed that a new citizenship curriculum should be developed as a 
contribution to the peace process, which was also driven by EU and US initiatives to 
further advance citizenship education (Emerson and McCully, 2014). Various research 
projects have been conducted, mainly by CCEA, which suggested the development of a 
specific programme for citizenship education and proposed among other values “equality, 
justice, and human rights within our society and our capacity as citizens to resolve conflict 
by democratic means” (CCEA, 2000b:4). After pilot work on citizenship education in 
1998 and 1999, the Department of Education introduced ‘Local and Global Citizenship’ 
(LGC) in all post-primary schools on a phased basis for all young people in Northern 
Ireland (DE, 2005) and it became a core statutory element of the Northern Ireland 
curriculum.  
In contrast to EMU, which was criticised because it lacked a structural response to 
discrimination and prejudice (McEvoy, 2007), LGC addresses aspects such as equality, 




social justice, and human rights. Furthermore, it also seeks to “strengthen young people’s 
social, civic and political awareness.” (CCEA, 2007:15). It consists of four major themes: 
‘Diversity and Inclusion’, where young people explore diversity in a local and global 
context; ‘Equality and Justice’, which directly addresses issues of discrimination and 
inequality based on group identity; ‘Democracy and Active Participation’, which is about 
structural aspects of democracy and active participation; and finally ‘Human Rights and 
Social Responsibility’, where young people not only learn about the legislation but also 
how to balance clashes of rights in diverse societies (CCEA, 2015).  
Although McEvoy (2007) recognised the acknowledgement of a structural response 
within the LGC policy text, she raised three concerns: first, the academic representation 
of the curriculum as a successor of EMU; this blurs the fact that LGC goes beyond the 
promotion of community relations and tolerance. Second, a concern is raised that LGC 
does not sufficiently mandate teachers to address the violence and injustices of the past 
and does not provide opportunities for young people to engage with different narratives. 
McEvoy argued that there is a need to provide teachers with support and a framework to 
address the local conflict on an individual and structural level. While an initial extensive 
teacher training was provided that increased teachers’ confidence to deal with 
controversial issues and to introduce active learning methods (Niens and O’Connor, 
2006), at the time of writing training in these areas was not offered. Third, McEvoy 
highlighted the shortcomings of its approach to human rights education, which does not 
address the dimension of state accountability and responsibility, reinforcing her concern 





Connecting this section about education to the one above about citizenship and identity 
politics in Northern Ireland, it becomes apparent that structures of inequality and 
sectarianism that have long fuelled the conflict between the two communities have not 




been sufficiently challenged, neither in the dominant political discourse nor in the 
educational policies. Yet, the Catholic community in Northern Ireland has also benefitted 
from policies and reforms as a result of the increasing commitment to promoting equality 
between the communities. Educational responses to the conflict have been informed by 
both cultural-psychological and structural explanations of the conflict. The former avoids 
providing a broader politico-historical understanding of the conflict from the outset and 
focuses on individual prejudice rather than social, political and economic structures of 
power as explanations for sectarianism and conflict. However, structural educational 
responses to the conflict such as LGC are also at risk of being depoliticised, since any 
notions of accountability and responsibility are absent from the citizenship curriculum 
(McEvoy, 2007).   
 
ISRAEL 
THE CONFLICT IN ISRAEL AND PALESTINE 
 
While the peace process in Northern Ireland remains fragile, it is non- existent in Israel at 
the time of writing. Negotiations between the Israeli and the Palestinian leadership remain 
difficult and the atmosphere is generally tense, characterised by regular outbreaks of 
violence such as the recent events in Gaza or around the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem22 
and frequent deathly attacks by individuals from both sides, targeting military, police 
personnel and civilians.  
Like Northern Ireland, Israel and Palestine are scarred by a long history of political 
conflict. Crimes that were committed in the past have not been accounted for and the 
political leaders and groups have not taken responsibility for their actions, making conflict 
transformation a difficult mission (see for example Rogan and Shlaim, 2007). The current 
conflict is fuelled by unresolved political issues such as the military occupation, the 
missing recognition of Israel’s statehood, the imposition of a diplomatic and economic 
                                                             
22 The most recent examples are the protests in Gaza, which started in March 2018 (Al-Mughrabi, 2018) 
and the events around the access and security control relating to the Al-Aqsa mosque in July 2017 (Berger, 
2017). 




boycott by some states, the status of the Palestinian refugees, the status of Jerusalem and 
the question of Palestinian statehood. Again, being constrained by limited space, I will 
briefly sketch the emergence of Zionism and Palestinian nationalism as the main political 
movements that shaped the conflict.  
The history of the land, which was later divided in the State of Israel and the occupied 
Palestinian Territories, is subject to different narratives by Palestinians and Israelis. Both 
claim priority status to justify a control of the land: whereas Palestinians emphasise their 
continuous residence and cultivation of the land, which was only disrupted by recent 
developments of flight, expulsion, and dispossession; Israelis claim a continuous spiritual 
connection to the land traced back to the biblical Hebrew kingdoms in addition to the fact 
that a Jewish minority has also continuously inhabited the land (Yiftachel, 2006). 
Influenced and inspired by modern nationalist movements in other parts of the world, the 
land became increasingly part of both Palestinian and Jewish imaginations of their 
designated national home and both nations base their political rights on a national 
narrative of belonging (Gelvin, 2014). 
The land that consists today of the State of Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip carried 
historically different names such as Canaan, Kingdom of Israel and Judea and, Palestine, 
ruled by various empires such as the Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian, Greek and, Roman 
Empire. More recently, it was part of the Ottoman Empire for four hundred years until its 
defeat and then captured by British troops in 1917, which ruled the territory as a mandate 
that they received from the United Nations until 1948 (Norris, 2013; Yiftachel, 2006).  
Jewish immigration to Palestine is commonly summarised in four waves of immigration 
from 1882 until approximately 1939, called aliyot23 (Gelvin, 2014; Kimmerling, 1995). 
Whilst the waves of Jewish immigration differ in terms of the origins of the immigrants 
and their ideological motivation, they were largely triggered by the political conditions in 
                                                             
23 Plural of ‘aliyah’ meaning in Hebrew ‘to ascend’, which is a common term to describe Jewish immigration 
to Israel as “to ascend from their diaspora condition and be reborn in Palestine” (Gelvin, 2014:56).  




Europe, Russia and other parts of the world where the Jewish minority was persecuted 
and discriminated against (Gelvin, 2014; Harms and Ferry, 2008).  
The Balfour declaration, issued by the British Foreign Office in 1917 maintained British 
support for a Jewish national homeland (Norris, 2013). Yet, at the same time, British 
representatives also made commitments to the establishment of an Arab state in the region 
(Yiftachel, 2006). Following increasing tensions and the outbreak of the Great Revolt in 
1936, the British Royal Commission of Inquiry headed by Lord Peel concluded that the 
mandate had become unworkable suggested a partition of the territory into a Jewish and 
an Arab state (Shahak, 1989). However, the plan’s realisation proved to be difficult in the 
face of “political, administrative and financial difficulties” (UK government, 1937). The 
British, the Zionist movements and, parts of the indigenous population organised and 
armed themselves during this time and all engaged in acts of violence, retaliation, and 
counter-retaliation (Gelvin, 2014). The reasons for the escalation of violence are complex. 
It was fuelled by fears of a Zionist-Jewish takeover and resistance towards the British 
administration among the Arab population while the Jewish population sought to guard 
its settlements, pressure the British to allow Jewish immigration to Palestine during the 
Holocaust and further its aspirations to establish a Jewish state (Gelvin, 2014). Yet, Gelvin 
(2014) noted that the roots of the revolt can also be attributed to economic 
peripheralization and growing impoverishment of the local native population.   
In 1947, Britain signalled its intention to terminate its mandate and the United Nations’ 
General Assembly proposed a partition plan24, splitting the territory in a Jewish state 
(about 56 percent of the territory) and an Arab state (about 44 percent of the territory), 
leaving the city of Jerusalem under international control (UN, 1947). The plan was 
accepted by the Jewish leaders but rejected by Palestinian leaders and the Arab states, 
which led to the outbreak of a civil war (Yiftachel, 2006). There are different perspectives 
about the events that led to the outcomes of the 1948 war. Some authors emphasised the 
unequal socio-economic political positioning of the Yishuv (the pre-state Jewish 
                                                             
24 The UN partition plan suggested allocating 56 per cent of the land to the Jewish people and 44 per cent 
to the Arab population.  




community in the Mandate) vis-à-vis the local population that gave the former an 
advantage during the war (Khalidi, 2006). Others emphasised that despite support by 
neighbouring Arab countries and Britain the local Arab population decided to flee or was 
driven into neighbouring countries in the face of overwhelming military power and skill 
on part of the Zionists (Oren, 2002).   
The war25 ended, one year later with the defeat of the Palestinian and Arab forces and the 
declaration of the State of Israel, remembered by Israelis as “the Independence Day” (yom 
ha'atzmaut) and among Palestinians and Arabs as “the catastrophe” (al-nakba) (Oren, 
2002). While the Jewish population established its new state, Palestine would cease to 
exist as one political entity, leaving 500,000 to one million Palestinians as refugees 
(Kimmerling and Migdal 2003); and over 400 villages completely destroyed (Davis and 
Coffman, 2014). The situation has not been resolved at the interim period, followed by 
wars in 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982, the Palestinian uprisings (Intifada) in 1987 and 2000, 
the recent conflicts in Gaza in 2008 and 2014. The Six Day War in 1967 between Israel, 
Egypt, Syria, and Jordan was particularly significant since Israel gained control over 
territories that were previously under control of Arab states such as the Sinai Peninsula26, 
Golan Heights, West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.  
Regular eruptions of violence have been accompanied by peace negotiation efforts. The 
most prominent example are the Oslo accords, which were also the first face-to-face 
negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. They were triggered by a favourable 
political environment at the end of the Cold War and on both sides for negotiations: in 
Israel, the election of Rabin as prime minister in 1992 represented a shift away from the 
uncompromising policies in the occupied territories by previous governments, which were 
viewed by many Israelis as a “stumbling block against Israel’s full integration into 
regional and world communities” (Gelvin, 2014:233). Gelvin (2014) outlined that the 
                                                             
25 The number of victims of the war, like the war itself is contested. According to Morris (2008), the Jewish 
side has lost between 5,700-5,800 people with a quarter of them civilians, representing about 1 per cent of 
its population. Morris notes that the number of losses on the Palestinian side is unclear but estimated to be 
slightly higher. 
26 As part of the Camp David Accords in 1978 between Israel and Egypt, Israel withdrew its troops from 
the Sinai Peninsula.  




PLO was at that time exiled in Tunis and lost its most important ally, the Soviet Union. It 
sought to regain strength by reinstating its status as the main representative of the 
Palestinian people, which was threatened by other competing groups (Gelvin, 2014; 
Harms and Ferry, 2008). At the beginning, about 65 percent of the population on both 
sides was in favour of the Oslo accords, which did not actually lead to any agreement or 
settlement but only a commitment that future negotiations will take place and that a 
Palestinian authority will be established, outlining its powers and duties (Gelvin, 2014; 
Harms and Ferry, 2008). The enthusiasm for the negotiations diminished over time on 
both sides and they were resisted by other political groups like the Likud party (the Likud-
National Liberal Movement), Gush Emunim27, Hamas and Palestinian rejectionists. The 
assassination of Rabin in 1995, the election of a new government under Netanyahu that 
resisted making concessions and the increasing disillusionment among Palestinians due to 
the incompetence and corruption on part of the PLO led to a decline of the willingness 
among both sides to negotiate over time, while the frustration among the populations 
increased also in the face of violence (Gelvin, 2014).  
THE EMERGENCE OF ZIONISM 
 
Jews have always expressed a longing for Jerusalem and an attachment to the land of 
Israel for centuries through religious practice (Brenner, 2002). The connection between 
Judaism and the geographical place of Jerusalem and Israel was understood mainly as a 
spiritual connection (Avineri, 2017), but at the end of the 19th-century projects for a Jewish 
state started to appear (Brenner, 2002). Avineri (2017) argued that whereas the most 
common explanation of why Zionism emerged at that time is often attributed to the 
outbreak of anti-Semitism and the persecution of Jews throughout Europe, an additional 
                                                             
27 Gush Emunim was a national-religious activist movement advocating as its main cause to establish 
settlements in the occupied territories. While the movement no longer exists, it remains active in political 
circles.  
 




explanation is that it developed in a particular political environment of emerging 
nationalisms across Europe28.  
Among these emerging projects for a Jewish state, the one formulated by Theodor Herzl 
was the most popular one, who is often quoted as the founder of political Zionism. Herzl 
(1934/1896) argued that since European Jews have long suffered from marginalisation 
and persecution in Europe that the ‘Jewish question’ is, in fact, a national one and can 
only be solved through the emancipation of the Jewish people as a nation. Among other 
places, he envisaged a future Jewish state in the land of Palestine as the historical 
homeland of the Jewish people and sought to create a common secular national identity. 
The Zionist pioneers with their ideological commitment to creating a revolutionary 
national Jewish society started to cultivate the land in Palestine (Kimmerling and Migdal, 
2003; Swirski, 1999). The Zionist strategy was territorial: purchasing land and attracting 
immigrants to create a viable socio-economic environment for a Jewish political 
sovereignty (Yiftachel, 2006).  
Different forms of Zionism emerged simultaneously while parts of the Jewish population 
also defined themselves as anti- or non-Zionist (Gelvin, 2014). The major Zionist streams 
were labour Zionism that envisioned a socialist, collectivist, egalitarian and Hebrew-
speaking society (Davis and Coffman, 2014), revisionist Zionism as a more militant form 
that included the formation of paramilitary organisations such as the Haganah (Hebrew 
Defense Organisation)29 and finally religious Zionism, which defines the Torah as the 
basis of Jewish nationalism (Schwartz, 2002). Whilst these descriptions are simplistic 
                                                             
28 With the French Revolution, the rise of secularism, modernism, liberalism and nationalism, new questions 
about belonging, inclusion and exclusion, emancipation and assimilation arose (see Avineri, 2017). As 
Avineri (2017) notes importantly, these theories were often connected to racism and cultural determinism. 
Thus, while they promote a language of freedom, liberation and community, the rhetoric of nationalism 
excluded minorities such as the Jews in Europe, by defining in racist terms what it means to be a “real” 
German, French or Russian. In an environment where Jews became increasingly politicised (also because 
paradoxically during this time they became more integrated into European societies (see, Brenner, 2002; 
Davis and Coffman, 2014) it is not surprising that this minority group started to formulate its own ideas 
about nationhood, self-determination and liberation (see Avineri, 2017). This also included a cultural 
revival, for example of the Hebrew language, which was preserved through religious activities, but 
increasingly flourished in literature and journalism as well (Avineri, 2017; Brenner, 2002). 
29 The Haganah was founded in 1920 and later split into the Irgun, a more violent wing, known for its attack 
of the King David Hotel and the Deir Yassin massacre (Davis and Coffman, 2014). After the establishment 
of the State of Israel it became incorporated into the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). 




since all of these approaches have sub-streams and are influenced by different Zionist and 
religious thinkers, they share in common that they envision a Jewish national homeland.  
Zionism has considerably shaped Israel’s status as a Jewish and democratic state, which 
will be discussed in further detail in the next section. Different approaches to Zionism 
influenced demands and compromises during Israel’s negotiations with the Palestinians 
such as where the borders of the Israeli and Palestinian state should be drawn. After 
Rabin’s assassination in 1995, Israeli politics regarding peace with the Palestinians has 
shifted increasingly to the right under the governments of Netanyahu, Sharon, and Olmert 
whose policies led to the construction of a barrier and subjected 85 percent of the territory 
of historic Palestine under Israeli control (Gelvin, 2014).  
Despite their differences, all Zionist approaches confirm the Jewish character of Israel, 
which is at the heart of the Proclamation of Independence (Provisional Government of 
Israel, 1948). Since the end of the 1970s, post-Zionism emerged as a set of perspectives 
that are critical towards Zionism, envisioning a transformation of Israel that protects and 
advances the interests of all its citizens, regardless of their ethnicity and thus giving non-
Jewish citizens equal status to Jewish citizens (Kelman, 1998; Pappé, 1997; Silberstein, 
2013). Yet, post-Zionism remained mainly an academic movement and has only a very 
limited following (Silberstein, 2013). 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM 
 
Arab nationalism developed at the beginning of the 20th century, influenced by Western 
concepts of nationalism and as a response, first towards the rule under the Ottoman Empire 
and then towards the colonial rule imposed by European powers (Hassassian, 2002). The 
distinctiveness of Palestinian nationalism, grounded on the idea of the existence of a 
Palestinian people in a Palestinian homeland, emerged later during the 1920s and 1930s 
in an environment of increasing resistance and suspicion by the native population towards 
the British Mandate and Zionist aspirations to form a Jewish state (Ghanem, 2013). 
Palestinian nationalism did not only form as a response to Zionism but rather as a 




resistance ideology30 among competing ideologies of European colonialism, Zionism, 
Arab nationalism and other local nationalisms that appeared after the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire (Muslih, 1987). From the outset, the Palestinian national movement was 
characterised by tribalism and internal divisions and rivalries (Hassassian, 2002), which 
would later constitute one of its major weaknesses in the face of countering Zionist 
aspirations. Hassassian (2002) argued that this fragmentation was also influenced by a 
British policy of divide and rule, which has caused leading Palestinian families to work 
against each other.  
In 1936, a series of events led to the escalation of violence between Arabs, Jews and the 
British (Gelvin, 2014). The Great revolt lasted for three years and was accompanied by an 
increasing militarisation on both sides (Gelvin, 2014; Kimmerling and Migdal, 2009). 
While the Zionist movement was expanding during this time, the results of the revolt were 
disappointing for the Palestinian national movement, whose leadership went into exile 
(Ghanem, 2013). In such a state, the Palestinian movement was not well equipped for the 
consequences of the 1948 war that decreased the number of Palestinians in the new State 
of Israel from 940,000 to 160,000 due to expulsion and flight (Cayman, 1984 quoted in 
Ghanem, 2013).  
The dispersion of the Palestinian population across the region created numbers of internal 
and external refugees and seriously disrupted political processes of forming a Palestinian 
national consciousness and community, which lacked a stable and unified leadership until 
the formation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 (Ghanem, 2013). 
Whilst the nationalistic movement succeeded in uniting support by local Palestinians and 
the diaspora, an increasing split between the nationalistic-secular and the religious forces 
emerged (Hassassian, 2002).  
                                                             
30 Muslih (1987) argued that the influence of Zionism on the emergence of Palestinian nationalism is often 
overstated. While it played a role in focusing Palestinian national aspirations, it rather emerged from a 
fragmentation of Arab nationalism and the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire by the European powers, 
which led to a rise of local nationalisms. He described both Arab and Palestinian nationalism as inspired by 
the fashion of nationalism in Europe, subscribing to liberal thought, self-determination and secularism. 
Thus, it was viewed by its supporters as embracing all indigenous groups, including Jews, but resisting the 
idea of domination by outside powers, be it European colonizers or Zionists (Muslih, 1987). 




Under the leadership of Arafat, the Fatah (Palestinian National Liberation Movement) 
and thus the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organisation), which became dominated by the 
Fatah, emerged as the major representative organisation of the Palestinian population, 
shaping Palestinian national aspirations (Ghanem, 2013; Kimmerling and Migdal, 2009). 
Previously, the PLO defined Judaism as a religion but did not recognise it as a legitimate 
nationality and Jews as belonging to their respective nation-states (Ghanem, 2013) 31. In 
the face of the need for wider international recognition, support and, pressure to act 
following the first Intifada, the PLO redefined its vision of a Palestinian state as secular 
and democratic, stating to treat all citizens equally, irrespective of their religious 
background (Ghanem, 2013)32. During the peace talks, which led to the Oslo agreement, 
the PLO constituted its agenda on the UN resolutions, which partitioned Palestine into an 
Arab and a Jewish state alongside each other (Ghanem, 2013). While a high number of 
Palestinians supported the peace process, at the same time many also saw violence as the 
only tool to force the Israelis to make concessions (Kimmerling and Migdal, 2009).  
After the death of Arafat, the Palestinian leadership entered a crisis, which intensified after 
Hamas won the elections in 2006 following their growing popularity since the Second 
Intifada in 2002 (Hassassian, 2002). This has caused political tensions and rivalry between 
the Hamas and the PLO, leaving the Palestinians an unstable government that struggles 
with conducting good governance and is accused of corruption (Gelvin, 2014; Ghanem, 
2013). Yet, recently, the Fatah and Hamas have started a reconciliation process after 
Hamas declared that it would transfer its responsibility for Gaza to the Palestinian 
Authority (Rasgon, 2017).  
In the face of stagnant peace negotiations, the president of the Palestinian Authority Abbas 
decided to take the case of Palestinian statehood to the United Nations, where the General 
                                                             
31 They referred to the immigrant background of most Jewish-Israelis, yet there was also an indigenous 
Jewish population in Palestine (Bechor, 1995 quoted in Ghanem, 2013). 
32 Ghanem (2013) outlined while Zionism conflates the idea of Judaism as a religion and a nationality, the 
political agenda of the PLO emphasises the distinction between Zionism and Judaism, where the former is 
seen as a ‘racist movement’ and expected to be renounced by Jews in turn for the integration into a future 
Palestinian state. 




Assembly voted in favour of Palestinian membership and leading the Palestinian 
Authority to declare the State of Palestine (Gelvin, 2014).  
Whilst many Arab-Palestinian citizens in Israel affiliate with Palestinian nationalism and 
the events in the occupied territories, their situation is considerably different than those 
who live in the West Bank and Gaza. The remainder of this section will deal with diversity 
and minority rights in Israel and thus it focuses on the situation of Arab-Palestinian 
citizens in Israel among other groups in Israel's diverse society.   
 
POLICIES ADDRESSING DIVERSITY AND MINORITY RIGHTS IN ISRAEL 
 
It was mentioned earlier that the Israeli state was founded on a Zionist ethos that emerged 
among European Jews. Since then, Ashkenazim33 have managed to establish themselves 
as a dominant group, shaping the political and socio-economic structures and control the 
country’s public resources (Ghanem, 2010; Shalom Chetrit, 2010). Western ideas of 
nationalism have dominated Zionism (Swirski, 1999), representing “a European Jewish 
solution to a European Jewish problem” (Shalom Chetrit, 2010:23).  
After the establishment of the state, a Constituent Assembly was elected (and became later 
the Knesset, the Israeli parliament) with the task of writing a constitution. However, it was 
decided to inscribe the fundamental principles of the state in a couple of basic laws. 
Israel’s basic laws resemble a constitution defining the state’s institutions and their role, 
the protection of civic and human rights and the ownership of land among others 
(Kretzmer, 1996). Besides, Israel’s legal system constitutes itself mainly on the common 
law, largely influenced by the English legislation of the Mandate and legislation from the 
Ottoman Empire (Friedman, 1975). For example, the millet system from the Ottomans 
was retained, which assigned the control to the respective religious authority (Muslim, 
Jewish or Christian) over important aspects of social life such as marriage, divorce, and 
burial (Saban, 2006).   
                                                             
33 The term Ashkenazim refers to Jews with Western European ancestry. 




Israel’s status as a liberal democracy has been challenged by some academics. For 
example, Smooha (1997) described Israel as an archetype of ethnic-democracy, 
underpinned by an ethnic nationalism, maintaining that a separate ethnic group with a 
common descent, culture, language or religion claims belonging to an exclusive homeland 
and its right to self-determination in this territory (Smooha, 2002). In response to 
Smooha’s concept of ethnic democracy, Yiftachel (2006) and Ghanem et al. (1998) 
labelled Israel instead an ethnocracy, raising doubts about its democratic character, due to 
its rigid ethnic hierarchy and lack of equal and inclusive citizenship, which continues to 
inform its political structure despite slight improvements. Ghanem et al. (1998) explained 
that citizenship in Israel cannot be inclusive, as it is anchored in Israel’s raison d’être that 
it is the state and the political tool of the Jewish people only. Mann (2004) and Ghanem 
et al. (1998) described equal citizenship in an ethnic state as irreconcilable differences and 
thus ethnos and demos as opposing or contradictory principles, whose hybridity can lead 
to a distorted acceptance of inequality as inherent in the democratic system (Ghanem et 
al., 1998).  
The status of minority rights in Israel gives a further indication about the state of 
democracy in Israel. There is a range of group-differentiated rights that are granted to 
Arab-Palestinian citizens and other minority groups, such as the recognition of Arabic as 
an official language (which stems from the British Mandatory legislation), whilst their 
access to national rights, self-government, and allocation rights are limited (Saban, 2006). 
After the first and second Intifada, more egalitarian policies were adopted towards Arab-
Palestinians in terms of the recognition of discrimination and the relationship between the 
police and minorities. However, Saban (2006) claimed that there remain “taboo 
territories” (p.899) that prevent minorities from pursuing extensive political changes such 
as transforming the nature of the state into a binational or civic state.    
Arab-Palestinian citizens in Israel are granted basic political rights, such as free, 
democratic and proportional elections and the opportunity for political organisation and 
activity (Al-Haj, 2002). Yet, Al-Haj (2002) argued that these rights are limited during 
increased tensions under the umbrella of ‘security’ legislation and policies. This remains 




part of a wider process of ‘negative racialisation’ of Arab citizens in Israel, underpinned 
by a construction of them as a security threat and the demand for ‘active control’ over 
Palestinians (Abu-Saad, 2004). Due to the ethnic-national character of the state, Arab-
Palestinians are basically excluded from full-citizenship and disadvantaged in terms of 
socio-economic welfare (Abu-Saad, 2004; Ghanem, 2010; Lustick, 1980; Rouhana and 
Ghanem, 1998; Smooha, 1990; Yiftachel, 1999). There is a range of discriminatory laws 
affecting Arab-Palestinian citizens in the realm of property and ownership of land, 
housing, family unification, the commemoration of the Nakba in schools, the revocation 
of citizenship and the expansion of the powers of security forces (Adalah, 2017, Saban, 
2006).   
It was argued above that the political culture and ideology has been largely shaped by a 
Zionist and thus Ashkenazi ethos. Besides legislation, this has sustained a subtler cultural 
hegemony that privileges (white) Ashkenazi Jews over Mizrachim and other citizens of 
non-European descent. During the 1950s the Jewish population doubled as a result of the 
Holocaust and emigration from the Middle East and North African countries (Davis and 
Coffman, 2014). Racist discourses and identity constructions common among White 
European cultures have served to preserve the Ashkenazi dominance in the face of an 
increasing Mizrachi and Sephardi population. Shalom Chetrit (2010) argued that a 
common discourse among Zionists portrayed Mizrachi immigrants as uncultured, inferior 
and backward.  
Officially, Mizrachim were integrated into the political and socio-economic structures, 
which were shaped and dominated by Ashkenazim (Ghanem, 2010). The cultural 
assimilation and ‘modernisation’ of Mizrachim, whose culture was not only portrayed as 
primitive but also as the enemy’s culture, was conceived as an important aspect of nation-
building (Dahan and Levy, 2000). Yet, in practice they were allocated to peripheral areas, 
characterised by a range of social problems like poverty and unemployment and being 
expected to provide cheap and unskilled labour (Shafir and Peled, 2002; Smooha, 1978), 
which attached to them a social stigma that is still visible today (Ghanem, 2010). 
Moreover, Mizrachim were marginalised in terms of their social rights, housing and, 
education (Shafir and Peled, 2002). Although the Knesset (Israel’s parliament) responded 




with an integration plan in 1968 to growing inequalities between children from different 
neighbourhoods and socio-economic backgrounds, this reform has not been successful 
since practices of segregation and exclusion continued (Dahan and Levy, 2000). The 
Mizrahi community became increasingly politicised and vocalised its demands for 
equality and inclusion through worker’s strikes and demonstrations, through the Black 
Panther movement and later through the formation of parties that advocate for ‘Mizrahi 
interests’ (Shalom Chetrit, 2000). While Mizrachim are largely integrated into the 
majority population in Israel, a gap between Mizrachim and Ashkenazim remains in terms 
of income and education levels (Cohen, 1998; Cohen et al., 2007).  
The following section will assess the education system and the subject of citizenship 
education as a response to diversity and conflict in Israel.  
 
EDUCATION AND POLICY RESPONSES TO THE CONFLICT IN ISRAEL 
 
The fact that the violent conflict in Israel is still ongoing is likely to be one of the main 
reasons that the educational policy response to address the conflict and diversity in Israel 
has been less developed, compared to Northern Ireland. This section outlines how the 
education system and the citizenship curriculum accommodate diversity and represent an 
educational response to the conflict. Whereas contact programmes were mainly initiated 
by non-governmental organisations such as the bilingual school movement (to which I 
will refer below in the description of the education system), some policymakers and 
educators have also envisioned the new citizenship curriculum as a way to provide 
students with a better understanding of the conflicts and diversity within Israel’s society 
(Ichilov et al., 2005). 
 
EDUCATION SYSTEM IN ISRAEL 
 
Israel’s education system is structured into kindergarten, pre-school, primary school, post-
primary, secondary and higher education. Secondary education is divided into different 




types of high schools and vocational schools, either preparing students for non-academic 
professions or the matriculation certificate (bagrut) that is a prerequisite to enter higher 
education (Iram and Shemida, 1998). To accommodate its diverse society, it is split into 
a state sector, a state-religious sector, a Jewish-religious sector and an Arab sector, which 
includes the Arab-Palestinian minority, Druze, and Bedouins. It is largely administered 
through a single control, the Ministry of Education. There is an additional private sector 
that comprises mainly religious institutions such as the ultra-orthodox religious and 
Christian denominational schools (Iram and Shemida, 1998). It is claimed that the 
education system is characterised by disparities between the Arab and Hebrew-speaking 
sector mainly regarding the level of autonomy in the organisation and management and 
the disproportionate allocation of resources (Abu-Saad, 2004; Al-Haj, 1995; Human 
Rights Watch, 2001; Pinson, 2007b; Swirski, 1999).  
After the establishment of Israel, the organisers were charged with the task to organise 
education for the Arab-Palestinian minority and established a branch for Arab education. 
The major issues emerged around the language of instruction and the content of the 
curriculum taught in Arabic-speaking schools. It was decided that the language of 
instruction in primary and high schools will be Arabic (Amara and Mar’i, 2002). Saban 
(2006) stated that the right to be educated in their native language is probably the most 
extensive minority right granted to the Arab minority. In terms of the content of the 
curriculum it was feared that in a separate autonomous sector anti-Jewish or anti-state 
sentiments could be promoted, so they are required to teach the same curriculum as state 
schools (Amara and Mar’i, 2002). However, in reality, the Arab-Palestinian minority is 
required to become bilingual and bicultural, they learn Hebrew and study about Jewish 
culture through the curriculum (Saban, 2006). Following Saban, fluency in Hebrew is 
essential since higher education is largely conducted in Hebrew and it is usually required 
to access the labour market.  
In terms of education for minorities in Israel, the amendments to the state education law 
in 2000 were important. It recognises officially for the first time the Arab minority’s 
distinct identity, culture and heritage and states that is it one of the objectives of the 




education system to learn about these topics (Agbaria, 2016b), Yet, Agbaria (2016b) also 
noted that this legislation failed to grant any autonomy to the Arab education sector, which 
remains a problem since it limits the minority’s influence on the content of the curriculum 
while the religious educational sector was granted administrative and pedagogical 
autonomy in regard to the content of the curriculum.  
More recently a new school type emerged that has parallels to the integrated school sector 
in Northern Ireland. These are bilingual schools, which are recognised as non-religious 
schools and supported by the Ministry of Education. Thus, for the most part, they use the 
standard curriculum of the state non-religious sector (Bekerman, 2009a). The first Israeli-
Palestinian bilingual school was established in 1981 in Neveh Shalom/Wahat al-Salam, a 
small Jewish-Palestinian settlement (Feuerverger, 1998). A network of bilingual schools 
was co-founded by individual educators in 1997, who established their first two bilingual 
schools in 1998 and expanded to five schools (Hand-in-Hand, 2015). However, since the 
number of schools remains small and they are mostly attended by students from a middle-
class background, they only cater to a small part of the population (Bekerman, 2005). 
CITIZENSHIP CURRICULUM IN ISRAEL 
 
THE SUBJECT AND CONTENT 
 
Until 1970, citizenship34 did not exist as an independent subject but a broader approach to 
citizenship was employed, more through the participation at ceremonies and related 
subjects, mediating knowledge about formal aspects of political institutions (Cohen, 
2017). During the 1990s, a committee35 was appointed to examine the state of citizenship 
education and it suggested that since the current curriculum was out-dated there was a 
                                                             
34 Most academics writing about Israel use term ‘civics’, but in the thesis, I will use the term ‘citizenship 
education’ to, make it more consistent with Northern Ireland. As the next Chapter will explain, some 
theorists (see for example McLaughlin, 1992) have outlined a difference between civics and citizenship 
education. However, in theory and practice, the approach to citizenship education in Israel can vary and 
moves between these two understandings.  
35 Drawing on the work of the Shenhar and the Kremnizer committee, the Ministry of Education has 
published a new policy directive for civic education in 1994 and implemented a new civics curriculum in 
Jewish schools in 2000 and in Arab schools in 2001 (Ichilov, 2008; Pinson, 2011). 




need to formulate a new one (Cohen, 2016 cited in Cohen, 2017). The new curriculum 
was introduced in 2000 in Jewish secular and Arab schools, while state-religious and 
private schools remained exempted from the official curriculum. In 2009, citizenship was 
also introduced as a compulsory subject for junior high schools, whereas before it was 
only taught from 10th to 12th grade when many students are preparing for their final 
examination (bagrut). While being traditionally assessed through a written examination, 
it was decided in 2008, to add the implementation task (matlat bitzuah) as an additional 
form of assessment. It demands from students to identify an issue in their society, which 
they then research and suggest solutions for (Cohen, 2017).  
The bagrut is the national high-stake matriculation examination whose results determine 
the acceptance into higher education and the students’ placement in the military service 
(Cohen, 2016). Angrist and Lavy (2009) found that matriculation holders in Israel 
comparatively earn a 25 percent higher salary. Whilst the passing of the final examination 
is crucial for the social mobility among minorities (Obgu, 1999), they tend to have lower 
passing rates than students from the mainstream state sector. Arab-Palestinian students are 
less likely to pass the examination than students from the state sector (48 percent 
compared to 67 percent in 2007), but it is also important to note that there are differences 
in the Arab sector: whilst Druze and Christian students have similar passing rates as 
Jewish students from the state sector, Muslims and Bedouins have considerably lower 
rates (Hemmings, 2010). Some explanations offered by Hemmings (2010) are the general 
lower socio-economic status among Arab-Palestinian citizens, the heavy work-load that 
is caused by the learning of Hebrew and written Arabic36 and in the case of the Bedouin 
students, their remote location that makes it difficult to access schools.  
In terms of its content, citizenship education in Israel has been largely shaped by the 
promotion of the Zionist project, Jewish culture, identity and its values (Ichilov, 2005). 
The decision to review the curriculum in the 1990s emerged among concerns to strengthen 
the democratic aspects of the citizenship curriculum and growing demands for human 
                                                             
36 Written Arabic differs from spoken Arabic that students learn at home and in their communities. 
A high proficiency in Hebrew is required to enter higher education, since almost all institutions 
teach in Hebrew except for some teacher colleges (Hemmings, 2010). 




rights education (Ichilov et al., 2005). The new curriculum emphasises its intention to 
promote a common conception of citizenship among all groups in Israeli society and 
mentions the need to respect each group’s cultural differences:  
[t]o inculcate a common Israeli identity, together with the development of distinct 
national identities, and to impart to students the values of pluralism and tolerance, 
educate students to accept the diversity that exists within Israeli society, and to 
respect those who are different from oneself (. . .) (Ministry of Education 2001:10, 
cited in Ichilov 2003). 
This statement expresses the intention to respect or even nourish “distinct national 
identities” and a “common Israeli” identity while accepting the inevitable diversity within 
society. Yet, I outline below that the curriculum remains undermined by a discourse that 
marginalises certain groups in Israeli society.  
The mandatory overarching topic “the government and politics of the state of Israel” can 
be broken down in exploring the state’s Jewish and democratic values and their internal 
tensions and reality, the features of Israel’s government and political system and finally 
current political debates in Israel (Bekerman and Cohen, 2017). Bekerman and Cohen 
(2017) divide the curriculum’s goal into three sections: cognitive goals - such as 
knowledge of the political, economic and social system, key terms of social sciences and 
the ability to evaluate issues from different perspectives; value-based goals – including 
values of Israel as a Jewish democratic state, the development of a civic identity in 
addition to one’s national identity and respecting human rights, civil rights and the 
fulfilment of one’s duties as a citizen including participation in public issues; and finally 
disposition goals – to develop the ability to apply these values and ideas, to evaluate the 
political system and, to use critical thinking skills in a way to draw on facts, identify 
connections between different phenomena, develop complex opinions and tolerance 
toward different opinions. These goals partly overlap with underlying pedagogical 
principles, such as the presentation of different views, fostering tolerance and respect, 
analysing critically current events and developing skills that empower students as 
independent learners (Bekerman and Cohen, 2017). 




Tesler (2005) noted, however, that despite the curriculum’s ambitions to create a ‘common 
Israeli identity’ there is no coherent understanding of citizenship among all different 
groups in Israel and thus each group teaches its own understanding of citizenship in its 
schools. While this is certainly true for the different groups within Israel’s Jewish 
population, for Arab-Palestinians the curriculum does not provide a space to teach about 
their history and identity. The curriculum and history textbooks are still undermined by a 
“Zionist historiography” (Pappé, 1997:30; Podeh, 2000; Shohat, 2003:61). For example, 
it still does not fully account for Israel’s responsibility of having created the Palestinian 
refugee problem even though considerable progress has been made to present a more 
complex picture of history (Podeh, 2000). While Zionist history is glorified across 
different school subjects (Al-Haj, 2005; Bar-Tal, 1998b; Firer, 1998; Pinson, 2007b; 
2013), Palestinian and Arab people are presented without historical and cultural heritage 
as well as without a collective identity (Abu-Saad, 2004; Agbaria, 2011; Agbaria et al., 
2015; Ichilov, 2008; Peled, 2006).  Whereas Palestinian students learn about the Israeli 
narrative of historical events, most Jewish students are not presented with a Palestinian 
narrative throughout their educational career (Al-Haj, 2002), which is reinforced by the 
more recent restriction imposed on schools to teach students about the Nakba37. In this 
way, the aim of the curriculum to confront students with different perspectives is limited 
to what falls under the mainstream Zionist narratives. As Sheps (2016) outlined, the 
“dilemma spaces” for teachers are controversial issues such as the occupation, the conflict, 
and relations with Arab neighbours and Arab-Palestinian citizens. This is because they 
tend to stir students’ emotions and may challenge mainstream Zionist views and 
opportunities to address these topics in the classroom seem limited (Sheps, 2016).   
EDUCATION AGAINST ANTI-SEMITISM AND RACISM 
 
A central aspect of citizenship education in Israel today is the teaching about the 
Holocaust. Even though it is officially situated under history education, it will become 
                                                             
37 The Knesset passed a bill in 2011 that allows the ministry of finance to decrease or even to withhold and 
withdraw funding for institutions that commemorate the Nakba day as a day of mourning, following the 
rationale that the teaching of the Nakba would politicise Palestinian children, as it reminds them of the loss 
of their land (Peled-Elhanan, 2012). 




evident in the discussion of the data that it is largely interpreted by schools, teachers, and 
students as an aspect of citizenship education as well. In the early years after the formation 
of the state, teaching about the Holocaust was marginal in the curriculum, since it 
conflicted with the ideals that political Zionism sought to promote (Porat, 2004; Resnik, 
2003). Over time, the Holocaust was increasingly incorporated into Israeli students’ 
everyday experiences and became an obligatory topic in the curriculum, strengthening the 
notion of the Jewish-Israeli population as a community of fate (Porat, 2004), to reinforce 
“a constant sense of threat” (Rouhana and Bar-Tal, 1998:764) and an image of the 
continuous victimisation of the Jewish people; in need for military power and a state with 
a Jewish identity, as a justification for “Israel’s raison d’être” (Resnik, 2003:308).  
Consequently, Rosenberg (2013, cited in Cohen, 2017) argued that while it is important 
that the curriculum addresses anti-Semitism and racism, education about the Holocaust is 
also politicised in a sense that it is approached from a nationalistic Jewish perspective. In 
doing so, it undermines the universal character of racism as a strategy of domination and 
dilutes it through a patriotic discourse. Instead of creating an understanding of the political 
and structural nature of racism, it rather serves to nourish a sense of threat and victimhood.  
EDUCATION FOR THE MILITARY SERVICE 
 
Another extra-curricular aspect of citizenship education in Israel is the preparation of 
students for the military service. Again, I decided to include it here because it emerged as 
a central aspect of citizenship education among the participants in the discussion of the 
data. Lemish (2003) argued that militarism is normalised in Israel’s society, since young 
people meet military personnel through their family, in public transportation and public 
places for example through security checks in train stations, shopping malls, supermarkets 
and even schools; where memorial days and public commemorations also act as a 
reminder of dead soldiers. This everyday experience becomes reinforced through 
education, as students are encouraged to enlist in the military service during their final 
years, making the possibility ‘to die for one’s country’ the ultimate civic responsibility 
(Lemish, 2003). Schools play a central role in promoting military service as an important 
aspect of Israeli citizenship (Ichilov et al., 2005), mediated through the civic teacher and 




by having military personnel coming to schools to encourage conscription (Lemish, 2003). 
Pinson (2011) argued that the success of citizenship in Jewish-secular schools is measured 
according to how many students enlist in the service, which contributes to the fact that 




This section summarised briefly the history of the conflict in Israel and Palestine and how 
it influenced the emergence of a separate education system and educational policies. The 
major challenges for citizenship education in Israel are to address the diversity of its 
population and issues of social justice that continue to fuel the conflict. The privileging of 
a Jewish-Zionist culture, narrative, identity, and citizenship in regard to other groups 
undermines their cultural rights, principles of equal citizenship, and justice. The 
citizenship curriculum seeks to instil on the one hand a republican/communitarian notion 
of citizenship for its Jewish citizens and on the other hand an individualist concept for 
non-Jewish citizens. Previous research suggests that this causes various problems such as 
alienation among minority groups (Pinson, 2008; 2013) and a lack of serious engagement 
with multiculturalism and racism (Al-Haj, 2002; Rosenberg, 2013, cited in Cohen, 2017). 
Additionally, a strong nationalistic focus that underpins the Israeli citizenship curriculum 
(and arguably history as well) is at risk to undermine critical thinking and the engagement 
with different perspectives on the conflict that might challenge dominant national 
narratives (see Chapter two for a more detailed explanation of the problems with 
nationalistic citizenship education). 
CONCLUSION 
 
In Northern Ireland and Israel, one can observe how identity politics has not only shaped 
the nature of the conflict but continues to influence understandings of the history of the 
conflict, notions of citizenship and belonging within each community. Moreover, both 
contexts expose the potential of either nationalism, religion and the combination of both 
to serve as an ideology of domination that is not only entrenched in the roots of the conflict 




but continues to impact on conflict transformation. The separate education systems in 
these divided societies limit young people’s exposure to the narratives, identities, and 
views of the other community and/or minorities. Educational policies in Northern Ireland 
have targeted this separation by facilitating contact between the communities through 
integrated education, shared education and other initiatives, while in Israel ‘contact’ as an 
educational response has been only introduced informally or as an extracurricular activity. 
Yet, this educational response has been critiqued on the basis that contact draws on a 
cultural-psychological understanding of the conflict, which frames sectarianism and 
racism as the result of individual prejudice. In contrast, the citizenship curriculum in both 
societies draws on structural explanations of the conflict as it addresses its historical and 
political context. Nevertheless, as issues of responsibility and accountability for the past 
(and continuous) violence could challenge the legitimacy of the state, it seems that 
structural educational responses to the conflict are at risk to be diluted, because there is 
lack of support and incentive for teachers and schools to critically address the conflict, 
sectarianism, and racism.  
Beside these commonalities, there are also important differences between both societies 
in terms of groups rights. Whilst in Northern Ireland both communities are granted 
collective rights38  in regard to citizenship and cultural rights and equal allocation of 
funding and resources in education, this is not the case in Israel. Minorities are not granted 
collective cultural and national rights and are largely disadvantaged in terms of funding 
and resources in education.  
The next Chapter further unpicks the differences between cultural-psychological and 
structural approaches to identity, racism/sectarianism and conflict and how these inform 
different educational approaches to citizenship.  
                                                             
38 Regarding language, Catholics in Northern Ireland are not granted collective rights. Attempts to introduce 
a legislation on the equal recognition of the Irish as a second official language in Northern Ireland by Sinn 
Féin are supported by the SDLP and the Alliance Party but blocked by the DUP (Burke, 2018).  









Whilst the previous Chapter set out the political and educational contexts, the purpose of 
this Chapter is to discuss the theoretical lens that facilitates a deeper understanding of how 
citizenship is taught and learned in different schools in Northern Ireland and Israel. 
Among a variety of different theories that enhance and extend this understanding, the 
thesis employs the theoretical framework of cultural hegemony, providing the basis for 
the discussion of the thesis’ two key concepts of citizenship education and identity. Taking 
a (neo)-Marxist perspective that focuses on the role of power is useful in exploring the 
state of citizenship education in these two societies because it illuminates structural 
political issues that permeate the teaching of citizenship and identity.  
The first section will establish the connection between Gramsci’s work on cultural 
hegemony and education in general, drawing on the work of critical educationalists such 
as Paulo Freire, Henry Giroux, and Michael Apple. The main argument presented in this 
Chapter is that education serves as an arena for different groups who seek to establish their 
ideology as the dominant one and facilitates the transmission of this ideology to the wider 
population. This is followed by the claim that understandings of identity are shaped by 
these ideologies. The concept of identity is arguably the most controversial aspect of 
citizenship education, particularly in divided societies. This section explains why the 
thesis draws on the work of postcolonial theorists such as Frantz Fanon, Edward Said, and 
Stuart Hall, as it provides an approach that is closely linked to the framework of cultural 
hegemony. These theorists reject essentialised and psychologised views of identity, which 
too often overlook the fluid and constructed nature of the concept, which is as a product 
of power relations.  
The relationship between citizenship and identity is the main focus of the second section. 
I start by outlining the two dominant approaches to citizenship; liberal and communitarian/ 




republican citizenship. This is followed by a discussion of national and pluralist forms of 
citizenship (multicultural, global, cosmopolitan etc.), which are critically examined 
against the framework of cultural hegemony. I will conclude that there is a need for the 
re-conceptualisation of citizenship, which is affected by the contradictions between 
universalism and particularism. These contradictions are expected to arise in the theory of 
citizenship education, which is discussed in the last section. 
The last section attempts to link the theoretical contribution of hegemony, identity, and 
citizenship education and explains their relationship. It outlines the development of 
citizenship education and its different aspects such as education for democracy, 
participation, difference, human rights, and peace. The Chapter concludes with narrowing 
down the political agendas that inform the respective approaches to citizenship education.  
EDUCATION AND CULTURAL HEGEMONY 
 
WHAT IS CULTURAL HEGEMONY? 
 
Cultural hegemony draws on Marxist thinking to describe the formation and maintenance 
of existing power relations in societies. The concept is attributed to Antonio Gramsci, who 
further developed and revised the works of Marx. Essentially, Gramsci (1971/1929) 
framed hegemony as a form of cultural, moral and ideological leadership over subordinate 
groups. He emphasised the difference between domination and hegemony: whereas the 
former is built on physical coercion, hegemony represents a subtler form of rule; it is a 
form of ideological control and consent. Gramsci divided superstructure into political 
society and civil society. Whereas the political society is constituted on the rationale of 
domination through coercive forces, such as the police or the legal system, the civil society 
constitutes itself on hegemony and non-coercive forces such as schools, churches, political 
parties or the family.  
Hegemony is essential to maintain a status quo since domination is usually not enough to 
gain popular support. Consequently, hegemony is not a static, totalising form of 
subordination, but a system of values, attitudes, beliefs, and moralities, which are 




mediated through processes of socialisation. Through these processes, the ruling class 
seeks to instil their particular values, moralities, and beliefs as the ‘common-sense’. Since 
hegemony differs from direct coercion, Gramsci described it as a dynamic process, as 
“hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the 
groups over which hegemony is to be exercised and that a certain compromise equilibrium 
should be formed” (1971/1929:211). However, at the same time, the goal of cultural 
hegemony remains cultural reproduction (Althusser, 1971; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990), 
ensuring that the power of the elite is reproduced, for example through capitalist relations.  
The concept of ‘common-sense’ is closely connected to the term of ideology. Foucault 
(1972; 1984) criticised Marxist approaches to ideology because they assume Marxism as 
a universal truth as opposed to the ideology of capitalism (Foucault, 1984: 60). Instead, 
Foucault rejected the notion of ideology altogether as it implies that there is an objective 
truth ‘out there’, warning that “there is a kind of nostalgia; behind the concept of ideology, 
the nostalgia for a quasi-transparent form of knowledge, free from all error and illusion” 
(Foucault 1972:117). Foucault thus urged an understanding of ‘ideology’ as a value-laden 
and biased term, which is often used to denounce the validity of an oppositional agenda. 
Similar to Foucault, Gramsci (1971/1929) emphasised the need to situate terms such as 
‘ideology,’ ‘truth’ or ‘rationality’ in their historical and political context, instead of 
viewing them as universal. Speaking about different ideological forms, Gramsci offers a 
way of discussing the workings of different ideologies through the concepts of cultural 
hegemony and counter-hegemony, using the term ‘ideology’ to describe ideas that 
underpin systems, institutions, and movements in our societies.  
To establish a hegemonic universality, competing political ideologies in society generate 
empty or floating signifiers (Laclau, 1996). Signifiers serve to sustain the existing 
hegemony in place, by filling it with a content that is in line with the respective ideology. 
As an example, Zizek (2000) referred to ‘democracy’ as a possible empty signifier, since 
its meaning is not predetermined, but the result of a hegemonic struggle about what it 
defines and who will be included and excluded from it. According to Laclau, empty 
signifiers are important for the concept of cultural hegemony, since their presence is “the 




very condition of hegemony” (1996:43). A group needs to establish signifiers to define its 
ideology and its organising principles to constitute its hegemony. 
This has consequences for the relationship between universality and particularity (Laclau, 
1992; 1996; 2000). Laclau described the universal as empty by itself and eventually filled 
with a particular (non-neutral) content resulting from a struggle for hegemony. As an 
example, Laclau (2000) referred to Eurocentrism, which established “European culture” 
as universal human interests of civilisation and modernisation by terming other cultures 
as particular, as “peoples without history expressing precisely their incapacity to represent 
the universal” (Laclau, 2000: 86). Thus, the claim to universality is a powerful tool for 
establishing cultural hegemony over other cultures or identities.  
The thesis draws on cultural hegemony as a theoretical frame to understand citizenship 
education. In the following, I will demonstrate how citizenship emerges through education 
as a form of (subtle) cultural hegemony. 
 
CULTURAL HEGEMONY IN EDUCATION 
 
Education is one of the social spheres through which hegemony as a form of cultural, 
moral and ideological leadership over subordinate groups is distributed. Althusser (1971) 
built on this idea; criticising the argument that the school is a site of reproduction for 
capitalist relations. The education system becomes an “ideological state apparatus” 
(Althusser, 1971:144), whose role is to transmit the ideology of the ruling classes. 
Similarly, Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) explained that the education system serves to 
legitimatise and to reproduce class inequalities inherent in capitalist societies. Through 
their power and privileged position in society, dominant classes define the cultural capital 
as an expression of their value, belief and moral systems. This cultural capital is 
distributed through schools, which set the acquirement of cultural capital as a requirement 
for educational success and thus function as sites of cultural reproduction to preserve the 
unequal social, political and economic structure. Children from dominant classes are 
privileged because they have the advantage of representing the cultural capital of society. 




Consequently, cultural capital is as a form of hegemony that sustains social control 
without the need for overt or coercive forms of domination (Apple, 2004). Giroux (1984) 
and Apple described how hegemony dominates through the overt and the covert 
curriculum. Features of socialisation, such as norms, values and belief systems are not 
only transmitted by formal curricula and textbooks, but also by the covert or hidden 
curriculum, which includes the school, classroom life, daily routines, symbols and 
relationships (Margolis, 2001). 
It was mentioned earlier that hegemony sustains itself through ideological control and 
consent based on a system of values and beliefs (Gramsci, 1971/1929). These particular 
values and beliefs become established as “common-sense” (p. 323), defining a set of 
generally held assumptions and beliefs in a society that are mediated through processes of 
socialisation, such as education. Consequently, the content of ‘official knowledge’ or 
‘common-sense’ is shaped by dominant groups in society (Apple, 2004). Apple stated that 
consent and popular support for cultural capital are generated through presenting ’official 
knowledge’ as legitimate and neutral. Similarly, constituting educators as neutral actors 
teaching neutral knowledge in neutral educational institutions serves to give the 
impression of the neutrality of the cultural capital (Apple, 2004). This hides the fact that 
the knowledge mediated through schools is selected from a wider universe of social 
knowledge. Apple explained how the distribution of a group’s culture and knowledge 
through education depends on its standing in society:  
The lack of certain kinds of knowledge—where your particular group stands in the 
complex process of cultural preservation and distribution—is related, no doubt, to the 
absence in that group of certain kinds of political and economic power in society. 
(2004:14). 
For example, the lack of African-American, Native-American or women’s perspectives in 
the history curriculum in the United States reflects their marginalised political and socio-
economic position in society (Banks, 2008). Thus, Phillips (1998) depicted debates about 
official history curricula as a battleground for identity, culture, and hegemony. 




The process of neutralisation of knowledge also has the effect of depoliticising the 
dominant culture, which is presented as apolitical and legitimate (Apple, 2004).  Giroux 
(1997) argued that conservative and liberal educators have promoted processes of 
depoliticisation and emphasised their commitment to individualism, choice and 
competitive ethic in their educational policies. Giroux (1980) claimed that prior to the 20th 
century there was no attempt to conceal this purpose of social control for obedience and 
conformity. Yet, this visibility of control was lost during the 20th century, when 
educational theory experienced a paradigm shift from political to technical with the 
emergence of the new rationales of efficiency and control. Therefore, critical 
educationalists, such as Althusser, Bourdieu, Giroux, and Apple have challenged the 
liberal education doctrine as it portrays knowledge in a neutral and universal way that fails 
to consider the connection between knowledge and power relations.   
 
COUNTER-HEGEMONY THROUGH EDUCATION? 
 
Gramsci (1971/1929) framed the concept of “good-sense” (p.323) as a force that 
counteracts common sense. Building on his declaration that “everyone is a philosopher” 
(p.323), good-sense constitutes practical, empirical knowledge that forms what Gramsci 
calls “common or popular philosophy” (p.328). By challenging and historicising the 
‘common-sense’ as a form of human action, the “good sense” can provide a critical and 
coherent approach that goes beyond the ‘common-sense’. According to Gramsci, the 
“good-sense” can be nurtured through education, by providing a critical consciousness (in 
this case a class consciousness), by seeing through the practices of the existing hegemony 
and finally by forming a “philosophy of praxis” (p. 321). This philosophy of praxis, as 
opposed to traditional ‘scientific’ and seemingly ahistorical philosophy, does not serve to 
disguise a ruling-class strategy and can provide the basis for political action, a movement 
of liberation for the working classes.  
Critical educators have drawn on the contingency of the “good sense” and emphasised the 
potential of education to counteract domination. For example, Freire (1970) saw education 




for liberation and emancipation in opposition to education for domination and hegemony. 
He framed the latter as the banking concept of education, where the oppressed are 
portrayed as ignorant and are turned into passive, manageable and adaptable beings 
through education for domestication. Freire described domestication as “an ideologizing 
instrument, [which] imposes the mythification of the world instead of its truth” 
(1972:174). This form of education is an important pillar of hegemony, facilitating subtle 
control of the oppressed and being part of a general strategy of “false generosity” (Freire, 
1970:45). Leonard and McLaren (2002) maintain that by building on myths that the 
individual and its ignorance are the source of social problems and not the system itself, 
the elites offer a ‘false generosity’ through education. For example, they prescribe to 
develop skills of employability as a response to unemployment without providing actual 
political solutions to unemployment (Leonard and McLaren, 2002).  
In contrast, according to Freire (1970), education for liberation or humanist education is 
built on dialogue with the oppressed and encourages them to trust in their capabilities. 
Freire argued that transformation can only be initiated by the oppressed themselves and 
not by the oppressors who have lost their humanity. Consequently, any attempt to impose 
a discourse on the oppressed will lead to another form of domination. Education for 
emancipation consists of two important aspects: first, it comprises a process of reflection, 
which seeks to empower the oppressed to reveal processes of domination through critical 
thinking and second, it enables them to reclaim their humanity. The latter also implies that 
they are empowered to reclaim their identity and culture as “beings for themselves” 
(p.161) and not beings for others since they have a crucial role to sustain the status quo 
and the dominance of the elites.   
Before the different strands of citizenship education are discussed and assessed from this 
perspective, the concept of identity, which is at the centre of this discussion requires some 
deeper theoretical elaboration.  
 
 




IDENTITY AND HEGEMONY 
 
CONCEPTUALISING IDENTITY: ESSENTIALIST VS ANTI-ESSENTIALIST APPROACHES 
 
Identity remains a much-debated concept in the literature across academic disciplines. Yet 
it is argued that identity has become “overtheorized”, as Brubaker and Cooper (2000) 
suggested: “Identity,'' […] tends to mean too much (when understood in a strong sense), 
too little (when understood in a weak sense), or nothing at all (because of its sheer 
ambiguity)” (p.1). Whilst they argued that there is a need to go beyond the term identity 
for greater conceptual clarity, Hall (2000) elucidated that the dilemma with identity is that 
it is “an idea which cannot be thought in the old way, but without which certain key 
questions cannot be thought at all.” (p. 16). Therefore, this section attempts to clarify the 
approach to identity on which the thesis draws upon.  It will be argued later that identity 
is an essential aspect of citizenship education. 
 
ESSENTIALISM AND ANTI-ESSENTIALISM 
 
The literature about identity (and the closely related and equally contested concept of 
culture (Benhabib, 2002) is dominated by a major debate alongside the positions of 
essentialists and anti-essentialists. Essentialists draw on an understanding of human 
beings as “cultural” subjects that can be differentiated in a world demarcated by cultural 
boundaries (Grillo, 2003); whilst anti-essentialists define concepts of culture and identity 
as fluid as opposed to fixed, static and uniform in a reality of boundaries (Bhabha, 1994; 
Butler, 1993; Hall, 2000; Mouffe, 1993; Spivak, 1990). 
Essentialist39 positions claim that the experience of being a member of a certain group is 
based on natural, universally valid characteristics, independent from other aspects of the 
                                                             
39 Traditionally, essentialist approaches to identity flourished in disciplines like anthropology, anatomy or 
biology that were often connected to racist projects of Western colonizers to justify exploitation, 
subordination and massacres committed against colonized people. Examples for these essentialist 
approaches that sought to promote racial ideologies and white supremacy are the work of Georges Curvier 
or famously the race ideology propagated in Nazi Germany. 




person and assuming an experience that is constant through historical, social and political 
contexts (Grillo, 1995). These views have been (fortunately) discounted in most of the 
scientific literature, which has established that race is not a biological but a social and 
historical construct, used as a tool for oppressing certain groups of people (see for example 
Appiah, 1985; Fanon, 2008/1952). Yet, essentialist views continue to guide theoretical 
descriptions of identity. Before elaborating on this further, I will outline anti-essentialist 
approaches to identity.  
Anti-essentialism is grounded in the awareness of the constructed and contingent character 
of our views and beliefs. Derrida (1981) maintained that the meanings of words are never 
fixed, always in flux and contingent in terms of time and context. This infers that identity 
should be understood as identification, describing a process that is constructed as a 
common origin, shared characteristics, and a sense of solidarity or allegiance with a 
person, group or ideal (Hall, 2000).  
The process of identification involves defining otherness or its relation to an external 
object outside of the group, which in turn transforms the individual itself (Bhabha, 1994). 
Thus, identity is sustained reflexively by the individual and its environment (Giddens, 
1991; Jenkins, 1996). For example, a positive identity can define itself by being different 
from the ‘negative’ other (Butler, 1993; Derrida, 1981; Laclau, 1990). The oppressor’s 
identity as positive is conditioned on the existence of an ‘other,’ which is different and 
negative40. For example, the definition of ‘otherness’ has been used as a tool by white 
(European) people to justify the exploitation of defined ‘others’ (McLaren, 1995). If these 
images of inferiority and self-depreciation are internalised by the oppressed, they might 
even submit to their own oppression (Taylor, 1994). Hall (1990) maintained that the 
constitution of an identity is an act of power, establishing a dominant identity and 
hierarchy between different poles, for example, white/black or man/woman. 
                                                             
40 For example, in “Black skin, white masks” Fanon (2008/1952) explained this process in the context of 
colonial domination, where the colonised internalize the negative construction of their identity and then 
aspire to imitate the culture of the coloniser. In all these cases, it is the oppressor who has the power to 
define the identity of the oppressed, as Fanon framed it: “What is often called a black soul is a white man’s 
artefact.” (Fanon 1991/1967:14). Thus, like in Hegel’s (2005/1807) master and slave dialectic, the master 
can sustain his dominance and positive self-consciousness only through the construction of the slave’s 
identity as something inferior and negative as well as through the recognition of his dominance by the slave. 




Consequently, anti-essentialists claim that identity is always contingent on relationships 
with others and the social, historical and political context. A collective identity can 
provide a means of inclusion but also operate as a means of exclusion (Butler, 1993). 
These claims by anti-essentialists suggest that identity needs to be examined against the 
backdrop of power interests, or in other words, hegemony.  
Nevertheless, there is another tendency in academia that dislocates identities from their 
historical and political context, which has been framed as the psychologisation of 
identities (Bekerman and Zembylas, 2012). These academics challenge the work of social 
psychologists such as Tajfel’s (1972) social identity theory and Turner’s (1991) work on 
self-categorisation that seek to explain identification mainly through interpersonal and 
intergroup behaviour41. While both approaches outline the contingency of ingroup and 
outgroup identifications in different social contexts, they generally fail to consider greater 
historical and political contexts. Following postcolonial approaches to identity and racism, 
prejudice and stereotypes cannot be fully explained through human interactions 
independent from context but need to be understood against the background of historical 
oppression, such as colonialism (Fanon, 2008/1952; Hall, 2000). Phillips (2010) argued 
that some psychological approaches (for example Hirschfeld, 1996) are prone to 
essentialism because they suggest that essentialist thinking can be described simply as a 
human condition. Since these approaches do not look at the process of identification as 
connected to human political action they risk not to challenge racist, sexist or heterosexual 
ideologies.  
Like the anti-essentialist critique, the concept of intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1989), 
deconstructs the essentialist myth by describing reality as consisting of multiple 
overlapping and intersecting identities. Intersectionality attacks the essentialist standpoint, 
arguing that the latter fragments the body of identities by singling out particular 
experiences, even though these cannot be understood as detached from other intersecting 
                                                             
41 Other theorists who have contributed and expanded social identity theory are: Hogg and Abrams, 1988; 
Hogg, Terry and White, 1995; McCall and Simmons, 1978; Stets and Burke, 2000).  
 




experiences and identities 42  (Crenshaw, 1989). Consequently, anti-essentialism and 
intersectionality basically embody the same critique and formulate as their main message 
that the contingency of identities lies between subordination and privilege (Grillo, 1995), 
or between the two poles of oppression and liberation (Bauman, 2004).  
Despite the challenges to pin down a clear definition of identity, the thesis will draw on 
the following definition by Castells (1997), who framed identity as a source of meaning 
and experience that is given priority over other sources of meaning. Identities can have 
different dimensions, as self-identities or collective identities and are socially constructed, 
relying on historical, geographical and biological material, personal imaginations and 
collective memories. Their meanings are negotiated by individuals, groups, and societies 
in a particular historical context (Castells, 1997). The last aspect of Castells’ definition is 
particularly relevant, as it differentiates it from other essentialist and psychological 
definitions by describing it as historical and contextual, urging that it must be understood 
beyond the immediate psychological analysis of human behaviour. Thus, leaning on 
Scheman (1997), instead of asking what it means to be a Catholic, a Protestant, a 
Palestinian or a Jew, we should ask how do people get to be one, how and who assigns 
this identity to someone and why. This brings the discussion back to the concepts of 
hegemony and counter-hegemony as analytical frameworks for identity.  
IDENTITY AS HEGEMONIC AND COUNTER-HEGEMONIC 
 
Using the concept of cultural hegemony as a theoretical framework can reveal the 
dynamics of subordination and privilege between different identities in a certain context. 
In his work on ‘Orientalism’, Said (1978) has drawn on cultural hegemony to outline the 
underpinning ideologies of Eurocentrism and European colonial and imperial projects. By 
creating a body of knowledge in literature, art, and science, European particularism has 
been presented as superior, neutral, rational and progressive. Said argued that this work 
established a notion of the ‘orient’ (as opposed to the ‘occident’) as something inferior, 
mystical, backward and irrational. Presenting the orient and occident in this dichotomy 
                                                             
42 For example, the experience of discrimination by a black woman cannot be detached from her experience 
as being black as well as being a woman, since oppression through racism and sexism can work together. 




serves to sustain Western supremacy and to justify policies of colonialism, imperialism 
and ‘civilising’ missions of the West.  
Said's work is not the sole example that established this link between hegemony and the 
construction of identities/cultures: for example, Butler (1993) famously framed 
heterosexual hegemony that sets heterosexuality as the norm or dominant culture/identity, 
assessing others' bodies' viability and sexuality based on its rationales or ideology. Culture 
or identities are constructed as two poles based on a certain ideology that underpins the 
dominant cultural hegemony. Persons can find themselves in relation to the cultural 
hegemony on a scale, between the two ends of subordination and privilege. Therefore, 
identities or identifications are not locked or static but subject to the dynamics of power 
relations (Hall, 2000). 
This approach to identity has implications for how racism is understood. Similar to the 
difference between essentialist and anti-essentialist approaches, racism can be framed as 
individual prejudice resulting from human behaviour or as oppression and privilege 
resulting from political and historical structures. The former depoliticises racism and 
frames prejudice as the result of cognition, as a ‘natural’ expression of human behaviour 
(Billig, 1985; Leach, 2002). In contrast, the latter understands racism as a system of 
advantage based on race (Wellman, 1993), which is sustained by institutional policies and 
cultural messages (Dixon et al., 2012; Tatum, 2000). Consequently, an anti-essentialist 
approach to racism exposes how cultural hegemony sustains existing privileges based on 
race and can be also extended to class, religion or gender.  
 
COUNTER-HEGEMONY: STRATEGIC ESSENTIALISM OR STRATEGIC UNIVERSALISM? 
 
Whereas the constitution of an identity can be used as a hegemonic tool, it is also possible 
to construct an identity as a counter-hegemonic strategy. Ironically, essentialism can be a 
counter-hegemonic strategy, or, a strategy of empowerment. Oppressed or marginalised 
groups have drawn on essentialist identity constructions to outline their history of 
oppression and to define themselves as an anti-racist, post-colonialist or nationalist 




movement. This is a powerful move since it has allowed them to regain their capacity for 
shaping their own identity that was previously taken from them by (usually white, 
European, colonialist) dominant groups. Spivak (1988) framed this as strategic 
essentialism, which can be employed as part of a political struggle. Resistance identity is 
constructed by those whose identity is stigmatised or devalued by the dominant culture 
(Castells 1997); by deconstructing the dichotomy between positive and negative images 
of identity. While essentialist identities can be part of an important political strategy of 
liberation according to the concept of intersectionality, they gloss over the distinct and 
complex experiences and identities of each person. Identities are formed by a context and 
cannot be understood apart from it since the context itself represents the condition for their 
existence. 
Laclau (1992) argued that demands by minority groups cannot be made in terms of 
difference or particularity. He claimed, “an appeal to pure particularism” without any 
reference to universality can only be “a self-defeating enterprise” (p.87). While 
particularism can serve to defend the rights of marginalised minorities, it can also defend 
the right to self-determination of reactionary groups. Laclau claimed that in their struggle, 
minorities cannot base their demands on difference but they need to draw on a universal 
principle for their political demands to be viable. As an example, for a universal principle 
through which marginalised groups can advocate their political demands, Laclau (1992) 
suggested citizenship.  
However, the next section will demonstrate that the link between citizenship and identity 
is contested and citizenship’s universality is limited, as Laclau (1992) also admitted. The 
tensions between universalism and particularism are used as frames to dissect citizenship 
and citizenship education in the following, by outlining how citizenship education 
responds to ‘universal’ concepts such as human rights, democracy or participation.  
 
 








Citizenship has become and remains a ‘buzzword’ (Faulks, 2000; Heater, 1990), discussed 
in a wide array of academic literature and defined in multiple and even sometimes 
contradictory ways. The interest in the concept and the amount of literature that has been 
written on it, point at its contested character and its political importance.  
Citizenship’s competing definitions demonstrate that it cannot be framed in a ‘neutral’ 
fashion, as its historical legacy has made it a tool for groups to establish their power or 
dominance. Most descriptions about citizenship as a concept usually refer to it as emerging 
from the historical context of ancient Greece and Rome, depicting it as a ‘Western’ 
concept. Isin (2012) argued that the discourse about citizenship is underpinned by “an 
orientalist assumption that citizenship is a European invention” (p.567) (see for example 
Weber, 1927), despite evidence that there were forms of citizenship as an organising 
principle in more ancient societies. Consequently, these constructions of citizenship, 
based on the traditions of citizenship in ancient Greece and Rome are not universal but 
specific to their ‘Western’ context.  
Following its historical legacy in the West, citizenship can be understood as a status or 
membership by the law of a political community, sustained by rights and responsibilities 
(McLean and McMillan, 2009). Citizenship is also defined as a set of social, political and 
economic practices (Isin and Wood, 1999), deriving from these rights and responsibilities. 
Additionally, the concept of identity sustains notions of citizenship, through promoting a 
sense of belonging to a political community. The section starts with outlining the two 
major approaches to citizenship that have emerged in the ‘West’ and thus influenced 
citizenship and citizenship education in Northern Ireland and Israel.  
LIBERALIST CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP 
 
While there are different understandings of citizenship among liberal thinkers such as 
Hobbes, Locke, Mill, and Rawls, they all emphasised the universal and egalitarian 




character of legal citizenship. Moreover, they viewed citizenship as utilitarian, as a 
political arrangement that primarily serves individual interests and protects individual 
rights (Isin and Wood, 1999). The liberal approach views individual rights as natural, 
universal and as predating the political community (Faulks, 2000).  
Liberalism emphasises the individual above the polity and advocates a division between 
the public and the private. For example, Rawls (1993) differentiated between public and 
non-public identity: while public identity is rooted in the basic laws, defined as a legal 
identity as citizens with rights and duties; non-public identity is connected to a person’s 
religion or culture (Rawls, 1985). Even though Rawls (1993) recognised the importance 
of the strong bond of culture, he maintained that this form of culture remains a background 
culture of the daily social life. He claimed that it is distinct from the political culture and 
should not provide a basis for citizenship. Instead, he proposed public identity, based on 
the political culture and liberal principles of freedom and equality as the basis for 
citizenship (Rawls, 1985; 1993). Among liberal and communitarian/republican theorists 
presented in the following, Rawls arguably advocated the most inclusive form of 
citizenship. However, he did not clarify whose interests, values and ideas underpin 
citizenship’s political culture. As citizenship developed in the context of the rise of 
nationalism, colonialism, and imperialism during the 19th century (Kymlicka, 1995), this 
has considerably formed notions of citizenship according to white, male and upper-class 
interest, as I will argue later. 
Mill (1972) claimed that only a common nationality can be the source of political 
allegiance and provide the basis for a democratic state. For him, cultural and national 
homogeneity is necessary to maintain a representative government and unity. Similarly, 
Marshall (1950) also shared the idea that common identity has an important integrative 
function for a welfare state.  He argued that a common national identity serves to integrate 




the working classes as citizens through the notion of a common culture, heritage, and 
possession43.   
Consequently, following Mill, Marshall, and Rawls, the universal claims of the liberal 
concept of citizenship are permeated by a notion of a collective identity or culture, which 
is arguably influenced by dominant groups in society. Despite its universal claims, 
liberalism has been complicit in sustaining the privilege of dominant groups, the 
production of inequalities and discrimination against minorities and disadvantaged groups 
(Isin and Wood, 1999).    
Among liberal thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke and Montesquieu, there has been less 
emphasis on citizenship as a practice in the political sphere. While the protection of 
citizens refers to the private life, the political community is only a necessary framework 
or arrangement instead of the source of a common life (Walzer, 1989). Therefore, it is 
reduced to an arena where different groups compete for their private interests (Mouffe, 
1992). Habermas (1994) claimed that the liberal approach positions individuals as external 
to the state, as private persons that only contribute to its preservation, in the form of duties 
or to receive rights and benefits from the state. This passivity of political participation 
reinforces the status quo, pointing to citizenship’s suitability as a hegemonic strategy. 
Faulks (2000) criticised that liberalism tends to overlook power structures which constrain 
citizens, limiting their access to political and socio-economic resources. 
COMMUNITARIAN/REPUBLICAN CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP  
 
Communitarian and republican approaches to citizenship vary from liberalism in their 
emphasis on the community or the ‘common good’ over individual interests. Modern 
theorists have drawn on the practices of citizenship in ancient Greece, where it was 
perceived as “the very core of life" (Heater, 1990:4). During the Renaissance, political 
theorists like Machiavelli and Rousseau emphasised commitment and obligation towards 
                                                             
43 According to Marshall "[c]itizenship requires a bond of a different kind, a direct sense of community 
membership based on loyalty to a civilisation which is a common possession. It is a loyalty of free men 
endowed with rights and protected by a common law." (Marshall 1950:24). 
 




the political community and promoted political participation as the citizen’s responsibility 
(Faulks, 2000; Heater, 1990). Republicans, such as Tocqueville (2004/1859) and Hobbes 
(1840/1691) argued that life in a political community serves to overcome human 
selfishness. Being critics of individualism, they suggested that individual rights are limited 
for the sake of the political community’s well-being. Thus, like in Athenian citizenship, 
the polis is given priority over the individual. Rousseau (1994/1762) outlined three 
mechanisms through which the individual will gain freedom and equality: through the 
social contract that regulates citizens’ rights and duties, the general will as a representation 
of the population’s interests, and life as a virtuous citizen. He argued that the general will 
requires certain homogeneity among the citizenry: “The further the social bond is 
stretched; the weaker it gets (…)” (Rousseau, Book II, chapter 9). The republican 
perspective prioritises the community and life as a citizen over individual rights, claiming 
that the individual finds true emancipation and freedom only in the virtue of being a citizen 
and an active member of the political community. Citizenship provides the overarching 
identity for the individual and this identity is defined by the political community. 
However, this definition of citizenship ignores the pluralism that prevails in most 
societies.  
To conclude, liberal and communitarian/republican approaches create an “irresolvable 
antinomy” (p.21) between citizenship and identity, promoting citizenship as ‘universal’ 
while it is actually tied to a particular identity (Isin and Wood, 1999). Isin and Wood 
(1999) claimed that civic republicanism conflates citizenship and identity, by referring to 
citizenship as an overarching ‘master identity’ (Mouffe, 1993) under which other 
identities (gender, race, class or culture) need to be subordinated. This weakens their 
relevance as a tool in the struggle for social justice. The next two sections examine 
theoretical approaches to national and multicultural citizenship in relation to identity and 
social justice. 
CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALISM 
 
Faulks (2000) argued that the historical association between citizenship and nationality, 
emerging from the rise of nationalism in Europe, has blurred the boundaries between the 




two. Nationalistic citizenship developed during the French revolution as a counter-
hegemonic strategy. Inspired by the work of Rousseau, French revolutionaries fostered 
the connection between citizenship and nationality. In the aftermath of the French 
Revolution from 1789, the nation was established as a secular and progressive entity that 
would replace the monarch or feudal systems with the people as the sovereign and thus 
provide a new source of authority (Faulks, 2000). The revolution has yielded a notion of 
a nation as a political community, making it the source of state sovereignty and granting 
it the right of political self-determination. It led to the fusion of nation and state and thus 
redefined the relationship between citizenship, state, and nation as it culturalised 
citizenship (Faulks, 2000). Taylor (1994) conceptualised nationalism as providing an 
ethnic, linguistic, cultural or religious identity as the ground for political allegiance. To 
provide a source of authority and common identity, the nation was presented as an entity, 
united not only in common agency but also in terms of place, descent, and customs (Miller, 
1995). The perception of the nation as having territorial boundaries resulted from the 
emergence of rival movements and the militarization in Europe (Faulks, 2000). This 
development gave rise to competing nationalisms, which defined themselves as distinct in 
some cultural or character traits (Miller, 1995). 
Some theorists framed different forms of nationalism. Smith (1986; 1991) and Ignatieff 
(1993) conceptualised the dichotomy between ethnic and civic or territorial nationalism, 
drawing on earlier works by Friedrich Meinecke and Hans Kohn. In their work, civic 
nationalism is portrayed as a ‘Western’ concept, built on a historic territory, political 
participation, citizenship and civic education, whereas ethnic nationalism is associated 
with a focus on descent, a vernacular culture, and customs and depicted as non-Western. 
In trying to reconcile these forms of nationalism, Miller (1989; 1995; 1999) defined 
nationalism as promoting a common national identity that does not exclude the existence 
of different ethnic groups and their practices within this national culture. Yet, he asserted 
that the public culture is based on a set of common understandings, political principles, 
social norms, cultural ideals and a national language, which suggests a certain cultural 
homogeneity. Brubaker (1999) criticised these distinctions between different forms of 
nationalism since they seem to be driven by an ethnocentric view that portrays Western 




nationalism as pioneering. The distinction between ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ remains 
ambiguous, as both refer to particular aspects of an assumed common culture and thus fall 
prey to essentialism, ignoring diversity and pluralism. All different forms of nationalism 
are marked by the same mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, leading Brubaker to 
conclude that different conceptions of nationalism are just differently inclusive and 
exclusive. Whether they rest on features of common descent or loyalty and patriotism for 
the nation’s ideology and institution, they vary only in applying different criteria for 
inclusion and exclusion. Despite its exclusionary character, many theorists advocated for 
nationalistic citizenship such as Mill, who depicted a common nationality as necessary for 
a functioning democratic state and citizenship. Even contemporary theorists such as Miller 
(1989; 1995; 1999) and Smith (1995) still stress the need for a common nationality as the 
basis for citizenship. 
Critics of this conflation between citizenship and nationality raised two major concerns: 
firstly, they questioned whether nationality is the only possible identity that can provide a 
bond with a community, as history has shown that religion and class, for example, can 
have a similar function (Faulks, 2000). Secondly, they doubted that national homogeneity, 
understood in ethnic or cultural terms can provide a basis for citizenship (Mouffe, 1992; 
Oommen, 1997); particularly in multicultural societies. This conflation can be dangerous 
since it is used to justify discrimination and exclusion of national minorities from 
citizenship rights. Consequently, nationalistic citizenship is a hegemonic strategy; a 
powerful resource to establish a group’s domination as a nation. It serves to legitimise the 
nation’s claims over a territory by building a body of history, symbols, and values that 
justify these claims, making it a powerful instrument of social closure (Brubaker, 1992).  
CITIZENSHIP AND DIFFERENCE 
 
Given these limitations of national citizenship, some theorists have argued for a re-
conceptualisation of citizenship that accommodates diversity (Benhabib, 1999; Kymlicka, 
1995; Parekh, 2003; Young, 1989). This demand has framed various understandings of 
multicultural citizenship (Joppke, 2001). Most famously in his liberal theory of minority 
rights, Kymlicka (1995) fleshed out his concept of ‘multicultural citizenship’. He did not 




break with the idea that a bond is required between the individual and her or his 
community. On the contrary, he emphasised the importance of cultural membership as an 
expression of an individual’s freedom. According to Kymlicka, the liberal ideal of free 
and equal individuals can be best realised within their own culture or nation. Yet, while 
values, cultural ideals, and history of majorities are usually constituted as the dominant 
culture, Kymlicka argued that national minorities should have equal rights of expression 
and access to their culture. As individual rights are not sufficient to guarantee justice, he 
demanded group-differentiated rights, such as the right to self-determination or self-
governance for minorities.  
Like Kymlicka, Young (1989; 1990) stated that oppressed groups need to be granted 
special mechanisms for recognition, effective representation and thus special rights. While 
both theorists revealed the flaws of apparent universal and neutral concepts of citizenship 
(Faulks, 2000), Kymlicka overlooked how the universalism promoted by liberal theory is 
pervaded by power structures, resulting in forms of domination and oppression (Isin and 
Wood, 1999; Young, 1989). Citizenship is defined in terms that favour a particular social 
identity, which minorities and feminists have identified as white, middle-class men 
(Ladson-Billings, 2005). Young argued that this can only be overcome through group 
differentiation and concepts of citizenship that do not assume the ideal of a just and equal 
society as their starting point but acknowledge the existence of power structures. She 
applied a different definition of social groups than Kymlicka, who framed minorities 
according to cultural and national affiliations. Like other theorists (Butler, 1993, Hall, 
2000; Said, 1978), Young claimed that these common group attributes assume a false 
continuity, referring to their constructed character. Instead, she defined group 
differentiation not as fixed, but as multiple, cross-cutting and shifting, depending on 
oppression and privilege, which is reminiscent of the concept of intersectionality 
(Crenshaw, 1989). This idea is also advocated by Benhabib (1999), who criticised 
Kymlicka’s homogenous understanding of culture and his assumption that ‘universalism’ 
derives from ‘Western’ cultures. Instead, she argued for the need to go beyond 
essentialised notions of cultures and to build citizenship rights based on the hybridity and 
fluidity of identities and cultures (Benhabib, 1999).  




The main argument of this section is that the definition of citizenship is part of a 
hegemonic struggle among different political groups. Citizenship has always been 
intertwined in power relations, which highlights the limits of liberal theory to achieve a 
fully reconciled society. This raises questions about how citizenship can be re-
conceptualised so that it goes beyond the universal pretensions of nationalism and 
liberalism and becomes the “product of diversity rather than an instrument for dominant 
groups to ‘accommodate’ diversity” (Isin and Wood, 1999:69). 
Responding to Spivak’s ‘strategic essentialism,’ Gilroy advocated for “strategic 
universalism” (2000:220). Strategic universalism aims at going beyond the constructed 
categories of race, gender, and class and appeals to a common human dignity (Gilroy, 
2000). Yet, as this section demonstrated, universalism is always at risk to be permeated 
by the most powerful particularisms.  
Is there a way to define a concept of citizenship that is generous to the multiplicity of 
identities, without making them redundant in their struggle for social justice? While the 
thesis’ purpose is not to answer this (important) question, it will remain in the background 
when examining the entanglements between citizenship education, identity, and 
hegemony in the next section and how citizenship education addresses questions of 
difference and justice. Perhaps this political question can be rephrased as an educational 
one, about how citizenship education can accommodate difference and a multiplicity of 
identities without compromising over its commitment to social justice.  
 
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION AND IDENTITY 
 
This section examines how identity is mediated through citizenship education against the 
backdrop of cultural hegemony. Like the concept of citizenship itself, literature from ‘the 
West’ tends to present the origins of citizenship education in the societies of ancient 
Greece and Rome and situates its modern development as part of nation-building. Yet, 
increasing demands for inclusion, rights and recognition by minority groups have 
challenged traditional forms of citizenship education. These demands led educators and 




academics to formulate approaches to multicultural and anti-racist education, which have 
been partly implemented as policies. Yet, like the concept of citizenship itself, citizenship 
education is at risk of being undermined by cultural hegemony. Like citizenship, it can be 
a powerful tool of either domestication, using Freire’s term, or of emancipation, as 
demanded by minorities and critical educators.   
 
WHAT IS CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 
 
Throughout history, citizenship education has taken different forms, depending on how a 
society envisioned its citizens to be. In ‘the West,’ it is often framed as originating from 
ancient Greece and Rome, where citizenship education was very militaristic and patriotic 
(Heater, 2004). With the decline of these societies, formal citizenship education retreated 
from schools and became understood as general education for socialisation instead of 
political education (Heater, 1990). During the upheaval of the French Revolution, 
Rousseau (1994/1762) and others demanded that schools should teach values that are 
beneficial to society and that citizenship education should regain its importance by being 
taught in schools to a wider public.  
Since the 19th century, school systems were mainly controlled by the nation state and this 
period was underpinned by new doctrines of nationalism, liberal democracy, and 
socialism, from which new concepts of citizenship education emerged. However, Heater 
(1990) described that these ideologies were restrained by the interest of the national 
governments to maintain the established order. Therefore, the state tried to prevent 
teachers from transmitting political ideas and values that would threaten the current status 
quo and urged schools to instil a sense of national identity among the masses (Heater, 
1990). Some school subjects like citizenship, geography or history promote national 
narratives, myths, and heroes that are intended to strengthen their citizens sense of 
belonging and their collective national identities (Anderson, 2006/1983; Nash et al., 1998; 
Phillips, 1998; Soysal, 2002). Thus, together with language teaching, these subjects were 
and remain important tools for homogenising and socialising mixed communities into a 




national community. The nation state’s control of education along with providing mass 
education for children was underlined by the purpose of institutionalising the nation state 
as the main entity to demand loyalty, against the competition with the churches and other 
sources of loyalty for national minorities (Heater, 1990). Therefore, historically the major 
role of citizenship and civic education has been to contribute to state formation by 
strengthening the sense of a common national identity, patriotism, and loyalty among its 
citizens (Green, 1990).  
During the second half of the 20th century, potentially influenced by the impact of 
citizenship education in militaristic societies like Nazi-Germany and fuelled by 
minorities’ demands for equal rights and inclusion (Bush and Saltarelli, 2000), citizenship 
education has been increasingly shaped by human rights, based on the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Tibbitts and Fernekes, 2011). This further exposed the need 
for democratic education, participation, and multicultural education to meet the demands 
of diverse societies. In the context of conflict societies, peace education has emerged as a 
field that claims to contribute to conflict resolution or conflict transformation. I will 
outline these educational trends and policies in the following and how they have impacted 
on citizenship education.  
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION POLICIES 
 
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION AND DIFFERENCE 
 
Education for difference as a form of multicultural, cosmopolitan and global education 
developed as a response to accommodate diversity in modern-nation states, which still 
tend to prioritise the development of one mainstream national identity. The field of 
multicultural education is complex, ranging from conservative to radical approaches 
(Sleeter, 1989). Since these different approaches promote conflicting meanings of 
multiculturalism, multicultural education has emerged as “a terrain of struggle around the 
reformation of historical memory, national identity, self-and social representation, and the 
politics of difference.” (Giroux, 1997: 246-47). McLaren (1995) mapped out these 
approaches to which he referred to as ‘conservative or corporate multiculturalism’, ‘liberal 




and left-liberal multiculturalism’, and ‘critical-resistance multiculturalism,’ which are 
discussed in the following. 
 
CONSERVATIVE AND LIBERAL MULTICULTURALISM  
 
Conservative or corporate multiculturalism has its roots in colonial colonialist attitudes 
(like Said (1978) described ‘Orientalism’) and constitutes itself on white supremacy, even 
though it professes to support equality (McLaren, 1995). Al-Haj (2002) framed this quite 
well in describing it as “a cover for an ideology of assimilation dominated by Whites”, 
where minorities are grouped under an apparent common culture, which is dominated by 
“white” history, language and identity and where “whiteness” acts as the “invisible norm” 
(p.93).  
Liberal and left-liberal approaches to multiculturalism differ from this conservative 
approach in a way that they recognise inequality between the majority population and 
minority groups (Al-Haj, 2002). While liberal multiculturalism places an emphasis on 
‘sameness’, supposing that everyone can compete equally in a capitalist society and 
promotes an ethnocentric universalistic humanism, left-liberal multiculturalism sets the 
emphasis on difference (McLaren, 1995). Giroux (1997) argued that liberal 
multiculturalism is obsessed with the celebration of identities, tolerance, and developing 
communicative competences. Left-liberal multiculturalism also does not go beyond 
acknowledging difference, analysing cultural stereotypes, and the celebration of tolerance. 
Both liberal approaches individualise and psychologise issues of racism and social 
injustice, which are only addressed on a personal but not a political level (Giroux, 1997). 
Consequently, the concern about social justice is missing from these approaches to 
multiculturalism (Giroux, 1997), which tend to essentialise culture and ignore the 
historical and political situatedness of difference in injustice and oppression.  
Critics of conservative and liberal multiculturalism illustrated this by policy examples 
from the United States and Britain. Prior to the civil rights struggle and ethnic 
revitalisation movements in the United States, citizenship education was dominated by an 




assimilationist approach and exclusionist policies (Banks, 2004; Castles, 2004). Policies 
of assimilation have denied full citizenship to minorities (Giroux, 1997:247), whose 
interests, cultures, languages, and identities are not reflected by the proclaimed ‘common’ 
culture. While minorities in the United States and elsewhere have increasingly brought 
multicultural policies to the fore, they still feel alienated by the promotion of the national 
culture they cannot identify with or be part of. Banks (2008) suggested that national 
citizenship curricula can be a form of hegemony: “Mainstream citizenship education is 
grounded in mainstream knowledge and assumptions and reinforces the status quo and the 
dominant power relationships in society.” (p.135).  
The prioritisation of one national culture mostly happens at the expense of omitting 
histories, cultures, and identities of minorities and marginalised groups in official 
curricula (Banks, 2008; Ladson-Billings, 2004; Osler and Vincent, 2002). Even though 
these curricula are presented as objective, value-free, colour-blind and as addressing all 
students, those who benefit from schooling and who can mostly identify with these 
curricula are usually white, middle-class students (Giroux, 1997; Ladson-Billings, 2005). 
Through her analysis of public policies in the United States, Ladson-Billings (1996) 
demonstrated that the social construct of race has been ‘muted’ by the paradigm of 
multiculturalism, which has become a rather mainstream approach of dealing with 
differences. She argued that by promoting an ‘equality of difference,’ multiculturalism 
obscures a critical analysis of race and the social reality of people of colour in the United 
States. Consequently, Banks (2004a) argued that there is a gap between democratic ideals 
in Western nations and the daily experiences of students in their schools since they are 
undermined by a white (Anglo-American) hegemony.  
Similarly, in the United Kingdom, efforts have been made to integrate multicultural issues 
as part of the national citizenship curriculum (QCA, 1998). However, academics (Faulks 
2006; Gilborn 2006; Osler 2003b) criticised the policy proposals44, arguing that they fail 
                                                             
44 The critics refer to the ‘Crick report’, published in 1998 by the ‘Advisory Group on the Teaching of 
Citizenship and Democracy in schools’. The advisory group was charged with the task to develop 
educational responses to   increasing concerns about racism. Another review was published in 2007, as 
the “Diversity and citizenship curriculum review” or ‘Ajegbo Report’ on the developments in 
 




to adequately address issues of institutional racism, social exclusion, and discrimination. 
Gilborn (2006) critiqued that policies have failed to address institutional racism within the 
UK’s education system. Racism has been framed as an interpersonal issue that is generally 
absent from British society. Osler (2009) argued that the curriculum encourages a 
“celebratory multiculturalism” (p.14), instead of a critical examination of diversity as a 
feature of democratic discourse. Similarly, Alibhai-Brown (2000; 2001) caricatured the 
model of British multiculturalism as “saris, samosas, and steel drums” which focuses on 
cultural characteristics of ethnic groups such as food or clothing and does not address 
more pressing issues of racism and collective identity. Young people are confronted with 
a choice between developing a national identity or aspects of European and global identity, 
but not given an alternative to seeing these identities as complementary (Osler, 2009).  
These multicultural approaches feature a corporate aspect (McLaren, 1995), as they are 
linked to individual opportunities rather than directed towards social justice. Kymlicka 
(2004) described this as an elite form of multiculturalism, which he labels ‘cosmopolitan 
multiculturalism’ as opposed to ‘domestic multiculturalism’. Whilst domestic 
multiculturalism stands for an education about the histories, identities, and cultures of 
minority groups to foster respect and justice in a common nation-state, cosmopolitan 
multiculturalism promotes studying international languages such as English and Chinese, 
which are influential in shaping the ‘world culture’ as enhancing individual opportunities 
and cultural capital (Kymlicka, 2004). Similarly, Bannerji (2000) drew on Althusser’s 
terminology of the ideological state apparatus to explain how cosmopolitan or 
multicultural elites seek to reproduce themselves and their cultural capital under the guise 




                                                             
citizenship education, which stated that citizenship education lacks contextualisation and continues to 
neglect issues of identity and diversity (Ajegbo et al., 2007). 






In contrast, critical-resistance multiculturalism goes beyond these approaches and argues 
for a transformative political agenda as opposed to the accommodation of the status quo 
(McLaren, 1995). While conservative and liberal approaches treat cultural narratives and 
national history as fixed, critical approaches view representations of culture, race, and 
gender as the historical result of social struggles for power relations (Giroux, 1997). 
Giroux (1997) argued that insurgent or critical multiculturalism critically analyses and 
deconstructs the dominant culture and how it reproduces structural inequality. For 
example, it postulates that curricula are media that reproduce relations of inequality, 
domination, and oppression (Giroux, 1997). Consequently, reforming relations between 
cultures is not enough, since the meanings of these cultures and identities need to be 
transformed so that they promote social justice. In contrast, conservative approaches see 
multiculturalism with its diversity of identities and traditions as a “threat to democracy” 
(p.245) and ignore the need for a democratic society that constantly re-examines itself by 
promoting a form of dialogue among its critical and engaged citizens (Giroux, 1997).  
Critical-resistance multiculturalism is closely connected to critical race theory (or 
antiracism, see Gilborn, 2004), which both deconstruct oppressive structures and 
reconstruct human agency of those who are oppressed under the current hegemonic system 
(Ladson-Billings, 2004). Ladson-Billings stated that critical race theory is sceptical about 
the civil rights agenda and liberal approaches to multiculturalism in education, claiming 
that white people have benefited most from these approaches to equality, which do not 
promote social change or challenge structural racism. Gilborn (2004) argued that 
antiracism or critical race theory in turn demand to identify and acknowledge that racism 
is deeply ingrained in socio-political and cultural structures of capitalist societies. 
Some multicultural educators argued that multicultural and citizenship education should 
promote different layers of identity, such as local, national, global or cosmopolitan 
(Banks, 2008; Osler and Starkey, 2005). Osler and Starkey (2005) viewed 
cosmopolitanism for example as an extension of national and cultural identities: 
“Cosmopolitan citizens act locally, nationally and globally” (p.24). They claimed that 




citizens should be encouraged to draw connections between their local, cultural, national, 
and global affiliations. This can foster their understanding of how these are interrelated 
and connected to matters of social justice and inequality (Banks, 2008; Lister, 1997; 
Nussbaum, 1996; Yuval-Davis, 1999). Consequently, multicultural education is also 
about learning knowledge, skills, and attitudes to function and participate across different 
local cultural communities and the global community (Banks, 2004; Castles, 2004).   
Additionally, there is a need to validate and recognise minority identities and rights 
through multicultural education (Banks, 2004; 2008). This can happen for example 
through textbooks and materials that give voice to histories and experiences of minority 
groups or activities that provide a space to express these with the goal to enable minority 
students to develop positive cultural identities (Banks, 2008). Banks identified this as an 
important aspect of transformative citizenship since all students should develop an 
extensive and critical knowledge about their own and other communities. This allows 
them to understand how identity and culture are ingrained in political structures and how 
to advocate for justice and transformation (Banks, 2008). Through transformative 
citizenship education, students can critically embrace their identities and use them as a 
source of agency and possibility (Giroux, 1997). In sum, the major difference between 
conservative, liberal and critical multiculturalism is that only the latter allows an 
examination of identities in the context of privilege, oppression and social justice.  
 
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION AS POLITICAL EDUCATION 
 
The degree of political participation of young people depends on the parameters of the 
political system they live in, particularly on how it defines citizenship and how inclusive 
it is towards young people. In ancient Greece, citizenship was based on the presumption 
that participation in public life was important for personal development (Heater, 1990), 
making it one of the important goals of citizenship education. Young people were trained 
in rhetorical skills and by attending public political discussions (Heater, 2004). 




Nevertheless, they remained ‘citizens in waiting’ in this ancient society, where political 
participation was limited to male, privileged adults. 
While the Convention on the Rights of the Child allocates participation rights to children 
that intend to allow them to have a more ‘active voice’ (UN, 1989), the entitlement to the 
full status of citizenship and associated political rights remain bound to a minimum age 
of 18 or 16 at best. Banks (2009) argued that the recognition of young people as citizens 
requires also a recognition of their participatory rights. Yet, in practice, young people’s 
political participation takes place mostly only in more informal processes through civil 
society or in the classroom. These informal processes are outlined in the following as the 
practice of democracy in classrooms, discussions of controversial issues, and the 
promotion of critical thinking. 
 
DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION 
 
Citizenship education has been framed as serving two purposes: the development of the 
individual on the one hand and the needs of the democratic polity on the other hand 
(Heater, 1990). For example, Karl Mannheim (1970) described the task of schools as to 
prepare young people for a society with a democratic polity that is always changing. He 
claimed that such a society requires individuals with a democratic personality who can 
tolerate disagreement and take exposure to different opinions as a sign of personal 
enrichment. Mannheim saw this task as transcending the realm of the school since the 
school itself should be exposed to the democratic society, being an intermediary between 
the family and the state, preparing young people for societal life (Mannheim, 1970).  
In similar terms, John Dewey (2014/1916) explained that democracy must devote itself to 
education as it requires individuals that are educated in a way to display voluntary 
disposition and interest in the democratic process. For Dewey, democracy is about 
maximising communication between individuals and groups, exposing them to different 
perspectives and point of views. His educational theory sought to incorporate both shared 
values that facilitate cooperation and the confrontation with contrasting point of views.  In 




his experiential approach to education, Dewey (1959) argued that democratic values and 
participation can only be internalised by students through promoting a democratic 
environment in schools: "all genuine education comes about through experience (…)" 
(Dewey, 1997/1938:25).  
Like Dewey and Mannheim, Gutman argued that education for participation is essential 
to secure the society’s democratic character: “Political education prepares citizens to 
participate in consciously reproducing their society, and conscious social reproduction is 
the ideal not only of democratic education but also of democratic politics (…)” (Gutman 
1987:287). 
Education plays a central role in democratic politics because it entails a form of 'conscious 
social reproduction': citizens must be empowered with the means to shape their own 
education. This education then provides the basis for the political values, attitudes, and 
behaviour of the future citizens. Gutman claimed that democracy and democratic 
education depend on each other, as democracy needs democratic education to unfold its 
moral strength and in turn, democratic education must be based on democratic principles. 
Disagreement and deliberation are an expression of freedom of democratic societies and 
schools that have the capacity and grounds to teach children to discuss disagreements 
(Gutman, 1987).  
All these theorists refer to the idea of providing a space for the negotiation of different 
perspectives and disagreement, based on the principles of toleration and respect for 
different opinions. Allowing opportunities for debate and discussion of contested issues 
and topics that are politically divisive in the classroom is the most important aspect of 
democratic education (Osler and Starkey, 2006).  Hess argued that discussions of 
controversial issue offer a pathway from issue discussion to political participation (Hess, 
2004a; Hess and Avery, 2008). She defined ‘discussion’ as a form of dialogue and 
exchange of information; as a way for people to express their own ideas while being 
exposed to those of others. Public discussions and the inclusion of controversial issues in 
the school curriculum prepare young people for competent and meaningful political 
engagement (Hess and Avery, 2008). Others argued that discussions of controversial 




issues also foster democratic values, such as tolerance, equality, and diversity (Oliver and 
Shaver, 1966), and that they prepare students to feel more comfortable addressing 




Another important aspect of political education is critical thinking (Banks, 2008; Johnson 
and Morris, 2010). While citizenship education traditionally focused on the promotion of 
patriotism, loyalty to the nation and a common identity; the concern to develop ‘critical’ 
citizens became increasingly incorporated into citizenship curricula around the world 
(Johnson and Morris, 2010). Yet, Banks (2008) contended that citizenship education, 
which teaches mainstream knowledge and focuses on maintaining the status quo, does not 
encourage critical thinking. Most policy documents provide a shallow form of critical 
thinking: for example, in England’s curriculum guidance, critical thinking is described as 
“exploring, developing, evaluating and making choices” (Qualifications and Curriculum 
Authority, 2007). This definition of critical thinking differs from critical pedagogy, which 
seeks to empower the oppressed (and also the privileged) to critically reflect on dominant 
political and economic structures and to challenge the status quo (Freire, 1970). The major 
difference between these approaches towards critical thinking is that critical pedagogy is 
not only about thinking critically but also emphasises political thinking (Burbules and 
Berk, 1999).  
This is reminiscent of Banks’ (2008) approach to transformative citizenship, which 
challenges mainstream knowledge, advocates for positive changes, and seeks to bring 
voices of minorities to the fore (Banks, 2008). For Banks, this defines ‘deeper’ citizenship 
(see Clarke, 1996), as opposed to forms of citizenship that only concentrate on the legal 
requirements of rights and obligations but fail to challenge unequal socio-political 
structures and to encourage active participation. Transformative citizenship encourages 
political action to dismantle existing oppressing structures, even if this violates existing 
unjust laws (Banks, 2008). 




HUMAN RIGHTS  
 
Another aspect of political education is Human Rights Education (HRE). Similar to 
critical thinking, HRE can be approached in different ways, as this section will argue. 
HRE has not only become an important strand of citizenship education, but also a legal 
requirement according to international law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
from 1948 established HRE as a right for all as it provides that 
(…) every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration 
constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for 
these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and 
international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, 
both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of 
territories under their jurisdiction. (UN Assembly 1948: Preamble). 
While this statement allocates a commitment of all member-states to HRE, the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC) manifests HRE also as an entitlement to all children 
(Osler, 2008). Yet, as Osler maintained, in practice there is a range of problems with the 
realisation of HRE for all children. For example, she referred to the tensions between HRE 
and citizenship education, since each suggests a different relationship between the 
individual and the state. Human rights claim universality that goes beyond citizenship 
rights, as they entitle all humans as rights-holders and maintain the adherence to these 
rights as the government’s responsibility (UN Assembly, 1948). Osler (2008) framed this 
as a conflict since citizenship education usually does not encourage learners to be critical 
towards their government and fosters a sense of patriotism. HRE, however, appeals to the 
learner’s awareness that the government can be held accountable to secure human rights 
(Osler, 2008). This critical aspect of HRE could empower learners to develop a more 
critical and reflective relationship towards their nation-state and to examine its democratic 
character carefully. Through this awareness of universal human rights, individuals are 
empowered to engage actively in demands for social justice (Osler and Starkey, 2005).  




Moreover, HRE also conflicts with traditional citizenship education in terms of identity, 
as it demands that children from minority groups have the right to be exposed to these 
identities and cultures in addition to the dominant national identity. Article 29 of the CRC 
states the right of 
 [t]he development of respect for the child's parents, his or her own cultural 
identity, language and values, for the national values of the country in which the 
child is living, the country from which he or she may originate, and for civilizations 
different from his or her own (UN 1989:29c). 
Whereas traditional national citizenship education focuses on the promotion of a common 
national identity, HRE is required to go beyond national identity by including the diversity 
of (national, cultural, and religious) identifications of children. Therefore, HRE can be an 
important part of political education that counterbalances nationalism and patriotism, 
since it points at the nation state’s accountability to recognise individual and group rights.  
However, it is important to keep in mind that the declaration of human rights, despite its 
symbolic importance, is not a powerful document in practice, as most governments violate 
human rights constantly without legal consequences (Isin and Wood, 1999). Isin and 
Wood (1999) explained that human rights are usually guaranteed through national 
citizenship, which does not secure the rights of minority groups. Thus, Kobayashi (1993) 
stated that like most policies, this document is full of rhetoric without contributing to 
minorities’ struggle for equality.  
 
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION AND CONFLICT 
 
Davies (2004) identified education as an important means for peace-building in conflict 
and post-conflict societies. Therefore, addressing the conflict and peace is a central feature 
in citizenship education in conflict-affected societies. Again, there are different 
approaches to conflict as part of citizenship education and some are at risk of being 
undermined by the cultural hegemony that sustains the status quo and can prevent the 
critical examination of conflict.  





PEACE EDUCATION AND ITS CRITICISM  
 
The parameters and content of peace education vary across different contexts, yet usually, 
they aim to promote certain values such as justice, tolerance, equality and human rights 
among others (Bar-Tal, 2002). Chapter one outlined the educational policies or activities 
in Northern Ireland and Israel that are based on contact theory (Allport, 1954), where 
students from different backgrounds meet or study together, either in activities, lessons or 
integrated and bilingual schools. Whereas negative contact is seen as strengthening 
stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination, contact theory postulates that positive contact 
under conditions of equal status, common goals and institutional support, can foster 
positive attitudes between different groups (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1971; Stephan and 
Stephan, 2001).  
However, critical social psychologists (Dixon et al., 2005) and educationalists (Bekerman, 
2002; 2005; 2016; Connolly, 2000) have pointed at the limitations of these encounters in 
the realities of divided societies. While Dixon et al. (2005) acknowledged that these 
encounters might work under the conditions created by the researchers, they represent a 
utopia that does not resemble people’s everyday life realities. Ethnographic studies that 
investigated the perception of ‘the other’ (Bekerman, 2002; 2005; 2016; Connolly, 2000), 
illustrate how participants’ constructions of themselves and ‘the enemy’ are embedded in 
complex socio-political structures and the particular context. Thus, they argued that these 
perceptions cannot simply be explained through ‘psychological’ processes of stereotyping 
and individual prejudice. For example, Bekerman (2005) demonstrated how bilingual 
environments in Israel are undermined by dominant political structures, which clearly 
prioritise one language (Hebrew) over the other (Arabic), imposing on the (Arabic-
speaking) minority language assimilation as a requirement for educational success. Thus, 
Connolly (2000) and Dixon et al. (2005) have argued that these encounters based on the 
contact hypothesis distract from the more salient issues by concentrating on individual 
prejudice as the major reason for conflict, ignoring its wider political and economic 




structures. Therefore, if policies are based solely on the theoretical framework of contact, 
they might be ideologically exploited by those in whose interests it is to cover up 
institutional racism, injustice or other inequalities (Dixon et al., 2005).  
Other forms of peace education seek to enable participants to take the perspective of the 
‘adversary’ group and to learn to view their perspective as legitimate, including their 
narratives, memories, and identities (Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009; Salomon, 2004). Bar-Tal 
and Rosen (2009) claimed that to promote reconciliation, a new ‘common’ account of the 
past needs to be developed and the image of the former ‘opponent’ needs to be accepted 
as a human being with equal rights. Yet, they also noted that to be effective, peace 
education needs to be embedded in a broader framework of societal change (Bar-Tal and 
Rosen, 2009). Such an approach that goes beyond the individualisation and 




Conflict transformation could provide a broader societal framework to address the 
conflict. Among other theorists, Lederach (1995) framed the term conflict transformation, 
which he intentionally differentiated from the more established terms of conflict 
management and conflict resolution. Whereas the former seeks to contain the conflict and 
achieve compromise (Bloomfield and Reilly, 1998), the latter aims to find constructive 
outcomes that are acceptable to all parties without having the parties to sacrifice their 
fundamental needs (Azar and Burton, 1986). Lederach (2014) criticised both approaches 
for their tendency to “cover up” (p.9) the conflict or to suggest that there are pragmatic 
solutions to the complex issue of conflict. While conflict resolution offers short-term 
relief, focusing on de-escalation and the content of the problem, conflict transformation 
provides a long-term approach, focusing on the context and relationship patterns of the 
conflict and admits that escalation to a certain degree might be necessary for constructive 
change (Lederach, 2014). This view is also shared by Davies (2004) who argued that peace 




education requires exposure to conflict, by encountering opposing views and narratives 
from ‘the other side’. 
Thus, the conflict transformation approach poses further challenges for peace education. 
Zembylas (2007) maintained that it is difficult for students and teachers to discuss 
reconciliation, where the remnants of the conflict still have emotional implications for 
them. He called this “the politics of trauma” (p.208), referring to the collective memory 
of fear, hatred, victimisation, and dehumanisation within these societies. The politics of 
trauma creates challenges by how past events related to the conflict are remembered and 
narrated and the need to critically evaluate these narratives (Zembylas, 2007). 
Consequently, due to the challenges of dealing with and questioning these emotions, Bar-
Tal (2002) stated that while peace education commits itself to promote positive change, 
there is a danger that controversial issues might be avoided. This presents one of the major 
challenges for citizenship education in conflict-affected societies, since discussing 
controversial issues related to identities and narratives of the conflict are a crucial part of 
democratic education (see Hess, 2004a) and peace education, as argued above.  
Consequently, Salomon (2011) claimed that peace education is more likely to take place 
on the individual or interpersonal level through the development of peace-related values 
and contact with ‘the other’. Yet, this does not affect social or political structures that are 
built on the legacy of the conflict (Salomon, 2011). Therefore, as Bekerman and Zembylas 
(2012) maintained, peace education tends to ignore power relations and structural 
problems that continue to institutionalise social injustice. Approaches to peace education 
have been mostly guided by functionalist, psychologised and often idealist perspectives, 
following the ‘Western’ tradition and have largely ignored the importance of power 
relations (one can argue that this is also true for approaches to human rights education, 
multicultural education, and democratic education) (Bekerman and Zembylas, 2012). 
They claimed that the understanding of peace in the ‘Western’ tradition is essentialised 
and thus problematic as it treats the ‘solution’ to difference (as the underlying force for 
conflict) as either assimilation or destruction, disregarding structural problems that 
institutionalise social injustice (Bekerman and Zembylas, 2012). Following the ideas of 




post-colonial theorists, this is not surprising since Western colonial powers sought to 
replace one hegemony with the other, for example, the hegemony of imperial powers with 
those of the nation state. Bekerman and Zembylas (2012) argued that Western colonial 
powers have homogenised peace and reconciliation instead of acknowledging their 
complexity and their situatedness in a certain context shaped by political power structures. 
Since they are sites through which ideologies are mediated, schools cannot be viewed as 
neutral arenas in modern nation states (Bekerman and Zembylas, 2012), and thus also not 
in terms of the conflict. They concluded that peace education is a “universal utopia” (p.27), 
which is at odds with diverse and sometimes conflicting representations of truth and 
justice in conflict-affected societies (Bekerman and Zembylas, 2012). Consequently, this 
raises the question whether citizenship education can contribute to conflict transformation 
in Northern Ireland and Israel.  
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION ALONG THE SPECTRUM 
 
Some theorists have placed different approaches to citizenship education on a spectrum, 
from passive to active forms (Kerr, 2000), or from minimal to maximal approaches 
(McLaughlin, 1992). Kerr (2000) and McLaughlin (1992) also sought to locate the terms 
of ‘civic education’ and ‘citizenship education’ along this spectrum, where the former 
frames a rather passive and technical concept, equipping the citizen with values, 
identifications, and knowledge to become a member of the community, whereas the latter 
is directed at broader, participatory and critical understandings of citizenship. I will 
describe this spectrum in the following by incorporating the different approaches to 
citizenship education theory and policies that were discussed above.  
PASSIVE CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION OR CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION FOR DOMESTICATION 
 
Passive or minimal forms of citizenship education are described as largely content and 
teacher-led, knowledge-based, providing little opportunity for student participation and 
initiative (Kerr, 2000); as well as teaching ‘technical’ knowledge about the government 
and history of the country (Torney-Purta et al., 1999; McLaughlin, 1992). Following 
critical multicultural or antiracist educators (Banks, 2008; Gilborn, 2006; Giroux, 1997, 




1980; Ladson-Billings, 2005), a passive approach teaches unreflectively about national 
identity, patriotism, and loyalty as a manifestation of the majority population’s privilege 
while marginalising minority groups’ identities, histories, and political interests. This 
form of citizenship education promotes ideologies that try to present private interests as 
the public good and to establish their ideas as universal truths (Giroux, 1980; 1984). 
McLaughlin (1992) described a passive form of citizenship education as an “unreflective 
socialisation into the political and social status quo” (p.238) and Kerr (1999) as promoting 
interests of political and economic elites.  
The increasing influence of neoliberalism on educational policies led to a depoliticisation 
of citizenship education in capitalist societies, which became incorporated in a culture of 
positivism and marketisation (Giroux, 1980). Marketisation defines the new official 
knowledge or common-sense in education (Apple, 2004). Kilkauer (2015) referred to a 
culture of managerialism as a similar trend that increasingly permeates public institutions 
such as schools, running them like corporations.   
Giroux (1997) argued that policies, infused with conservative liberal multiculturalism are 
grounded in excessive individualism and a competitive ethic. Issues of structural racism 
and poverty are individualised and minorities are seen as responsible for their own success 
or ‘failure’ (Giroux, 1997). Examples of these educational policies are the promotion of 
choice, the focus on enhancement of test scores, the re-privatisation and deregulation of 
schools, nationalisation, and standardisation of the curriculum and literacy.  
The conservative and liberal establishment advertises these policies as guarantors for 
equality (Giroux, 1997). Consequently, Giroux (1997) claimed that citizenship is 
privatised and individualised, empty of political obligations and commitments to social 
justice and transformation since this would threaten current power relations and the 
privileges of the (usually white, male) upper classes. Political and economic elites prefer 
to define citizenship as an act of altruism or philanthropy instead of social responsibility, 
masking problems of white racism and social justice through the “celebration of choice 
and the logic of the market” (Giroux, 1997:241). By glossing over institutional and 
systematic issues of racism and inequality and locating them in the context of personal 




prejudice, citizenship education is reduced to a tool for stability and control (Gilborn, 
2006), providing only a “false generosity” (Freire, 1970:45) to marginalised groups. As a 
result, passive approaches to citizenship education are infused with cultural hegemony 
that secures the status quo and reproduces a form of education for domestication (Freire, 
1970).  
ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION OR CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION FOR EMPOWERMENT 
 
In contrast, it is argued that active forms of citizenship education not only seek to inform 
students but also build their capacity to participation and interaction with other students 
through debates and discussions (Kerr, 2000). They seek to promote critical understanding 
and questioning, nourishing a concern for and commitment to social justice among young 
people (McLaughlin, 1992). Debates and discussions of controversial and politically 
divisive topics are an important aspect of active citizenship education since they foster 
democratic values and prepare young people for competent and meaningful political 
engagement (Hess, 2004b; Hess and Avery 2008; Oliver and Shaver, 1966; Osler and 
Starkey, 2006). Yet, how can citizenship education nourish dialogue and democracy if it 
is itself subject to domination and manipulation? How can young people be critical 
citizens when the banking concept turns them into “receiving objects” (Freire, 1970:77)?  
Critical educators (Apple, 2004; Freire, 1970; Giroux, 1997; McLaren, 1995) have 
demanded that political education and thus citizenship education needs to reflect critical 
pedagogy. They argued that education should enable learners to deconstruct dominant 
ideologies that underpin the status quo and assess them against their demands for social 
justice. McLaren (1995) formulated this aptly by stating that justice does not simply exist 
because it is inscribed in our laws, such as in constitutions or the declaration of human 
rights, instead it needs to be constantly reassessed and struggled for.  
In terms of identity, critical multiculturalists and advocators of critical race 
theory/antiracism urged a critical analysis of the construction of different identities 
through race, class, culture, and gender (Banks, 2008; Giroux, 1997; Ladson-Billings, 
2005). They also demand that citizenship education needs to go beyond mainstream 




narratives of the nation, its history and culture and allow the exploration of alternative 
identifications, narratives, and histories. In this way, it includes the right of minorities to 
have their cultures, narratives, and identities included in addition to those of the majority. 
In societies scarred by conflict, political generosity can enable a discussion with people 
who have different or opposing views. Emerson (2012) defined political generosity as “the 
ability to legitimise the cultural and political identity of those with opposing views” 
(2012:290), which she based on the condition of having confidence in one’s own cultural 
and political identity and in the right of others to hold these views. Yet, this also includes 
criticality towards one own’s identity, culture, and narratives. Related to this, Banks 
(1994) and Jenks et al. (2001) claimed that the development of cross-cultural competency 
involves “the critical examination of one’s own beliefs and values regarding culture, race, 
and social class; and an understanding of how knowledge, beliefs, and values determine 
one’s behaviour with respect to minority groups.” (Jenks et al., 2001:88). ‘Political 
generosity’ can be set in opposition to “false generosity” (Freire, 1970:45), promoted by 
passive citizenship education that facilitates a subtle control of the oppressed through 
imposing notions of citizenship, identity and conflict that act as empty signifiers and fail 
to challenge the current status quo and system of advantage. Knowledge and confrontation 
with other perspectives, narratives about the conflict and other political identities can 
enhance the capacity for political generosity (Emerson, 2012). 
Therefore, such an educational approach treats identities as products of their political and 
historical contexts and allows a reconceptualisation of identity as a fluid and changing 
idea that is connected to power relations (Hall, 2000).  
Giroux argued that a critical perspective on citizenship education 
(…) not only situates the relationship between schools and other social institutions 
in a basically political framework, but it also makes problematic the very nature 
of citizenship itself. It provides the basis for analysing how a given conception of 
what it means to be a citizen is conveyed through the dominant rationality in a 
given social order. Thus, it calls into question not simply what the school claims 
it does, but what in fact schools may unintentionally do as institutions that exist in 




a particular relationship with the state. The nature of their relationship, of course, 
is contained in one of the fundamental questions at the heart of any notion of 
citizenship education (1980:334). 
Thus, active approaches to citizenship education encourage a critical examination of the 
concept of citizenship and citizenship education itself.    
HRE, democratic education, participation, and multicultural education all consist of 
critical aspects with potential for empowering citizenship education. These critical aspects 
could re-define young people as critical democratic citizens, who are invited to explore 
their identities in relation to dominant structures of inequality and oppression and to 
realise their demands through active participation. Part of this process of transformation 
includes the reclamation of identities by the oppressed to become “beings for themselves” 
(p.161) and by the privileged to critically examine their own identities in the politico-
historical context (Freire, 1970). As opposed to the ‘common-sense’ promoted by minimal 
or passive forms of citizenship education, this approach relates to Gramsci’s (1929/1971) 
idea of ‘good sense’, nourishing a critical consciousness that dismantles hegemonic 




This Chapter linked the critique of the educational approaches and policies that underpin 
citizenship to the theoretical framework of cultural hegemony. It revealed the hegemonic 
character of these policies, which are influenced by the marketisation, individualisation, 
and psychologisation of citizenship and conflict. The review of the literature proposes two 
key arguments: firstly, citizenship education reproduces a ‘common-sense’ that masks 
itself as neutral, apolitical, colour and culture-blind. It rephrases issues of inequality and 
racism as the responsibility of the individual while breaking the link between injustice and 
ideologies promoted by political and economic elites.  
Part of this hegemonic strategy that underpins citizenship education is to essentialise 
meanings of identity, culture, and difference. Conservative and liberal multiculturalism 




employ assimilationist or exclusionist strategies to citizenship, which promote for 
example a sense of ‘Americanness’ or ‘Britishness’ that is in fact dominated by white, 
upper-class and male perspectives. The analysis of citizenship curricula and policies in 
other contexts demonstrated how the cultural capital is shaped by the culture and 
knowledge of the privileged (white and upper-class) population (Banks, 2008; Ladson-
Billings, 2004; 2005; Osler and Vincent, 2002). These approaches deliberately overlook 
dimensions of power, domination, and oppression that are running through the history of 
Western nation states. In Northern Ireland and Israel, citizenship education is framed as a 
response to division and difference. Yet, this Chapter discussed how education systems 
and policies are infused by cultural hegemony that maintains the privilege of political and 
economic elites and secures the status quo. The first Chapter outlined citizenship 
education in Northern Ireland and Israel and concluded that whilst it has the potential to 
provide a structural explanation of conflict and division to learners, it is at risk to be 
undermined by political (hegemonic) interests.  
Secondly, drawing on Laclau, these ‘passive’ forms of citizenship education promote ‘a 
particular’ disguised as ‘a universal’, through terms such as equality, human rights, 
democracy, and peace. The previous section outlined how these concepts can become 
empty signifiers in the face of cultural hegemony. Therefore, cultural hegemony can dilute 
the meaning of these important concepts (equality, democracy and human rights), by 
offering a “false generosity” (Freire, 1970:45) to marginalised groups to silence their 
struggle and to discourage criticality and transformation also among the majority 
population. The dominance of identity politics and neoliberalism might prevent a critical 
examination of the conflict, racism, and sectarianism, as this would jeopardise the status 
quo. When citizenship education is framed in the language of individual prejudice and 
responsibility, it fails to address broader issues of social justice. 
What does this mean for citizenship education in divided and conflict-affected societies? 
The thesis seeks to explore how citizenship education is practised in the classroom and 
how the concepts of citizenship, identity and the conflicts are understood by teachers and 
students. Chapter one argued that educational policies in Northern Ireland and Israel 
sidestep addressing structural explanations of conflict, racism, and sectarianism. 




Additionally, in Israel, the curriculum is increasingly dominated by a national-religious 
ideology. These observations inform the first research question, which examines how 
cultural hegemony is expressed through the citizenship curricula in both societies. 
This Chapter outlined how cultural hegemony is transmitted through schools as sites of 
cultural reproduction (Apple, 2004; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990). Cultural reproduction 
is ensured through the distribution of cultural capital in schools, which is infused with the 
interests of political and economic elites (Apple, 2004). Cultural hegemony is exercised 
on other groups by setting the acquirement of cultural capital as a requirement for 
educational success. However, this Chapter also argued that some aspects of citizenship 
education, such as critical thinking, (critical) multiculturalism, education for democracy 
and human rights have an emancipatory potential. This raises the second research question 
of how schools in Northern Ireland and Israel respond to the citizenship education policies. 
The context of division and discrimination45 in both societies also prompts to examine 
whether Catholic and Protestant, Arab-Palestinian and Jewish-Israeli schools deal 
differently with these policies. 
While the citizenship curricula in Northern Ireland and Israel state to promote community 
relations and tolerance (Ministry of Education, 2001; CCEA, 2007), the previous Chapter 
suggested that the curricula are at risk from being diluted by identity politics, 
individualisation and psychologisation of conflict (Bekerman and Zembylas, 2012; 
McEvoy, 2007; Pinson, 2011). These processes can prevent a critical examination of the 
conflict, racism, and sectarianism. This concern informs the third research question of 
whether and how citizenship education can contribute to conflict transformation in these 
societies.  
 
                                                             
45 I am referring to the historical discrimination of the Catholic population in Northern Ireland. In Israel, the 
Arab-Palestinian population experiences structural discrimination through unequal legal treatment (see for 
example Adalah, 2017). 








This Chapter outlines the methodology and describes the data collection and analysis. 
Additionally, it discusses the limitations of the methodological approach and includes a 
reflection on how my personal background has affected the data collection and the 
interpretation of the data.  
The previous Chapter concluded with a discussion of the research questions. For reasons 
of clarity, I start with a repetition of the research questions, which have also informed my 
methodological decisions. This study seeks to fill the gap of research on how citizenship 
education is practised and interpreted in classrooms in a conflict-affected and a post-
conflict society. Part of the study is concerned with examining how citizenship education 
is interpreted in the educational policies. Thus, the first research question explores: 
1. How is cultural hegemony expressed through the overt and covert citizenship 
curricula in Northern Ireland and Israel?  
Moving from the policy-level to the institutional-level, the second research question 
examines processes of cultural reproduction and resistance among different groups in 
divided societies: 
2. How do different schools in Northern Ireland and Israel respond to the citizenship 
education policies? 
The last research question focuses on the connection between citizenship education and 
conflict:  
3. How can citizenship education contribute to conflict transformation? 
The first research question draws on individual interviews with policymakers and policy 
documents. The second and third research question concentrate on the contexts of the four 
different schools (Catholic, Protestant, Arab-Palestinian, Jewish-Israeli), exploring how 




teachers and students understand citizenship education policies, the concepts of 
citizenship and identity and how they analyse the conflict.  
 
A COMPARATIVE CROSS-CULTURAL CASE STUDY 
 
Two major goals guided this study: firstly, it seeks to explore the workings of cultural 
hegemony through citizenship education and therefore requires a broader perspective, by 
examining phenomena at different levels (policy, institutional, individual). Secondly, the 
subtle nature of cultural hegemony requires an in-depth exploration of processes of 
meaning-making by studying interpretations of concepts such as citizenship, racism or 
conflict. Consequently, I approached the research as a case study, which is an investigation 
of substantial depth of one or a few cases (Gomm et al., 2000), and as comparative and 
cross-cultural research that explores phenomena across different cultural contexts. Below, 
I outline this combined approach.  
In a case study, a phenomenon is studied in detail and in a particular context by exploring 
different perspectives (Ritchie et al., 2003). Yin (2003) argued that case studies offer a 
good framework to investigate ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions as they require a deeper 
understanding of the context and how people make sense of a phenomenon. This approach 
is holistic in a sense that it relies on multiple sources of evidence (for example 
observations, interviews, documents) and that prior theoretical prepositions guide the data 
collection and analysis (Yin, 2003). Moreover, case studies are characterised by rich 
descriptions of the real-life context and set a focus on narratives, events, contexts or 
phenomena (Cohen et al., 2011).  
Critics of case study research have maintained that it does not allow for generalisation, as 
it narrows the research to specific contexts (Yin, 2003). However, Yin defended that the 
goal of case studies is not a statistical but analytical generalisation, which seeks to expand 
theory. Theory-building can be supported since common conclusions from different cases 
can be more powerful than those deriving from a single case (Yin, 2003). Thus, the study 
of multiple cases allows exploring deeper reoccurring problems across cases (Stake, 




1995). Similarly, Bryman (2012) stated that a comparison can provide a better 
understanding of a phenomenon by comparing it to a case that is similar or contrasting. A 
comparison can derive more solid findings by increasing the researcher’s sensitivity and 
awareness of the particularities of a specific context (Bryman, 2012; Ritchie et al., 2003).  
As an extension of this, a cross-cultural comparative study examines a certain 
phenomenon in different countries (Hantrais, 1995). Hantrais (1995) outlined that the 
nature of the phenomenon is explored in different cultural settings by using the same 
research methods with the goal to gain a deeper understanding of these settings and to 
uncover explanations for similarities and differences. Comparative cross-cultural research 
provides tools for understanding and uncovering complex meanings, emphasising the 
‘situatedness’ of phenomena (McNess, 2004). Hantrais (1995) maintained that 
comparisons allow gaining “fresh” insights and deeper understandings while they also 
often help to identify gaps in knowledge (p.4).  
Stake (2011) and Bryman (2012) raised concerns about comparisons, arguing that they 
can distract from contextual insights and rich descriptions. However, in combination with 
a case study approach, a comparative case study can benefit from both the advantages of 
a comparison and the holistic and detailed understanding of case study research. A 
comparative case study allows for a “thick description” (p.174), while its goal remains to 
illuminate contrasts, similarities and patterns across different cases (Campbell, 2010). 
Therefore, it addresses the study’s two goals of providing a broader perspective across 
contexts and different levels, while exploring in-depth processes of meaning-making.  
 
A QUALITATIVE APPROACH: EPISTEMOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY 
 
Whilst quantitative research focuses on the measurement and analysis of causal 
relationships between variables and probability samples, qualitative research seeks to 
answer questions concerned with how social experience is created and given meaning 
(Ritchie et al., 2003; Bryman, 2012). The theoretical framework of this study and the 
framing of research questions as ‘how’ questions that explore meaning-making processes, 




suggest a qualitative approach. The theoretical framework of cultural hegemony and post-
colonial theories of identity draw on social constructivism and are at odds with positivism 
that underpins quantitative research (Bryman, 2012). In contrast, qualitative research can 
illuminate processes that establish common-sense through power structures (Bogdan and 
Biklen, 2007); and therefore provides the means to explore cultural hegemony. Below, I 
will outline the qualitative approach of this study, which is guided by worldviews of 
constructivism, critical theory, interpretivism and a participatory paradigm. This will 
further elaborate on the connection between the theoretical framework, the research 
questions, and the qualitative approach.  
 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND CRITICAL THEORY 
 
This study draws on the paradigms of critical theory and constructivism as both are inter-
related, while also complementing the theoretical framework of cultural hegemony. 
Constructivism views reality as socially constructed, concluding that common-sense 
knowledge about the world emerges from social interactions between people (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966; Schütz, 1962). Critical theory sees reality as shaped by the historical 
context and influenced by social, political and economic values (Lincoln and Guba, 2000). 
Both perspectives oppose traditional positivist views, which portray reality as ‘being out 
there’ and instead they frame reality as the result of a particular context. As the previous 
Chapter proposed, critical theory is concerned with issues of power and justice and 
illuminates how social systems, institutions, and structures are based on ideologies and 
constructions of gender, race, and class (Kincheloe and McLaren, 2000). 
Qualitative research can provide better understandings of asymmetrical power relations, 
by going beyond mainstream perspectives and exploring the complexities of individual 
social realities (Bogdan and Biklen, 2007). Setting the focus on different perspectives, 
qualitative research often explores people’s narratives, biographical stories and life- and 
oral histories (Legard et al., 2003). It addresses claims raised by critical race 
theory/antiracism that worlds are not fixed but constructed of words, narratives, and 
silences, which can be used to write and challenge against unjust social arrangements 




(Ladson-Billings, 2003). In sum, social constructivism provides a theoretical basis to 
explore how individuals make sense out of their reality and how they understand concepts 
such as citizenship or racism. Critical theory analyses these concepts in the context of 
power relations, bringing their underlying ideologies to the fore.  
Constructivists and critical theorists see knowledge as created through social interactions 
and interpretations by individuals (Berger and Luckman, 1966; Habermas, 1973). Their 
view of reality implies that the qualitative researcher can only interpret phenomena 
through the meanings that other people attach to them (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011) since 
the world is not immediately knowable for the researcher (Bogdan and Biklen, 2007; 
Flick, 2014). Therefore, constructivism and critical theory rely on an interpretivist 
methodology, which approaches human experience through interpretation (Blumer, 
1969), by examining perspectives, descriptions, and accounts of the social world by the 
participants (Bogdan and Biklen, 2007; Bryman, 2012; Garfinkel, 1967). The critical 
hermeneutical tradition maintains that there is only interpretation instead of ‘objective’ 
facts as positivism postulates (Kincheloe et al., 2000). From this perspective, research is 
not a value-free process but influenced by the researcher’s perspective and interpretation 
of participants’ accounts (Kincheloe, 1991).  
THE PARTICIPATORY PARADIGM 
 
The participatory paradigm emerged as an extension of the orientations of the 
constructivist and the critical theory paradigm (Lincoln and Guba, 2000). Heron and 
Reason (1997) referred to critical inter-subjectivity, which the individual develops 
through the exchange with others, through dialogue and co-creation of knowledge (Heron 
and Reason, 1997). They proposed a form of collaborative inquiry as a methodology, 
promoting “research with people” (p.9) instead of research of people (Heron and Reason, 
1997). From the view of interpretivism, action can be a meaningful outcome of the inquiry 
process, whilst critical theory, constructivism, and the participatory paradigm all 
emphasise a call to action (Lincoln and Guba, 2000). 




Participatory action research is the reasonable expansion of this approach as it seeks to 
promote a critical consciousness among oppressed groups and to empower them to 
challenge dominant constructions of knowledge (McIntyre, 2007; Reason and Bradbury, 
2008). I planned initially to recruit a group of young people as research advisors (Kellet, 
2011; Lundy and McEvoy, 2012), which represents a ‘deeper’ participatory approach 
(Cahill, 2007). However, constrained by access to participants and time, I decided to 
follow a more pragmatic approach towards participation (for a more detailed explanation 
of the limitations of access and time see section ‘Access and time’). 
Hart (1992) and Cahill (2007) explained that participatory research consists of a variety 
of practices and can take place at different levels of participation. Despite the constraints, 
I still attempted to draw on a participatory approach. Participation took place on a ‘lower’ 
level following Hart’s (1992) ‘ladder of participation’. Thus, the study approached 
participation as the consultation of participants on their views regarding educational 
policies that affect them. Related to this, the purpose of group interviews and activities 
was also to encourage interpretation and reflection among young participants (Hart, 1992).  
While this approach does certainly not meet the demands of participatory action research, 
a lower degree of participation was still of value in terms of allowing a space for 
participants to reflect on matters of social justice, to voice their views on these matters 
and to engage in dialogue. Huffman (2013) also argued for smaller, more actionable, and 
pragmatic participatory methodologies that still explore matters of social justice, 
meaningful action and endeavour mutuality in research.  
LIMITATIONS OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
 
Critics of qualitative research argued that it lacks ‘scientific rigour’, reproducibility and 
generalisability and is permeated by researcher bias (Bryman, 2012; Mays and Pope, 
1995). However, these weaknesses can also be regarded as strengths of qualitative 
research, which is described as in-depth, focused on context (Bryman, 2012), and as 
considering researchers’ baggage (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011; Kincheloe, 1991). 
Importantly, qualitative research does not aim for generalisation of findings but of theory 




(Mitchell, 1983; Yin, 2003). Nevertheless, this also implies that a qualitative study is 
limited due to its focus on the specific contexts, the biographies of the participants and the 
researcher and its focus on theory building.  
Qualitative researchers further responded to this criticism by arguing that the same criteria 
that are applied for evaluating quantitative research cannot be applied to qualitative 
research (Guba and Lincoln, 1994; LeCompte and Goetz, 1982; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) proposed the alternative criteria of ‘trustworthiness’ and 
‘authenticity’. I sought to address ‘trustworthiness’ by providing multiple accounts of 
social reality through triangulation, a thick description of the context of each school (in 
the appendix) and the societies, by keeping records of the data and by including a 
reflection on my own background and how it has influenced the study. I attempted to 
ensure the ‘authenticity’ of the study by including different contexts and viewpoints from 
each identity group and the field of education (policy, institutional, individual). 
Additionally, I incorporated a participatory element into the study, which sought to 
encourage participants to reflect on issues of social justice. It is hoped that the detailed 
descriptions provided in this Chapter assist the reader to assess this qualitative study with 
its limitations and strengths. 
 
DATA COLLECTION AND METHODS 
 
Flick (2014) explained that qualitative research tends to draw on multiple methods. This 
allows the researcher to gain an in-depth understanding of the phenomena in question and 
offers an alternative to validation as a criterion in quantitative research. Since individuals 
cannot give full explanations of their experiences, it is only possible to collect ‘puzzle 
pieces’ of experiences and stories (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). A multi-method approach 
allows for triangulation, to study the same phenomenon through different research 
methods (Bogdan and Biklen, 2007), in different places and with different people (Denzin, 
1989). Another advantage is that a variety of methods can serve to stimulate and maintain 
the interest of the participants (Greene and Hill, 2005). Before I will introduce the reader 




to the methods I have used, I will describe and justify the choice of the sample because it 




In case study research, cases are selected based on which case will lead to a better 
understanding of the inquiry at hand (Stake, 1995). The case study of separate schools in 
the context of two divided societies is used instrumentally to understand how citizenship 
education is understood and practised in these contexts (Stake, 1995). Two divided 
societies based on their common history of conflict were selected to gain a broader 
perspective on the state of citizenship education in conflict-affected societies. Yet, the 
contexts of Northern Ireland and Israel experience different levels of violence and vary in 
their progress in terms of power-sharing and peace agreements. This difference can shed 
light on how citizenship education is dealt with differently in a conflict-ridden (Israel) and 
post-conflict society (Northern Ireland). To address the first research question of how 
cultural hegemony is expressed through the citizenship curricula, I have interviewed 
policymakers from governmental and non-governmental bodies 46  in the area of 
citizenship education. Participants were selected based on their different national-cultural-
religious background (Catholic, Protestant, Arab-Palestinian, and Jewish-Israeli) to 
include perspectives from each identity group by keeping the ratio even (I did not 
categorise the participants according to one specific national or religious identity to 
respect their overlapping and intersecting identities. Instead I selected them based on their 
affiliation to a certain organization and their expertise). Thus, in Northern Ireland I 
interviewed one policymaker from CCEA, one from CCMS, one from TRC, one from the 
Ministry of Education and one policymaker who was involved in the curriculum 
development. In Israel, I interviewed current and former policymakers from the Ministry 
                                                             
46  Policymakers were selected from the Ministry of Education (Israel), the Department of Education 
(Northern Ireland) and from organisations and institutions that are involved in the development of 
curriculum material or the provision of teacher training. 




of Education, the pedagogic council (Dirasat) and the Academic Committee for Civics 
Instruction. This was supported by the analysis of policy documents such as the citizenship 
curriculum, textbook, guidance for teachers, and legal documents. 
The second research question refers to how schools respond to the citizenship education 
policies. I have selected one Catholic, Arab-Palestinian, Protestant and Jewish-Israeli 
school, based on the following criteria: their different affiliation regarding identity; their 
similarity in terms of location (urban or sub-urban) and finally their adherence to the 
official citizenship curriculum. While I adhered to these criteria during the selection 
process of the schools, the choice of schools was rather pragmatic due to constraints that 
are outlined in the “Challenges and limitations” section in this chapter (see page 122-4). 
It has been argued that decisions regarding sample selection have often to be made along 
pragmatic considerations such as time and resources (Ritchie et al., 2003). The case study 
of each school comprised its physical environment and its population. In each school, I 
conducted individual interviews with teachers and the principal, observations of 
citizenship lessons and focus group interviews with the students. The third research 
question about whether citizenship education can contribute to conflict transformation was 
explored through interviews with participants who are involved or experience citizenship 
education at the policy, school, and individual level.  
In terms of age and year group among the students, I tried to keep both features consistent 
across the two contexts. Yet, I needed to consider that in Northern Ireland, Local and 
Global Citizenship (LGC) is taught at Key stage three and four, whereas, in Israel, civic 
education is usually taught between year 10 and 12. At the Jewish- Israeli school the 
students already studied a subject called ‘Humanities’47 in year 9, which is similar to 
citizenship education. Consequently, I conducted group interviews in this school with 
students from year 9 as well and indicated this in the interpretation of the data. Generally, 
most students were recruited from year 9 and 10 (key stage three) in Northern Ireland and 
from year 10 till 12 in Israel. Therefore, the students in Israel (except for two focus groups 
                                                             
47 According to the school’s website, “Humanities” covers a mix of topics such as literature, history and 
culture in Israel. 




at the Jewish-Israeli school) were generally two years older than the students in Northern 
Ireland.   
Consequently, the sampling selection process was purposeful, since the comparative case 
studies were chosen based on the assumption that the study of these four cases can provide 
the richest and broadest information. Two different contexts and four different schools 
were chosen to achieve demographic variation through different identity groups 
(Sandelowski, 1995), and due to their political importance as conflict-affected societies 
(see Patton, 2002).   
The table below summarises the number of interviews and participants in each context. 
The data in Northern Ireland was collected from May 2016 until October 2016 (only one 
additional interview was conducted in January 2017) and in Israel from October 2016 until 
December 2016. 
FIGURE 1 OVERVIEW OF INTERVIEWS AND PARTICIPANTS 
 
Northern Ireland Israel 
 Interviews Participants  Interviews Participants 
Policymakers 6 6 Policymakers 6 6 
Principals 1 1 Principals 2 2 
Teachers 4 4 Teachers 4 4 
Students (year 
9-10) 
8 35 Students (year 
9-12) 
9 32 
Total 19 46 Total 21 44 
INTERVIEWS 
 
Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) describe two different theoretical approaches to 
interviewing: interviews as a process of knowledge collection or as a site of knowledge 
construction through the interaction between the interviewee and the interviewer, who 
enter a collaborative process (Fontana and Frey, 2000; Gubrium and Holstein, 1997; Kvale 
and Brinkmann, 2009). In the latter approach, they describe the qualitative interviewer as 




a “traveller” (p.48), acknowledging that knowledge is not simply collected but constructed 
and influenced by the researcher’s interpretations. This approach to interviewing is 
reminiscent of a constructivist and interpretivist methodology that was discussed earlier 
in this Chapter.  
Through interviews, the researcher can collect empirical data in the participants’ own 
words, obtain insights and access to their interpretations, perceptions, and constructions 
of their reality (Bogdan and Biklen, 2007; Punch, 2009). Interviews are described as 
purposeful conversations (Morgan, 1997), where discourse and negotiation about meaning 
take place (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). To facilitate meaning-making, the interviewer 
should provide a space where interviewees can articulate their views freely and 
democratically, without a superimposed, manipulative and rigid structure dominated by 
the interviewer (see Fontana and Frey, 2000). Defining the interviewee as an active 
meaning-maker, engaged in processes of interpretation, differs from traditional 
approaches in interviewing, which rely on the experiential truths held by the passive 
interviewee (Gubrium and Holstein, 1997). According to Gubrium and Holstein, the 
interviewer should encourage the production of narratives from the interviewee and as 
DeVault (1990) maintained, to address topics that are relevant to the interviewees’ lives. 
Yet, at the same time having a broad agenda of topics that are discussed in the interview 
can help researchers to focus on the research questions and to collect comparable data 
(Bogdan and Biklen, 2007). To compromise between the need to let the interviewees raise 
issues that are important to them on the one hand and the need to collect comparable data 
on the other, I decided to use the format of semi-structured, topical or guided interviews. 
This allowed uncovering participants’ views on a few general topics, while it also 
respected how participants structure and frame their responses (Marshall and Rossman, 
2011). The use of semi-structured interviews led some participants to deviate from the 
topic, which was also valuable as they provided new insights into matters that are 
important to them. Yet, I was able to direct the focus back to the topic of citizenship 
education with the help of the guiding questions.  
 




INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEWS WITH ADULTS 
 
Individual interviews are well suited to focus in-depth on the participant’s perspective 
about complex systems, processes or phenomena (Ritchie et al., 2003). In this study, the 
purpose of individual interviews with principals, teachers and policymakers was to 
uncover their perspective on underlying meanings of citizenship education in each context 
through their knowledge about the practice and ideology that underpin it. One reason why 
I have chosen individual interviews was to provide a confidential and safe environment 
for the interviewees, where they could voice their opinions freely. Confidentiality and 
anonymity have proven to be of importance and were ensured throughout the research (see 
the section ‘Ethical considerations’ for further details); since participants partly shared 
information that they did not want their superiors to know about and that could have 
professional or personal consequences if their views were public.  
All interviews were guided by some general questions about the participants’ background, 
understandings of identity, citizenship education and the conflict in Northern Ireland and 
Israel. Then, the interview usually went in a direction that the interviewee decided to focus 
on. The individual interviews varied in their length but usually lasted between 40 and 90 
minutes. They took place either in their office in the school or in their organisation, in 
coffee places or at university.  
 
FOCUS GROUPS WITH YOUNG PEOPLE 
 
Traditional approaches to research of children and young people treat them as objects of 
study, which is shaped by adult definitions and adult interests (Grover, 2004). These 
approaches have been challenged by children’s rights movements and the new social 
studies of childhood (Barker and Weller, 2003; Marshall and Rossman, 2011). These 
perspectives reject perceptions of young people as passive citizens-in-waiting and instead 
treat young people as competent social actors and citizens (Kurth-Schai, 1988). Since the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC, 1989) maintains that 




children have a right to their voices being heard and considered in decisions that affect 
their lives, increasingly methodologies are developed and conducted that are sensitive to 
the rights, demands, and needs of young people. These methodologies seek to enable them 
to express their perspective, to preserve the authenticity of their voices, and to facilitate 
collaboration throughout the research process (Grover, 2004).  
This study sought to include the views of young people on citizenship education and the 
conflict, to provide them with an opportunity to raise their concerns, and to consult their 
opinion on the subject. Yet, I explained earlier that the participatory approach I sought to 
implement was constrained by time and access. Therefore, I have included participatory 
elements in the focus group interviews, which are described below.  
Krueger and Casey (2009) suggested that the purpose of group interviews or focus groups 
is to gain a better understanding of how people feel or think about a topic through listening 
and collecting information from them. Group interviews can provide a space for young 
people to discuss and articulate their educational experience and the relevance of 
citizenship for their everyday life in general. One major rationale for using group 
interviews with young people was to address the power inequalities that exist between the 
adult researcher and the students (Eder and Fingerson, 1997).  
In a research project about citizenship, there should be also an emphasis on participation 
and agency, a “collaborative form of inquiry” (p.8), relying on democratic dialogue and 
involving participation in directing the research (Heron and Reason, 1997). Participatory 
methods facilitate the process of knowledge production as opposed to knowledge 
gathering, with the aim to encourage debate through the articulation of multiple voices as 
a ground for empowerment (Veale, 2005).  The research process should be based on non-
hierarchical relationships, reciprocal learning and principles of social justice (Fals-Borda, 
2001). Due to the power imbalance between adults and children, there is a need to promote 
reciprocity through methods, where children and young people are given the opportunity 
to articulate their views (Barker and Weller, 2003). Eder and Fingerson (1997) argued that 
the power imbalance is minimised in-group interviews when young people outnumber the 




researcher, creating a more natural setting, where young people are usually more relaxed 
and comfortable in groups with their peers.  
Another rationale for using group interviews is that they allow space for interaction among 
the participants, to probe and comment on each other’s views, which can increase the 
diversity of perspectives (Morgan, 1998). The focus groups allowed me to observe how 
participants interpret and negotiate complex concepts (Powell and Single, 1996) such as 
citizenship and identity.  
Eder and Fingerson (1997) suggested that combining the interview with an activity that 
young people are familiar with could reduce the artificiality of the group interview and 
create a more natural environment. By integrating activities into focus group discussions, 
the group is confronted with a greater variety of interactions, which stimulates interest and 
further discussion (Darbyshire et al., 2005). Given the cross-cultural context of the study, 
activities also helped to reduce the language barrier as participants relied not exclusively 
on oral language (Colucci, 2008).  
I facilitated two activities in the focus group interviews: the first activity was 
brainstorming about citizenship, where students were asked to design a citizen followed 
by a discussion about their understandings of citizenship, whether citizenship is important 
for young people, and about problems associated with citizenship. In the second activity, 
students were asked to brainstorm on identities of young people in Northern Ireland/Israel 
and what or who influences these identities. This provided the basis for a discussion about 
which identities are important to young people and whether these are addressed in the 
citizenship lesson. Afterwards, the interviews moved towards a discussion about students’ 
experiences with citizenship education and their understanding of the conflict, racism, and 
sectarianism in Northern Ireland/Israel.   
Morgan (1998) suggested that focus groups should generally include between six and ten 
participants, but he recommended smaller groups when it is likely that individuals have a 
lot to say about the topic at hand. The focus groups in this study varied from two to five 
participants and one additional single interview was conducted with a student who was 




free while his classmates had to do a test. Although this interview was planned as a focus 
group, it was also quite refreshing and informative to conduct an individual interview with 
a young person because it provided a deeper insight into individual attitudes, backgrounds 
and opinions (Eder and Fingerson, 1997). Moreover, focus groups also allow observing 
how the individuals interact with each other and how they co-construct meaning through 
these interactions (Morgan, 2002; 2012). While I requested to keep groups small to three 
or four participants so the influence of other peers could be minimised (Eder and 
Fingerson, 1997), in some cases more students wished to participate. Consequently, the 
conduct of focus groups was more flexible and pragmatic in practice as I prioritised 
inclusivity so all young people who wished to participate were able to do so. 
The focus group interviews usually lasted for one lesson (45-50 minutes) and in some 
cases the students decided to continue with the interview during their break. I asked the 
teachers to recruit students from different gender and mixed abilities backgrounds. In most 
focus groups there was an even ratio of different genders, yet in Israel slightly more girls 
than boys volunteered to participate.  
OBSERVATIONS 
 
The main reason for undertaking observations was to gain a deeper understanding of each 
school’s ethos and their approach to citizenship education. These observations were 
intended to be “naturalistic” (Angrosino and Mays de Perez, 2000; Punch, 2009), to study 
social interactions in their natural everyday setting with the researcher as a non-participant 
observer (Angrosino and Mays de Perez, 2000). Such observations can inform researchers 
about typical language routines, communicative norms and generate a better 
understanding of the local culture (Eder and Fingerson, 1997). Yet, although observations 
are intended to be non-interventionist into people’s everyday routines, it is also 
acknowledged that the researcher’s presence influences the participants’ behaviour during 
the observation (Cohen et al., 2011).  
My intention was to gain a better understanding of how citizenship education is framed 
and taught in a Catholic, Protestant, Arab-Palestinian or Jewish-Israeli school. I focused 




on how citizenship is conceptualised, the teacher’s pedagogical approach, the content and 
the students’ participation and contribution in the lesson. The observation was semi-
structured; since I prepared an agenda of issues with the intent that the observation will 
further illuminate these issues. It was assumed that observations allow the researcher to 
experience first-hand what is taking place and provide a ‘reality check’ of the setting 
(Cohen et al., 2013).  
A prior meeting between the interviewer and the participants can ease the relationship 
between them and help to gain rapport (Dockrell et al., 2000; Eder and Fingerson, 1997). 
Therefore, I conducted an individual interview with the teacher before observing each 
lesson. This allowed me to consider the teachers’ background, their pedagogical approach, 
and understandings of citizenship and the conflict during the observation. Since the 
individual interview increased trust and familiarity between the interviewee and me, it is 
hoped that the interviewees felt more comfortable during the observation. In terms of the 
students, the observation took place prior to the focus groups. This allowed me to explain 
my study to them, to let them ask questions about it, and to get to know me a bit before 
they decided to participate in the focus groups.  
The observations were limited to one or two lessons in each school (except for the Catholic 
school, where citizenship was not on the schedule during the term when the data collection 
took place, I reflect on this in the limitations section, page 123). In the Jewish-Israeli 
school, I was also invited to participate in an event and activity to commemorate the 
assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. Similarly, the teacher in the Arab-Palestinian school 
invited me to come along to a theatre play as part of the citizenship lesson. Certainly, this 
small number of observations cannot be representative of how citizenship is taught in the 
schools. Yet, it has complemented and strengthened the other data collected through 
interviews and documents because it facilitated to gain rapport between the researcher and 
the participants. Furthermore, it has allowed the researcher to experience at first hand the 
interactions between the teacher and the students. 
 




DOCUMENTARY ANALYSIS  
 
Since documentary analysis involves illuminating the substantive content and the 
documents’ deeper meanings (Ritchie et al., 2003), documentary data can contribute to 
triangulation (Denzin, 1989).  It can help the researcher to uncover the cultural context 
and ethos of participants and their institutions (Punch, 2009). 
Yet, Atkinson and Coffey (2000) cautioned that documents should be treated as particular 
accounts of social reality. They explained how texts are constructed based on conventions, 
creating a documentary reality. To approach this reality, questions about the form, 
function and the intertextual dimension of documents need to be raised. Documents do 
not exist in isolation but are related to other documents (Atkinson and Coffey, 2000). For 
example, the material that a teacher prepared for a lesson reflects partially curricular 
materials. Consequently, it is important to explore their relationship through an analysis 
of similarities and differences. Additionally, a critical examination of documents requires 
considering author- and readership, their purposes, goals and the processes of their 
production, circulation, and consumption (Atkinson and Coffey, 2000).  
As part of this study, I have used documents as supportive data to gain a better 
understanding of the hegemonic discourse around citizenship education, to get a broader 
insight into the teacher’s practice through their teaching material and the schools’ ethos 
through their websites. I have included in my analysis the current official curricula 
documents 1, curricula guidance for teachers, legal documents about content and 
pedagogy, teaching materials shared by the teachers and each school’s curriculum and 
description of their ethos. Since the curriculum of civics in Israel is in Hebrew, I relied on 
translations of the content page and the help of a Hebrew-speaking academic who has 
                                                             
1 These documents include the ‘Global and Local citizenship’ module, which is part of the broader subject 
of ‘Learning for Life and Work’ in key stage 4 and key stage 3 as well as the module ‘Environment and 
Society’ in key stage 3: in Israel “To be a citizen in Israel: A Jewish democratic state”, which is the official 
textbook for civics and the basis for the curriculum. 








Before and during data collection, researchers should reflect on the impact of their 
interventions on the participants’ lives (Flick, 2014). In the context of research with young 
people, Punch (2009) suggested consideration of whether the research is also in their 
interest. During the focus groups, young people were encouraged to reflect on the state of 
citizenship and social justice in their society. Using qualitative and participatory methods, 
they were given an opportunity to express their views and reflect on their experience with 
citizenship education. In general, the young participants were quite interested in these 
topics and many mentioned that they do not have the opportunity to speak about the 
controversial aspects of citizenship and identity in the classroom context. 
Consent forms were given to participants informing them about the content of the research 
and their rights, giving them the option to ‘opt-in’ by signing the consent form and 
reassuring them that their data will be treated as private and confidential. Forms for young 
people were written in a more accessible, child-friendly language (Punch, 2009). In 
addition, consent forms were distributed to their parents and guardians. In Israel, all forms 
were translated into Hebrew and Arabic. Before presenting the forms to the participants, 
I introduced myself and the study to the class (except for the Catholic school, where the 
teacher decided to recruit participants and explain the study herself).  
The participants were reminded in the form and again before the interview that they had 
the right to withdraw at any time, their participation was voluntary, they could refuse to 
answer questions posed during the interview and that their data would be used as part of 
the PhD dissertation, presentations at conferences, and publications.  
The data were stored securely and all possible identifiers such as names of teachers, 
students, and schools were removed. During the focus groups, the young people produced 
drawings and mind-maps, of which they have the right to ownership. Some wanted to keep 
the material produced during the focus groups, so I took pictures of all their drawings and 




mind-maps for my analysis. Some of the drawings contain personal identifiers (for 
example the name of the area where they live or where the school is located) and thus I 
have disguised this information and all other identifying data when presenting the 
drawings in the thesis. 
REFLEXTIVITY 
 
As an interactive process, research is always shaped by the biographies of the participants 
and the researcher’s cultural baggage (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011). Harding (1987) argued 
that “the researcher appears to us not as an invisible, anonymous voice of authority, but 
as a real, historical individual with concrete, specified desires, and interests” (p.9) so it is 
important for researchers to reflect on their role and impact on the research. Reflexivity 
means to reflect critically on oneself, to come to terms with the choice of the research 
problem and the participants, and to reflect on the researcher’s multiple identities that 
come into play in the research setting (Lincoln and Guba, 2000). 
The impact of the researcher’s background, as an insider or outsider has been broadly 
discussed in the literature. Collins (2000) argued that researchers should have lived 
through similar experiences as their participants for their research to be credible. A shared 
background can enhance the depth and breadth of the research (Kanuha, 2000), as it can 
provide a certain level of trust and an openness on the side of the participants, assuming 
that the researcher will better understand their experiences as ‘one of them’ (Dwywer and 
Buckle, 2000). The most important argument for being a ‘native’, ‘indigenous’ or ‘insider’ 
researcher is probably the issue of power dynamics between researcher and participants. 
Essed (1991) argued that researchers are better positioned if they investigate members of 
their own social group, presenting better conditions for non-hierarchical relationships, due 
to shared experiences.  
Cross-cultural research, in particular, demands cultural sensitivity on part of the researcher 
(Liamputtong, 2008). Ladson-Billings (2000; 2003) explained how European or 
‘Western’ epistemology has traditionally served to justify white supremacy, domination 
and exploitation of other people through ‘objectifying’ them. She argued that researchers 




must confront the fundamental question of for whom the research is conducted, requiring 
researchers to question their own privileged position and not to act as colonisers, muting 
the voices of the marginalised (Ladson-Billings, 2000). The unequal power relationship 
between the traditionally white and male researcher studying the colonised subject does 
indeed raise concerns that form part of the agenda of academics of colour who fight for a 
wider representation of marginalised voices. However, Milner (2007) emphasised that it 
is more important that researchers, in general, develop “deeper racial and cultural 
knowledge about themselves and the community or people under study” (p.388) and are 
“mindful” about their own and others’ positionality, than that they themselves are 
members of the community under study. As a researcher foreign to the settings of 
Northern Ireland and Israel, I must confront the issue of obtaining 'cultural knowledge' in 
order to accurately interpret the experiences of the communities under study (Tillman, 
2002). 
Milner (2007) proposed a framework for researchers guiding them to racial and cultural 
awareness and positionality in doing their research. His framework consists of four 
aspects: Researching the self, suggesting that researchers raise “racially and culturally 
grounded questions about themselves” (p.395); researching the self in relation to others, 
which he framed as acknowledging the researcher’s and participants’ different roles and 
identities that they negotiate throughout the research process; engaged reflection and 
representation, urging researchers to represent both the researcher’s and participants’ 
voices and narratives and finally shifting from self to system, where he argued that 
researchers should embed issues of race and culture in the wider context moving from the 
individual towards the structural level. Drawing on this framework, I will discuss my own 
background in relation to the research participants. The last two aspects, engaged 
reflection and representation and shifting from self to system, are referred to in the section 
about the presentation of the data analysis.  
 
 




RESEARCHING THE SELF IN RELATION TO OTHERS 
 
Milner (2007) suggested that the different roles assumed by the researcher and participants 
and what the researcher knows about the communities under study need to be 
acknowledged. Thus, I will reflect on how my identities and my views have impacted on 
the research.  
First and foremost, I was perceived by my participants as a white, European young woman 
from a university and thus being privileged in both societies. My German background 
positions me as a white and Western European immigrant in Northern Ireland and thus as 
a member of a privileged group that is not affected by racism like other immigrants in 
Northern Ireland, mainly from Eastern Europe, Asian or African countries. Similarly, in 
Israel, white (European or North American) Jews represent the dominant population and 
even though I am not Jewish myself, I could blend into the dominant group. Despite our 
common working-class background, I would consider myself more privileged than the 
students in Northern Ireland who live in areas affected by poverty, unemployment, and 
crime.   
In both societies, the participants accepted me as an outsider, as someone from a different 
place, as a young woman from a university with a European background. Despite the 
usually warm and welcoming reception by participants, for some there was a sense of 
ambiguity on whose side I am, leading one boy from the Catholic school to ask me frankly 
whether I am a Protestant and pointing out that Germany has “invented Protestantism”. 
Similarly, in Israel, I noticed that some people were testing me sometimes to uncover on 
whose side I am. In these situations, I usually pointed at the complexity of the situation 
and emphasised that I am trying to understand each side’s point of view.  
However, I will not deny that my interaction with the participants throughout the research 
process has been far from neutral and there are a few things that I need to account for. The 
society I was socialised into is traditionally structured by racism towards people who are 
not white and Christian. Since 9/11 there is an increasing racist sentiment towards people 
from an Arab and Muslim background. ‘Orientalist’ and ‘anti-Semitic’ stereotypes have 




always been prevalent in German culture, literature, and media, which remains an issue 
even though the German state has officially committed itself towards a policy against 
“forgetting”. Moreover, I grew up in a village where the majority population was 
Protestant even though in my high-school most students were Catholic. Thus, I carry these 
views and notions with me and try to challenge myself constantly, through reflection on 
how my own perceptions are influenced by these views. For example, during the 
fieldwork, I have kept a reflective journal on my thoughts and experiences during the data 
collection process and I have discussed some of my impressions with fellow researchers 
and friends from both contexts. I encourage the reader to take my background into account 
when reading my analysis and interpretation of the data.   
Finally, my political beliefs have shaped considerably the approach I have taken in my 
research and how the data is interpreted. While I am not active in any political party, I 
identify as politically-left, Marxist, I am politically active through volunteering in 
organisations that support refugees, I participated in demonstrations against the denial of 
rights to refugees, immigrants, LGBTQ people and demonstrations against racism in Israel 
and Northern Ireland. Regarding my views on the conflict in both societies, I have started 
my research with preconceived opinions while I have tried to be open to alternative views 
that challenged my political opinions. It is only fair to say that since I have started learning 
about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, I have sympathised with the situation of Palestinians. 
However, I developed already in school a particular interest in the crimes committed by 
the Nazi regime and the history of the Jewish people in Europe. A long and close 
relationship with a Jewish boyfriend in Germany, his family and community broadened 
my knowledge about the experience of being a Jewish minority and the meaning Jews 
attach to Israel. Since I was less familiar with the legacy of the conflict in Northern Ireland 
and due to its post-conflict status, I think I entered the context more open-minded, even 
though I do not deny that I am influenced by my political views and this is the lens through 
which I interpret.  
My relationships and friendships with people from both societies under study have also 
increased my knowledge about their narratives and struggles, while I am consciously not 
using this as an excuse to define myself as being immune to racist or sectarian ideologies. 




Like every other individual and in particular as a ‘white’ German woman, I am not - 
though arguably immersion in other people’s cultural knowledge together with a 
willingness to question power and privilege can enhance the understanding of structural 
racism and sectarianism.  
I think that my position as an outsider encouraged participants to be more open to talking 
about their views. As an example, Colucci (2008) found that her outsider position allowed 
her participants more freedom to talk about sensitive issues, which they might have been 
reluctant to discuss if she was a member of their community. According to Liamputtong 
(2008), there can be a lack of trust if the researcher belongs to a group that historically 
acted as an oppressor. In Israel, local researchers have reported that for them it can be 
difficult to conduct research in the context of the other identity group. For example, a 
Jewish-Israeli researcher told me if he will go into a Palestinian school they might 
associate him with the intelligence service. While the situation in Northern Ireland might 
be more relaxed (in military terms at least), the relationship between the researcher and 
participants from two different communities can be burdened with the legacy of the past 
and a culture of politeness when it comes to talking about controversial issues. Therefore, 
I think that in my case it was beneficial that I came from a different context and had no 
affiliation with either identity group.  
RESEARCHING THE SELF 
 
I grew up in a small village in the centre of Germany, where the majority population can 
be described as white, Protestant and 'German', while during different times the population 
also consisted of guest-workers mainly from southern Europe and Turkey, ‘resettlers’48 
and refugees. My parents were both born in Germany after the Second World War, from 
a working-class background whose parents were partly German immigrants from Poland 
and Ukraine. As most German citizens during the Third Reich my grandparents were 
                                                             
48 Resettlers are described as ‘ethnic Germans’ who formed German minorities in other places, particularly 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, who are granted permanent residence and eventually 
citizenship. 
 




integrated into the machinery of Nazi-Germany through its military and youth 
organisations – yet to my parents’ knowledge they were not supporting its ideology49. 
Nevertheless, the history of the country where I grew up is marked by the promotion of a 
racist-nationalistic ideology that led to the genocide of the Jewish people, other minorities, 
and its political opponents and continues to affect the society in Germany where racism 
remains prevalent.  
My family’s socio-economic background would be considered working-class with my 
sister and myself being the only members of our extended family to have graduated from 
university. Influenced by my father’s critical stance towards religion, my sister and I grew 
up as Atheists. While religion did not play an important role in our home, politics did. My 
father was politically active in the social democratic party and a former member of a 
communist youth organisation. 
Despite the remoteness of my village, it was characterised by diversity as many refugee 
and immigrant families lived next-door to our house during my childhood and the students 
in my primary school were from diverse backgrounds. However, my secondary school, a 
gymnasium2 was mostly attended by white, middle-class, ‘German’ students. This has 
shaped considerably my privileged position as being able to attend university. Most of my 
adult life, I have spent studying and working in other countries like France, Canada, the 
United States, Israel and the UK. During my PhD, I moved between Northern Ireland and 
Israel, making both places my centre of living for quite some time. Thus, although I am 
an outsider to both societies, I have spent considerable time in both places and developed 
relationships with people from the communities under study.  
 
 
                                                             
49 My grandparents did not support the national-socialist ideology due to their religious beliefs or support 
for the communist party. My grandfather’s resistance led to his imprisonment. 
2 Most advanced school type in the German three-tier system with an emphasis on academic learning.  




CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS DURING DATA COLLECTION 
 
The previous section established that the data collection and analysis is influenced by my 
own background, views, and experiences. This section will discuss challenges I 
encountered during the data collection and how this influenced the analysis of the data. 
The major challenges stemmed from the use of language and access to participants, which 
also limited the use of a participatory approach.  
LANGUAGE  
 
My background as an outsider comes with its challenges, as I was researching different 
cultures than my own in a different language than my own. Cross-cultural research 
requires that the researcher is familiar with the cultural context of the research setting and 
has spent some time there (Irvine et al., 2008). Having lived in English-speaking countries 
for more than three years prior to the fieldwork has enabled me not only to conduct my 
research in English but also to access the different cultures in Northern Ireland through 
this language. However, I had difficulties with parts of the specific language that young 
people use in Northern Ireland and I had to ask them to explain to me terms such as 
“hoods”50 and “kneecapping51,” which also carry a cultural meaning. 
Similarly, having lived in Israel before for four months and with a basic knowledge of 
Hebrew and Arabic (even though I have conducted the interviews in English) allowed me 
to become familiar with the cultures in this context as well. Yet, as the research in Israel 
was not conducted in the participants’ or my own native language, this is an issue that 
requires further discussion.  
Language is a fundamental tool for researchers to understand human behaviour, social 
processes, and cultural meanings (Hennink, 2008). I decided to conduct the research in 
English, based on the premise that all participants have a sufficient proficiency in this 
                                                             
50 The term ‘hoods’ is used in Northern Ireland to describe young people who are involved in minor criminal 
activities such as car theft, shop-lifting, vandalising etc.  
51 ‘Kneecapping’ in Northern Ireland refers to a form of criminal punishment or torture employed by 
paramilitary groups to punish petty criminals or ‘hoods’.  




language and to facilitate comparison. However, English is neither my first language nor 
the native language of Arab-Palestinian and Jewish-Israeli participants. While it was 
possible to conduct all my interviews in Israel in English, this might have limited the 
participants’ capacity to express themselves as they would have in their native language. 
Furthermore, the knowledge of English became involuntarily a selection criterion for 
participants. Depending on their fluency in English, the participants would be more or less 
engaged in the interviews and discussions. While this was more of a challenge in 
individual interviews, where we had to use a dictionary during some occasions, this was 
less an issue in the focus groups with young people as they helped each other with their 
vocabulary. Despite these challenges, I have preferred to speak to the participants directly 
rather than through a translator, as it has been argued that translators are not “neutral” as 
interpreters, but bring with them a cultural baggage (Temple and Edwards, 2002).  
Additionally, since the policy documents and the textbook in Israel are in Hebrew, I relied 
on the help of native speakers and dictionaries for translation. According to Temple and 
Edwards (2002), this is a limitation since translation is not merely “technical” but involves 
constant decision-making about the cultural meanings that language carries, which “is not 
a neutral medium” (p.3). I have sought to address this limitation partly by asking different 
native-speakers (fellow researchers and friends) for help so I could take into account their 
different approaches to translation.  
ACCESS AND TIME  
 
I mentioned earlier that I intended to recruit a group of young people as research advisors. 
Grover (2004) argued that children and young people are rarely consulted on research 
problems and research design. Researchers advocating children’s rights-based 
participation have worked with peer advisory groups (PAG) and children as co-
researchers (Kellet, 2011; Lundy and McEvoy, 2012). Yet, to live up to the importance of 
context, I would have needed to recruit two mixed groups in both Northern Ireland 
(Catholic-Protestant) and in Israel (Arab-Palestinian-Jewish-Israeli) and arrange at least 
three sessions with each of them in addition to the fieldwork I have conducted (40 
interviews, 5 observations), which would have gone beyond the scope of what is doable 




in a PhD project. Therefore, I decided to refrain from working with PAGS and children as 
co-researchers since I preferred to attend to the depth that is advised in qualitative instead 
of the breath of different methods.  
Access to schools and participants has also proven to be a serious challenge, in particular 
in Northern Ireland. It quickly became clear that in order to gain access to schools, one 
must rely on contacts such as fellow researchers and friends, who have facilitated the 
contact with principals and citizenship teachers. This is also the reason why I had to 
compromise regarding the type of schools, which vary in their location (the Arab-
Palestinian and Protestant school are considered urbaner than the Jewish-Israeli and 
Catholic school) and in terms of socio-economic background (the populations in the 
Jewish-Israeli and Arab-Palestinian schools are more affluent). I have included a brief 
sketch of the schools at the beginning of the findings section so the readers can familiarise 
themselves with each school’s particular context.  
In the Catholic school, I was not able to interview the principal due to her busy schedule 
and I could not observe a citizenship lesson since the subject was not taught in the term 
when I conducted my fieldwork. This has limited the insight into the interactions between 
students and teachers as well as the conduct of the lesson to the second-hand descriptions 
that I gained from teachers and students. Consequently, the analysis of the Catholic 
school’s context relies more on the rich descriptions by teachers and students compared 
to the other schools, where I was able to observe citizenship lessons. In general, the 
schools in Israel were more accommodating than the schools in Northern Ireland. This 
influenced the data collection and analysis because it allowed me to get a deeper insight 





I analysed the data using thematic analysis, “a method for identifying, analysing and 
reporting patterns (themes) within data.” (Braun and Clarke, 2006:79). This method was 




chosen because of its flexibility as a research tool, providing a useful way to organise the 
rich and complex data gathered across different contexts around the elusive concepts of 
citizenship and identity. The thematic analysis was guided by a constructivist (Burr, 1995; 
Lincoln and Guba, 2000) and critical theory approach (Kincheloe and McLaren, 2000), 
which were outlined earlier in the epistemology and ontology section. They emphasise the 
relationship between identity constructions, power, and constructions of knowledge in a 
particular politico-historical context. Following a theory-driven as opposed to a data-
driven approach, influenced the decision to foreground certain themes in the presentation 




The data include notes from observations, photographs from the drawings in the focus 
groups, policy documents, curricula, teaching material, and verbal data from interviews 
and focus groups. I transcribed all interviews, using the process of transcription to 
familiarise myself with the data and to note down initial codes and themes. Transcribing 
most interviews immediately after they were conducted allowed me to pick up on potential 
themes in the next interviews, while I also tried to maintain a certain consistency between 
the interviews by asking similar questions. Thus, while I focused on ‘latent’ themes, as 
will be explained in the next section, I also familiarised myself with the whole data set.  
In the process of transcription, I produced verbatim transcripts in the first instance and 
only when I had written up the analysis I edited some of the quotes (the changes are 
indicated throughout the text) in order to make the text clearer to the reader but without 
altering its meaning. However, I did not always transcribe the whole focus group 
interviews, but only when the students were focused on the task or having conversations 
that were related to the topic. In Israel, when participants struggled to express themselves 
in English, a dictionary was used during the interview or I translated the terms later and 
encouraged them to express their ideas through alternative words. Partly, I have added 
translations in addition to the original words in the presentation of the data.  





CODING, THE CREATION OF THEMES AND THE USE OF SOFTWARE  
 
During the process of transcription, I coded the transcripts and the documents such as the 
teaching materials, curricula, and materials from each school’s website. After this initial 
“open-coding” (Burnard, 1991), I summarised them into broader themes, which capture 
“something important about the data in relation to the research question, and represent[…] 
some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set.” (Braun and Clarke, 
2006:82). Put another way, a theme is an idea that traverses the data collected, attracting 
the attention of the researcher (Braun and Clarke, 2006). I decided to focus on themes that 
are relevant to the research questions and those that reoccurred among different 
participants, during observations, and in the collected documents. Resulting from the 
exploration of the quite elusive concepts of identity and citizenship, I focused on the 
analysis on the latent level, which Braun and Clarke (2006) defined as going “beyond the 
semantic content” in order to “examine the underlying ideas, assumptions and 
conceptualizations - and ideologies - that are theorized as shaping or informing the 
semantic content of the data.” (p.84).  
To identify themes as repeated “patterns of meaning” (Braun and Clarke, 2006:86), I 
searched for themes throughout the data collection process, trying to clarify emerging 
ideas, since “data collection and analysis typically go hand in hand to build a coherent 
interpretation.” (Marshall and Rossmann, 2011:208). Examples of themes that were very 
dominant across the data are avoidance and censoring. I have identified them as patterns 
in the interviews with policymakers, principals, teachers and students and then analysed 
them further against the background of the literature. After the transcription, I coded the 
entire dataset with the help of a qualitative analysis software (Atlas.ti). During this 
process, I familiarised myself with the data and noted down ideas for headings, categories 
and codes. These were checked again in reference to the transcripts and also during the 
writing up stage. I compared the themes that I had narrowed down to ‘avoidance’ and 
‘censoring’ with the complete transcripts and recordings. This facilitated to keep the 




analysis and interpretation of the data closer to their original meanings and context 
(Burnard, 1991).  
The benefits and limitations of software in qualitative research have been discussed in the 
literature. Authors raised concerns that the use of software for qualitative analysis 
distances the researcher from the data (Fielding and Lee, 1998), leads researchers to rush 
through the analysis (Weitzman, 2000), or decontextualizes the data (Coffey and 
Atkinson, 1996).  However, the benefits of using a software like Atlas.ti are that it helps 
to manage large amounts of data, by providing tools for organising, storing, and searching 
through the data (Gibbs, 2008; Ritchie et al., 2003). I used the software only as a tool for 
‘analytic support’ (Atkinson and Coffey, 1996), as a database that helped me to organise 
and structure the large amounts of data that I collected. While it assisted in organising 
themes, drawing comparisons and identifying differences, I did not view it as substituting 
my task in analysing the data. Although Fielding and Lee (1998) raised concerns of 
detachment between the researcher and the data, from my observation I felt that the 
software provided me with a better overview of the data, facilitated better comparisons, 
and allowed quick access to specific parts of the transcripts.  
 
THE ORGANISATION OF THE DATA: REFLECTIVE REPRESENTATION AND CONTEXTUALISATION 
 
Milner (2007) argued that the white, privileged researcher needs to find ways to represent 
the voices and narratives of the researched so that they are not muted or overshadowed by 
the researcher’s own (white) interpretation. He called this process ‘engaged reflection and 
representation’, as the “researcher’s responsibility to listen to the voices and perspectives 
of those under study […] to provide compelling, fair evidence.” (p.396). In the 
representation of the data, I sought to prioritise the voices of the participants and tried to 
outline different perspectives and arguments from the literature in the analysis, where I 
disagree with the participants’ interpretations (see for example interpretation of teachers’ 
statements pages 172-74; 177-79). However, in all research, the interpretation is 
considerably shaped by the researcher’s theoretical lens, background, and views. Thus, I 




hope that by providing the reader with detailed accounts, they can assess the analysis and 
interpretations in the light of these influences.  
Finally, Milner (2007) also suggested that embedding concepts of race and culture that 
arise during the research in the wider socio-historical and political context allows moving 
from an individual to a structural level. Illuminating the connections between the 
structural, institutional, and individual level represents a central concern of this thesis and 
traverses the literature review, the methodology, and the data analysis. I have sought to 
embed expressions of identity, culture, and citizenship in the context of each school, the 




This Chapter introduced the reader to the qualitative approach, the methods, ethical 
considerations, a reflection on the researcher’s background, and the process of the data 
analysis. I discussed how the topic of citizenship education and identity in the context of 
two societies, where the researcher is an outsider, benefits from a qualitative approach that 
employs individual and group interviews, observations, and the analysis of documents. At 
the same time, I reflected also on the limitations and challenges that come with this 
approach. The researcher’s background and relationships with the participants also 
influenced how the data has been analysed and how it is presented in the remaining 
chapters. The following data analysis starts with a brief description of each school context, 
which consists mainly of field notes that I collected in my reflective journal during the 
school visits. The main part of the analysis is structured into two chapters: Chapter four 
discusses the theme of avoidance and how it emerged on the policy level and in the context 
of each school across Northern Ireland and Israel. Chapter five introduces how 
sidestepping is a result of the processes of censoring by a managerialist culture and 
identity politics, which are reproduced to some extent by the schools and inside the 
classrooms.   
 






DESCRIPTION OF THE SCHOOLS 
 
This section introduces the reader briefly to each school context, providing background 
information about the environment in which the school is situated, the school population, 
the school ethos and the role citizenship education plays in the school in terms of the hours 
allocated to teaching and the importance attached to it by the school leadership. As noted 
earlier, beside statistics and interview excerpts, these descriptions rely mainly on my 
fieldnotes that I collected in a reflective journal during my school visits. In this journal I 
noted down my impression of the school environment and how I was welcomed in each 
school. The purpose of this section is to provide the reader with a more detailed description 
of each school context, so the data can be situated against this background.  
PROTESTANT SCHOOL 
 
The Protestant school is located in the outskirts of a major city in Northern Ireland, in an 
area that is predominantly Protestant, where crime is still a prevalent feature of the area 
and which ranks quite low in the social deprivation index of Northern Ireland (NISRA, 
2010). The school was merged with another predominantly Protestant school, which 
increased its enrolment.  
While most students are from a Protestant background, since the merger the pupil 
population has become increasingly diverse including pupils from other cultural, 
religious, and national backgrounds. Yet, more than half of the student population is 
Protestant, 3.3 percent is Catholic and about 22 percent have another religion or have not 
indicated their religious background (DE, 2017b). During the time of the data collection 
decorations featuring the Union Jack were put up to commemorate the 12th of July so it 
was quite visible that the area in which the school is located sought to promote a Protestant 
identity and culture.  




Decorations and signs in the schools seek to transmit a positive message of encouraging 
achievement and leadership. The value of courtesy is emphasised on the school’s website 
and links to the school’s strict policy on uniforms and appearance, which has been 
resented by some parents. In a newspaper article, the principal has defended this policy 
by linking it to the promotion of a positive image of the school and as a visualisation of 
the school’s overall “readiness for work”.  
During my visits to the school, I could not identify any display of the school’s cultural, 
national or religious identity, suggesting certain ‘neutrality’. Related to this, in the 
interviews, students have told me that due to the diversity of students’ backgrounds, no 
cultural or religious events are celebrated in the school to not to offend anyone. Even 
though I could not identify any symbols that refer to a particular culture, religion or nation, 
the environment of the school and the areas where the students are from are dominated by 
a Protestant (and loyalist) ethos.  
I gained access to the school through the vice-principal, who was very supportive of my 
research, perhaps because he was also pursuing a degree at the university at the time of 
the fieldwork and regarded it as an important project. While  he himself was very 
enthusiastic about citizenship education and viewed it as an important subject, another 
teacher suggests that the school does not attach enough importance to the subject stating 
that not much time is allocated to it on the timetable (1 period per week, 10 lessons per 
term and year since citizenship is only one unit of Learning for Life and Work (LLW)). 
The fact that significance is attached to LLW as a GCSE subject is reflected in the school’s 
strong performance, according to the vice-principal. However, policymakers and other 
teachers have argued that in general, the subject’s strength fades at key stage four, as it is 
taught as quite an academic subject based mainly on memorisation of ideas and concepts 
while building less on methods of active learning. 
CATHOLIC SCHOOL 
 
Like the Protestant school, the Catholic school is located in the outskirts of a major city 
in Northern Ireland. Despite being located in a socially-deprived area, the school performs 




above national average, which as one teacher claimed can be traced back to its efforts to 
develop good relationships with the students and parents as well as a good pastoral system.  
The background of the students is exclusively Catholic with some students coming from 
the Irish-traveller community. In this sense, this school is less diverse than the Protestant 
school. The area around the school has a strong Irish-Republican identity, expressed 
through murals that commemorate the Hunger Strikes, paramilitaries, Irish culture, and 
nationalism. In the interviews, the young people from this school reported about various 
crimes that were happening in this area including murder and drug abuse.  
One teacher explained that the area is marked by a lack of investment, high unemployment 
and high rates of suicide among young people of whom many come from a background 
of poverty and have been looked after by social services. This also came up during the 
activities with the students, who described the social reality of young people through drug 
and alcohol abuse, suicide, crime and social services.  
In contrast to the Protestant school, this school was more open in displaying its identity; 
when entering the school, one would encounter a poster with the picture of the Pope; every 
classroom was furnished with a cross on the wall and pictures of Jesus and Mary.  
One teacher described the ethos as positive, as encouraging young people “to outperform 
what’s expected of them” (Teacher 2, Catholic school). There also seemed to be an 
emphasis on creating informal relationships between students and teachers that were not 
apparent in the Protestant school. For example, one of the teachers greeted every student 
before class and often involved them in a chat, creating a more informal relationship 
between teachers and students.  
There seemed to be divergent perceptions about the importance of citizenship education 
on part of the school management and the citizenship teachers on the other side. I gained 
access to this school through one citizenship teacher who was very enthusiastic and 
supportive of the subject itself and my research. Yet, as noted in the Methodology Chapter, 
despite attempts to interview the principal this was not possible. One of the citizenship 
teachers stated that from her point of view the principal does not regard citizenship as an 
important subject and would mock it occasionally. Both teachers further described that 




teachers from other subject areas who were invited to teach the subject were not very 
enthusiastic about it and did not see it as important. In contrast, the two teachers who I 
interviewed participated in the initial teacher training for the subject. They emphasised 
the importance of citizenship to prepare young people for their future in terms of personal 
development and for life in a conflict-affected society.  
JEWISH-ISRAELI SCHOOL 
 
The Jewish-Israeli school is located in a suburban area in Israel, inside of a Kibbutz52. It 
was formed as part of the kibbutz movement and the Kibbutz itself has been growing in 
terms of its population and economy. It has eventually become privatised as many other 
of its type. In terms of its size, the school is comparable to the Protestant school in 
Northern Ireland. I became acquainted to this school through an Israeli colleague who was 
a student there himself in the past and he introduced me to the teachers and the principal.  
While in the past most students would come from the Kibbutz, the schools’ catchment 
area has expanded and now includes adjacent villages and cities. In terms of the socio-
economic background, one teacher explained that the number of students from higher-
income families has increased since more students come from outside of the Kibbutz. 
Regarding the socio-cultural background of the school population, the school would be 
almost exclusively Jewish, apart from one Arab-Palestinian teacher and possibly some of 
the staff like cleaners or caretakers. The students were described during the interviews as 
mostly secular and this is one reason why the school started a contact programme with a 
religious Jewish school. When asked about the cultural background of the Jewish students, 
one teacher responded that it is mixed, but the majority of students are from an Ashkenazi 
background. 
The ideology of the school mirrors in many ways the ideology of the Kibbutz, which was 
established by Ashkenazi Jews and thus influenced by their culture and history, suggesting 
that it does not reflect the narrative and identity of Mizrachi students. One teacher 
                                                             
52 Kibbutz is the term for collective communities in Israel that are/were based on agriculture.  




explained that the ethos of the school is about the Holocaust (reflecting the history of the 
Ashkenazi Jews). Similarly, during the time of data collection, there was an event held in 
memory of former Prime Minister and Labour party member Yitzhak Rabin, which further 
reflects the school’s association with the political (Ashkenazi) left. Moreover, there is a 
picture of Rabin in the entrance of the main school building.  
It was explained that the teachers and students who are from the Kibbutz would grow up 
in an environment that is politically left-wing and Zionist, as most people would vote for 
rather “left” parties such as the labour party (Avoda). The history and ideology of the 
Kibbutz are described as having contributed to the Zionist cause, which is embodied 
through Israeli flags, displayed all around the school property.  
The school management and the teachers stressed the importance of citizenship education. 
In addition to the compulsory teaching of civics from year 10 to 12, school managers 
introduced another subject entitled ‘Humanities’ that is taught alongside other subjects 
from year 7 to 9. According to the school’s website, ‘Humanities’ covers a mix of topics 
such as literature, history, and culture in Israel.  
During the interviews, it became clear that citizenship education extends beyond what is 
officially prescribed. For example, from Year 10 all students in the school must participate 
in a project called “social culture53” usually for one year and to pass the matriculation 
examination they need to participate for three years. This project involves volunteering in 
social schemes that support young people, the elderly or refugees among others.  
Moreover, as with other Jewish students in Israel, the students from this school have to 
take part in the mandatory trip to Poland during year 10 or 11. Throughout this trip, 
students visit historical sites of the Holocaust such as the former concentration camp 
Auschwitz.  
 
                                                             
53 Translated from Hebrew: (תיתרבח תוברה) 






The Arab-Palestinian school is located in the centre of a mixed-city, inhabited by both 
Arab-Palestinians and Jewish-Israelis. Yet, as some students pointed out to me when we 
went on a trip through the city, most inhabitants would live in separate neighbourhoods 
stating: “This is where the Arabs live - this is where the Jews live.” In terms of its size, 
this school is the smallest of all four, but comparable to the size of the Catholic school. In 
contrast to the other schools, which are all public high schools, this school was a private 
high school. All students are from an Arab-Palestinian background, mostly Christian with 
a minority of Muslim students. According to the principal, the students are mainly from a 
middle-class background.  
Again, I gained access to the school through the citizenship teacher who was interested in 
and supportive of my research project. He explained to me that this school was at first 
only open for the Christian community but was eventually opened for students from all 
backgrounds. Yet, in many ways, the Christian ethos of the school remains dominant. For 
example, the citizenship teacher explained to me that the school preferred to hire him 
because of his Christian background. Moreover, the Christian ethos is also visible through 
the display of religious symbols throughout the school such as crosses and sculptures of 
Virgin Mary. On its website, the school states to promote values of Arab culture, which 
they relate to brotherhood, love, support, and attention to the other. It further states to aim 
to develop students’ independent and self-directed learning in an atmosphere that takes 
into account the differences between the students. When I asked the teacher about the 
values that the school seeks to promote, he named educational success and good grades.  
As a private Christian school, which is generally considered ‘better’ in terms of the 
teachers and overall conditions than state-run Arab schools, this school is preferred by 
Arab-Palestinians who can afford the tuition (Al-Haj, 1995). Similar to other private 
Christian schools (see Okun and Friedlander, 2005), this school has a selective admission 
policy favouring Christian over Muslim applicants (at least for teachers, as the interviewed 
teacher reported) reflecting the Christian ethos of the school as of being “a minority in a 




minority” (Teacher, Arab-Palestinian school) that needs to serve and protect this 
minority54. 
The school puts a strong emphasis on educational achievement as a way of self-
empowerment for Arab-Palestinian citizens and therefore success in the matriculation 
examination in subjects like citizenship is considered important. The teacher described it 
as an important subject because it teaches students about their rights as citizens and 
knowledge about democracy in Israel. It was to be expected that the role of citizenship 
education as preparation for the military is contentious among Arab-Palestinian schools. 
Yet, the principal framed it as “the problem” of Arab-Palestinian citizens in Israel that 
they do not serve in the army and thus they do not receive their full rights as citizens. This 
statement suggests that she supports the idea of the military as a force of assimilation, 
which will be described in Chapter four. 
 




This Chapter is chiefly informed by the theoretical framework on cultural hegemony 
presented in Chapter two. Cultural hegemony was described as a system of values, 
attitudes, beliefs, and moralities (Gramsci, 1971/1929), which are mediated through 
processes of socialisation such as educational policies and the overt and covert curriculum 
(Apple, 2004; Giroux, 1984). These processes follow the goal of cultural reproduction of 
the ruling classes who seek to manifest their dominance as the ‘common-sense’ 
(Althusser, 1971; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990).  
Through interviews, observations, and documentary analysis I sought to explore the 
hegemonic discourse, to answer the research question of how cultural hegemony is 
expressed through the overt and covert citizenship curricula. The central argument that 
                                                             
54 There are no Muslim private schools, since the Muslim population is not allowed to keep autonomous 
religious institutions (Al-Haj, 1995). 




emerges from the data is that educational policies are permeated by avoidance as an 
expression of cultural hegemony.  
It was argued earlier in Chapter two that avoidance is a powerful hegemonic strategy that 
sustains the status quo in each society. By eluding the critical and potentially 
transformative aspects of citizenship education (such as critical pedagogy, critical 
multiculturalism, conflict transformation), avoidance trickles down from the policy level 
to schools and finally to classrooms. Avoidance is not simply a form of domination, but 
schools, teachers, and students subtly reproduce it. Therefore, this Chapter addresses also 
the second research question of how different schools respond to the citizenship education 
policies. While this Chapter will focus on avoidance strategies, the next Chapter 
introduces the reader to the ‘censors’ that direct and control avoidance.  
Citizenship education curricula and educational policies, in general, seek to mediate a 
‘common sense’ that is presented as ‘apolitical’ and legitimate (Apple, 2004).  Drawing 
on the collected data, the ‘common sense’ is shaped by the interest that seeks to 
depoliticise the content of citizenship education in Northern Ireland and Israel. In both 
societies, dealing with the political dimensions of the conflict might not be necessarily in 
the interest of political and economic elites, because this would raise questions about 
victimhood, accountability, and allotting responsibility for the violence exerted during the 
conflict. However, curricula in citizenship education and other related subjects like history 
touch inevitably on aspects of the respective conflicts and their legacies as they have 
shaped the political systems, political institutions, legal systems, values and beliefs in 
these societies. Similarly, critical political thinking, following Freire’s critical pedagogy 
can provide means to dismantle dominant knowledge and ideologies such as racism 
(Banks, 2008).  
Indeed, in Northern Ireland and Israel curricula specify aspects of the conflict as part of 
the content in citizenship education. Yet, by looking closer at how ‘conflict’ and ‘critical 
thinking’ are framed and approached, it becomes evident that the curricula do not promote 
conflict transformation or critical pedagogy. In contrast, they even enable schools and 
teachers to be at liberty to avoid addressing controversial and critical aspects of the 




conflict and the structural dimensions of racism and sectarianism through a ‘flexible’ 
curriculum. Therefore, in the following section, I will outline the impact of this ‘flexible’ 
approach, this will be followed by a discussion of how critical thinking, conflict, and 
racism/sectarianism are depoliticised in the respective curricula.   
POLICY: FLEXIBILITY AS AN AVOIDANCE STRATEGY 
 
The curriculum in Northern Ireland is characterised by its inquiry approach towards 
history (Barton and McCully, 2005) and its emphasis on the development of skills through 
an interactive pedagogy (CCEA, 2007). Instead of prescribing a specific content, it allows 
schools and teachers to be flexible regarding the content that is addressed in the classroom. 
They are encouraged to focus on ‘active learning’ in the curriculum, referring to the 
facilitation of discussions and mind mapping as opposed to traditional pedagogy like 
textbook study (CCEA, 2015c).  
This appears at first glance as an expression of a progressive pedagogy, shifting away 
from its predecessor, which had a very prescriptive “heavy” content as one policymaker 
remarked. He explained that the rationale, which underpins increased flexibility in the 
curriculum, is there to make the experience of learning more relevant for young people, 
growing up in a divided post-conflict society. Yet, the focus on inquiry, flexibility, and 
skills-development also comes with its issues, since it allows schools to set their own focus 
and interpret the concepts according to their own ethos. Similarly, the active learning 
approach is somewhat vague, as the curriculum guidance only defines it as a pedagogy 
“to facilitate different learning styles” (CCEA, 2000a:21)55. One policymaker explicitly 
referred to this and highlighted the limits of such an approach:  
[S]chools can approach these [concepts in citizenship] in so many different ways, 
so you may not have a consistent approach to it, that’s the other side of it. (…) 
Now at key stage four, you can see they [the key concepts] are very loose (…) what 
                                                             
55 There is another guidance handbook on active learning strategies that is analysed in the section about 
neoliberalism, which provides more examples about active learning. Yet it will be argued that this guidance 
also fails to provide a clearer definition.  




you have for Local and Global Citizenship in these bullet points, that’s all teachers 
have, that’s all you get. (Policymaker 3, Northern Ireland)  
Chapter one and two discussed how the concepts of diversity and inclusion, equality and 
justice, human rights and social responsibility theoretically allow an exploration of issues 
related to the conflict (CCEA, 2007). There is a rationale for keeping the content flexible 
for a political subject in a society where narratives and perspectives on the conflict are 
contested and where teachers in different school contexts might potentially interpret these 
concepts differently according to their ethos. However, this shifts the burden of finding a 
way to teach these complex political concepts to the schools and teachers. 
In Israel, the citizenship curriculum 56  also retains a certain flexibility, which one 
policymaker described as ‘vagueness’ since different groups in society can interpret it in 
a way that suits their ideology. As an example, she referred to the concept of Israel as a 
Jewish and democratic state:  
In Israel, the solution is to put everything [referring to all demands by different 
groups in society] inside and not to decide and then everyone is happy. And it’s 
very vague, everyone can find what they want and read it the way they want. Even 
if you talk about Israel as a Jewish democratic state, its citizens can read the 
democratic in his way and the Jewish in his way. So, it’s very vague as you have 
there everything, you have the Zionists, you have the values of the patriots, to love 
your country and to learn about it and to learn about your culture, and to be a 
pluralist person and to know the way democracy is working. You have everything, 
really! (…) It’s awful! In this way, it’s like you are doing nothing because everyone 
takes it to his place. (Policymaker 6, Israel)  
According to this policymaker, there is an ambiguity regarding the understanding of a 
Jewish democratic state. She explained that this approach seeks to combine democratic 
                                                             
56 At the time of the data collection the curriculum was in the process of being revised and remains 
subject to further change. Consequently, some of the discussions refer to the old curriculum and 
some to the new textbook and civics material, which is becoming increasingly shaped by the 
nationalist-religious agenda of the current government. 
 




values of pluralism and nationalistic values of patriotism. The impact of this ambiguity is 
that schools approach the concept of the Jewish democratic state in a way that reproduces 
the school’s and community’s ethos. She criticised that schools are left at liberty to 
emphasise patriotism and conservative values over pluralism and democracy. Moreover, 
she also added that ‘peace’ or ‘conflict transformation’ is not the aim of citizenship 
education in Israel, since this is not part of the political agenda of the current government 
(Agbaria, 2016a):  
We have experts in Israel who think [that civic education can contribute to peace 
or to conflict transformation], but in the situation that we are in right now … it’s 
not the aim. (...) Of course, if the government will make the decision, we can do it, 
but you can’t do it without support from- and I think in Israel it’s not even the 
Ministry of Education, it’s bigger than that. (Policymaker 6, Israel) 
Therefore, she concluded that sidestepping of controversies and keeping the subject’s role 
insignificant is in the interest of those who seek to maintain the current political situation: 
[I]t’s very comfortable57 for everyone that [citizenship] is a small subject and 
everybody fights (…) You’re not dealing with it [the controversies]. (Policymaker 
6, Israel)  
This statement is an example of how avoidance is not challenged on the policy level. The 
concomitant lack of political support for citizenship education in Israel, to which the data 
refers in this Chapter, leaves schools and their teachers at liberty to avoid discussing 
controversial issues, fostering critical thinking or teaching about racism and sectarianism 
in a critical manner. Below, I will demonstrate how flexibility facilitates sidestepping, by 
introducing the reader to three major avoidance strategies: the absence of critical 
(political) thinking, the decontextualization of the conflict, and finally the avoidance of 
structural approaches to racism and sectarianism. 
 
                                                             
57 Translated from Hebrew [חונ] 




ABSENCE OF CRITICAL (POLITICAL) THINKING AS AN AVOIDANCE STRATEGY 
 
Chapter two discussed different interpretations of critical thinking: the goal of developing 
‘critical’ citizens became increasingly incorporated into citizenship curricula around the 
world and has been mostly defined as to explore, evaluate, and develop different opinions 
(Johnson and Morris, 2010). Yet, it is argued that this form of critical thinking differs from 
critical pedagogy since it does not question mainstream knowledge (Banks, 2008). In 
contrast, critical pedagogy seeks to empower the oppressed (and also the privileged) to 
critically reflect on dominant political and economic structures and to challenge the status 
quo (Freire, 1970). The central argument of this section is that curricula and schools 
promote benign forms of critical thinking, which are reproduced by teachers and students, 
and serve as an avoidance strategy.  
 
POLICY: CRITICAL THINKING AS A SKILL 
 
In the curricula in Northern Ireland and Israel, critical thinking is framed as a skill or a 
goal. The statutory curriculum for citizenship in Northern Ireland at key stage three 
specifies critical thinking as one of the central skills (CCEA, 2015a), while the curriculum 
in Israel states that it is one of the central goals of citizenship education (Bekerman and 
Cohen, 2017). 
In Israel, it is defined as to “reach conclusions based on facts, identify connections 
between different social phenomena, understand the difference between an opinion and 
an argument, develop complex opinions and be tolerant toward different opinions” 
(Cohen, 2016:474). This definition resembles the understanding of it as to explore, 
evaluate, and develop different opinions that I referred to earlier and it does not contain 
ideas of critical pedagogy, promoting a shallower form of critical thinking.  
Nevertheless, whereas the Israeli curriculum provides a definition, critical thinking is left 
unspecified in the statutory requirements for citizenship in Northern Ireland (CCEA, 
2015a). A more detailed definition is only provided in a guide for teachers on ‘Teaching 




Controversial Issues’, published by the Council for Curriculum, Examination, and 
Assessment. Interestingly, its definition of critical thinking is similar to definitions of 
critical pedagogy since it frames its purpose as “[to] identify stereotyping, bias, prejudice 
and hidden agendas” (2015b:41). By identifying hidden agendas, students are encouraged 
to expose political interests that shape stereotyping and bias, which might lead them to 
question the status quo. This is in line with how one of the policymakers defined critical 
thinking as intended by the curriculum:  
[Y]ou will be analysing sources, (…) you’ll be looking for hidden agendas, so a 
typical lesson could be around for example around the flag incident, (…) you can 
be looking at you know how this information is portrayed to different papers, what 
kind of agenda is here, why are people saying these things, (…) getting them to 
really thinking about why these questions or why these things are happening. 
Think beyond what is my experience in my own families and communities. 
(Policymaker 3, Northern Ireland) 
Yet, another guidance document for teachers on active learning strategies describes 
critical thinking as ‘effective thinking’ (CCEA, 2000a), framing it as a marketable skill 
that contributes to students’ ‘employability’. Such an understanding dilutes the potential 
of critical thinking as critical political thinking that challenges dominant political and 
economic structures. Ultimately, these documents only provide guidance for teachers, 
leaving it up to them to interpret critical thinking. It will become evident later in the 
discussion of the teachers' interpretation that they are inclined to opt for the 'effective 
thinking' approach since it less likely to stir controversy.  
In Israel, one policymaker claimed that the teaching of skills such as critical thinking is 
an ‘agreeable’ aspect of the curriculum among policymakers who represent different 
interests: 
[T]hat you have to have an opinion, critical thinking, to know how to have a 
discussion with others, to know how to write it, to know how to speak [about] it, 
to know how to analyse what you read, to analyse things in the media and so on. 
So this is quite agreeable, I don’t think that we had a lot of discussions about that. 




(…) In the values perspective and the content perspective, there are many doubts 
about the thing itself. So the main thing I think is seeing Israel as a Jewish 
democratic state and of course, there are populations that do not agree. But they 
must teach it because this is our country today. (Policymaker 4, Israel)  
However, the lack of opportunities to critically examine the concept of the Jewish 
democratic state is criticised by Arab-Palestinian policymakers. Whilst the curriculum 
promotes the skill of critical thinking, it does not provide the space to criticise the 
dominant narratives or challenge the status quo, due to the restrictions imposed by other 
educational policies (see page 51 that refers to the restrictions to teach about the Nakba). 
Hence, Arab-Palestinian policymakers lamented the fact that critical thinking is absent 
from the citizenship curriculum. In the excerpt below, the policymaker suggested that even 
benign forms of it (as described above) are not promoted since the current government 
has shifted the focus towards “ethnic education”: 
There is no critical thinking in Israel. Maybe in civics before the change of the 
book, they had a little bit [of critical thinking], because sometimes they have some 
places for two opinions, but now I think there is no critical thinking. (…) [The] 
Ministry of Education think[s] [that there] is not enough … ethnic education now. 
(Policymaker 5, Israel)  
According to this policymaker, the citizenship curriculum in Israel does not encourage the 
examination of alternative perspectives to the dominant Zionist narrative. The data 
presented below and in the next Chapter (five) will reinforce this argument by 
demonstrating how alternative perspectives and criticism are avoided and censored in 
Israel. While the data suggest that in both jurisdictions the curriculum does not actively 
encourage critical political thinking, the next section examines if and how schools and 
teachers practice critical thinking.  
SCHOOLS: DILUTION OF CRITICAL THINKING 
 
The data across schools suggest that citizenship teachers tend to uphold less controversial 
forms of critical thinking, by approaching critical thinking primarily as a pedagogical 




concept that enables teachers and students to explore, evaluate, and develop different 
opinions but does not critically reflect on mainstream knowledge or political and 
economic structures. For example, Teacher 1 from the Protestant school understands 
critical thinking as engaging students with different kind of views, this includes adopting 
a different stance from her students in order to challenge them: 
I’m trying to get them to see both sides of the argument and sometimes I play 
devil’s advocate and you know, bring forward the view- but you know I always 
give around that I may say things, it is not necessarily what I believe- (Teacher 1, 
Protestant school)  
Similarly, teachers in Israel tend to frame critical thinking as discussing different 
perspectives, becoming politically active, and thinking independently: 
(…) you need to show both sides. I don’t care if you are left or right wing, I want 
you to bring the situation as it is, I want you to bring what has been tried before, 
I want you to bring one side of the conflict and I want you to bring the other side, 
what do they say.  (Teacher 1, Jewish-Israeli school)  
I told you in every lesson they have to [discuss] – “Ok you [said] told [there is] 
x,y,z – but there is another way” (Teacher 1, Arab-Palestinian school) 
I think people need to learn how to criticise, how to be involved in the political 
situation, they have to read and to communicate, all these things. And we have to 
give them the [tools] … to decide on which side they want to be. We don’t tell them 
what they have to choose, but they need to have the tools. (Teacher 2, Jewish-
Israeli school) 
Whilst this appeared to be the most common definition of critical thinking across all 
schools, one Catholic and one Jewish-Israeli teacher also described critical thinking 
additionally as questioning dominant discourses that are portrayed by the media, adults or 
their peers: 
Yes, we would do that [teach critical thinking], how does the media portray these 
things? Is that really the reality or is it somebody’s own spin? (…) You know did 




that create a lot of the problems in Northern Ireland, the way certain things were 
portrayed? (…) Yeah, we try to teach them, whether they do think critically or not 
because you know children are very “What you see is what you get!” and “If it’s 
written it has to be true!”  (Teacher 1, Catholic school) 
Mainly I think to teach the students how to think and to fight for subjects that are 
important for them. And to not take everything for granted and what the newspaper 
says that this is the only truth and things like that. (…) I want them to learn how 
to ask questions, … to know how be criticised, to criticise the information that they 
are getting from the parents, the school, from friends, from everyone. (Teacher 3, 
Jewish-Israeli school) 
Their approach is reminiscent of critical pedagogy and has the potential to develop critical 
political thinking by questioning dominant ideologies. Yet, they do not specifically refer 
to power relations, the interests of the political and socio-economic elite or how to 
challenge the status quo.  
Whilst some teachers demonstrated structural understandings of sectarianism, racism (in 
terms of racism, this was only demonstrated by the Arab-Palestinian teacher) and the 
conflict, they avoid transmitting these in the classroom. This will be reinforced by the data 
from the focus groups that will be presented later, which shows that many students tend 
to draw on one-sided narratives and cultural-psychological explanations of the conflict, 
racism, and sectarianism.   
However, even though critical political thinking is not encouraged or it is diluted and 
reconfigured into a “skill” that does not develop into critical pedagogy, some students 
demonstrated a critical awareness that citizenship education does not actually empower 
them. The following excerpts from Northern Ireland provide an example of a theme that 
emerged across all schools.  
 
 




Whilst some students expressed alienation from citizenship and citizenship education, 
they argued that this is because of how it is delivered to them:  
A58: [W]ould you say citizenship is something that really matters to young people? 
S1: Yes, I would say this. 
S5: No. 
S3: It should, but I don’t really care about it.  
S5: It doesn’t but it should like it is part of everything.  (Focus group 1, Protestant school) 
 
A: So, would you say that citizenship is something that really matters to young 
people? 
S3: No. Probably like more older people … 
S2: We don’t really get it- 
S3: Or understand it. (…) But you don’t really have a chance to understand it, 
because no one is like really explaining it to you. 
S4: There is some [kids] who understand that it is all about politics but there is 
not that many. (Focus group 2, Protestant school) 
Importantly, one of the students (S4) explained that citizenship is “all about politics”, 
suggesting that teachers depoliticise the subject. Consequently, whilst students partly 
describe citizenship as an important subject they confirm that it is permeated by avoidance 
that lessens its importance and depoliticises it.   
 
 
                                                             
58 ‘A’ in the excerpts from the interviews indicates that the researcher is speaking [Aline].  




DECONEXTUALISATION OF THE CONFLICT AS AN AVOIDANCE STRATEGY 
 
In post-conflict societies like Northern Ireland, education can be framed as part of the 
reconstruction policy in terms of dealing with the conflict and its legacy (Davies, 2016). 
Chapter one outlined how the conflict is framed either through a cultural-psychological 
lens and focuses on the divisions between Catholic and Protestant communities (see Ruane 
and Todd, 1996; 2005 for critique) or a structural explanation is offered that highlights 
political and economic inequalities as the root of the conflict. I will argue in this section 
that a cultural-psychological lens that is devoid of power, which focuses on the ethnic 
conflict paradigm and individual prejudice, is emphasised over a structural explanation in 
the curriculum in Northern Ireland.  
While the intention of the curriculum for LGC was to provide a structural explanation, it 
has been diluted by the community relations paradigm and a focus on interpersonal 
conflict (specified as conflict resolution skills) that allow avoidance of the critical and 
contentious aspects of the conflict. Addressing the conflict is specified in the statutory 
requirement of the citizenship curriculum, which states that lessons should “[i]nvestigate 
how and why conflict, including prejudice, stereotyping, sectarianism and racism may 
arise in the community” and “[i]nvestigate ways of managing conflict and promoting 
community relations, [and] reconciliation” (CCEA, 2015a:2). Conflict is approached 
through a discussion of the different communities, mainly through the promotion of 
community relations work, in order “to manage interpersonal conflict” (p.5) and to 
negotiate conflicting values (CCEA, 2007). Some participants stated that they learn about 
the conflict in related subjects like history and geography. In history, conflict is addressed 
as to “[I]nvestigate how history has been selectively interpreted to create stereotypical 
perceptions and justify views” (p.40), mentioning examples such as “the Troubles” or the 
“Arab-Israeli conflict”, while in geography it is framed as addressing conflict through 
challenging stereotypes (CCEA, 2007). Thus, the curriculum in these subjects grants 
teachers the option to teach about the recent conflict but teachers are also free to draw on 
different examples. In LGC, there is a requirement to explore the impact of history on 
identity constructions but there is no statutory requirement to study the recent conflict 




(Emerson, 2012). The interviews with principals and teachers (that will be presented 
below) suggest that they depoliticise the conflict in citizenship education by focusing on 
conflict resolution skills, teaching about other conflicts or one-sided historical accounts 
of the conflict.  
In Israel, a review of the textbook for citizenship “To be a citizen in Israel” that I have 
conducted confirms that it does not mention the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Instead, the 
textbook refers to ‘rifts’ in Israeli society, among them the rift between Jews and Arabs, 
which is only allocated a couple of pages in a book that encompasses about 500 pages 
(Ministry of Education, 2017a). Framing the current conflict as ‘rifts’ glosses over its 
historical, political and structural context. Previous research about textbooks and curricula 
in Israel stated that narratives about political and historical events are dominated by a 
Zionist ethos (Pappé, 1997; Podeh, 2000; Shohat, 2003). This is confirmed by the current 
history curriculum, which foregrounds a Jewish-Zionist narrative and does not address the 
recent conflict (Ministry of Education, 2018).  
Yet, the citizenship curriculum still provides opportunities to address the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, for example by discussing current events (actualia), the concept of 
equality, human rights education, democratic education or pluralism in Israeli society. The 
data suggest that teachers partly make use of these channels to address the conflict, but 
they are restrained by the dominance of one-sided accounts of the conflict which are not 
challenged by the curriculum (other examples of censors will be introduced in Chapter 
five).  
Both principals in Israel state that the conflict is not addressed through citizenship 
education in their school. The Arab-Palestinian principal simply indicated that her 
students “are living it in their daily life”, suggesting that this might be enough 
confrontation with the conflict. Her Jewish-Israeli colleague remarked in the interview 
that 
Unfortunately, I think that they absolutely don’t speak about it at school, because 
I don’t know if [another policymaker who she knows] told you but most of the 
people don’t know really the facts. I wanted to believe that in civic education we 




can teach the facts, but the facts are not so like one fact- you know. (Principal, 
Jewish-Israeli school) 
She referred to the challenges of teaching about the conflict since the ‘facts’ about it are 
contested. Her statement suggests that the difficulty of teaching about issues related to the 
conflict and possibly a lack of knowledge and preparation among teachers lead to an 
avoidance of the topic altogether.  
Compared to all interviewed principals 59 , the vice-principal of the Protestant school 
seemed the most supportive and optimistic that the conflict is addressed in the classroom:  
I think it’s the only vessel that we have in education that is now accepted, you 
know it’s now compulsory within the curriculum, so it’s the only legitimate vessel 
that it can be delivered through and the parents can’t argue against it- you have 
to do it. (Vice-Principal, Protestant school) 
However, the curricula do not specify that the recent conflict needs to be addressed: in 
Israel, they only advise to address the ‘rifts’ in Israel’s society and the school curricula in 
Northern Ireland refer to the recent conflict only at GCSE level60. In the latter case, this 
mainly stems from the fact that the recent conflict is only an elective module in the history 
and citizenship curriculum in Northern Ireland (CCEA, 2014; 2015a; 2015c). The lack of 
clear policy guidance in terms of how to address the conflict in school has an impact on 
how schools, teachers, and students interpret the conflict in the classroom, which will be 
discussed in the following section.  
 
 
                                                             
59 I mentioned earlier in the Methodology Chapter that I was not able to arrange an interview with the 
principal of the Catholic school. Consequently, her perspective is missing here.  
60 The Protestant school presents its curriculum for history on its website, showing that up until the students 
enter the GCSE stage and decide to take up history as a GCSE subject, they will not learn about the recent 
conflict in Northern Ireland. In the Catholic school the head of history was asked by the citizenship teacher 
whether he touches on issues of identity in his subject he denied this. 




BREAKING THE LINK BETWEEN THE CONFLICT’S LEGACY AND CURRENT DIVISIONS 
 
This section presents how teachers tend to refer to the conflict as a residue of the past and 
this obscures its connection to current political, social, and economic issues in Northern 
Ireland and Israel. The main argument is that it is more comfortable for teachers to address 
the conflict through less controversial aspects that are devoid of power and lie in the past 
than its recent violent outbreaks.  
In the excerpts below, teachers and students confirm that the conflict is rarely referred to 
in the citizenship lesson. Interestingly, students from the Catholic, the Jewish-Israeli and 
the Arab-Palestinian school suggest that the conflict is even ignored in the classroom. One 
Catholic teacher explained that the schools’ curriculum does not require them to teach 
about the recent conflict in the citizenship lesson nor in history, which the history teacher 
later confirmed:  
That would be history [learning about the conflict]. I’m not even sure if they would 
learn anything about the conflict in history. (…) But it’s definitely not part of our 
curriculum for citizenship so- we would look at symbols maybe of identity (…) and 
how that can cause conflict. And we would look at you know how parades can 
cause conflict and marching causes conflict, you know they don’t really- we don’t 
go into what happened during the conflict. (Teacher 1, Catholic school)  
Teachers from the Jewish-Israeli school confirm that the curriculum requires them only to 
talk about the ‘rifts’ in Israel’s society. Yet, they claimed that they seek to rebel against it 
by making the Israeli-Palestinian conflict part of the lesson by discussing current issues:  
Not too much [teaching about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict], because the 
subjects in the bagrut [final examination] are the conflicts between Israelis and 
Israeli-Arabs, not the Palestinians. But we cannot ignore it, so it’s there. I’m 
usually spending five or ten minutes at the end of the lesson, speaking about what 
was in the news yesterday, if it’s in the bagrut or not in the bagrut. (Teacher 3, 
Jewish-Israeli school) 




[I]f there [are] political events, I try to bring it to the school and to connect it to 
want we learn. The actualia [current issues] is very important, very important. To 
show them how there is a connection to the reality. It’s not history, it’s happening 
now.  (Teacher 2, Jewish-Israeli school) 
Despite these efforts by some teachers in both contexts to address the current dimension 
of the conflict, students are given the impression by the curriculum that the conflict is not 
relevant anymore. For example, it is depoliticised in Northern Ireland as current events 
such as marching and parades are treated as separate from events of the past. Importantly, 
Teacher 2 explained that she allocates five to ten minutes at the end of the lesson to the 
discussion of the news. This is a very small amount of time, considering the importance 
of the news (actualia) and the ongoing conflict.  
In Israel, the link between the divisions in Israel’s society as a result of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is not drawn. The excerpts below demonstrate that in the Catholic, 
Jewish-Israeli, and Arab-Palestinian school students are aware of sidestepping. While 
some Catholic students believe that the conflict is not happening anymore, another student 
argued that it is still relevant but partly ignored. She even claimed that they are not allowed 
to talk about it in class: 
A: And do you also talk about the conflict in Northern Ireland?  
S4: Little. It’s not really happening anymore. (Focus Group 1, Catholic school)  
 
A: And do you talk about the conflict in citizenship? (…) 
S1: No, we are not allowed to talk about it! (…) 
S5: It’s not here! 
S1: No, it’s definitely there but some people end up like just ignore it.  
A: But you don’t talk about it in school? (…) 
S2: We have it in history. (Focus Group 3, Catholic school) 




Whilst other students and teachers did not state that discussions about the conflict are not 
allowed, as Students 1 suggests, other students and the teacher also confirmed that there 
is a lack of opportunity for students to discuss the recent conflict or that they only discuss 
it in history, as the last excerpt demonstrated.  
In the Jewish-Israeli and Arab-Palestinian school, students argued that the conflict is not 
discussed in the classroom and also suggested that it tends to be ignored: 
A: Do you also speak about the conflicts in Israel? Like with the Palestinians or 
conflicts inside society? 
S1: No. Maybe in 9th grade, we did, but not that much. (Focus Group 1, Jewish-
Israeli schools)  
S5: You know we know what’s happening, but we don’t talk about it. So, we need 
more to talk about it. Because any one of us knows that but we don’t discuss about 
it. (Focus group 3, Jewish-Israeli school, Year 9) 
A: And do you talk about the conflict at all? 
S1: About the conflict? In the citizenship lesson no. There is a conflict! He [the 
teacher] told us that there is a conflict but we did not get inside the conflict, we 
don’t (…) discuss it. (Student interview, Arab-Palestinian school)  
Students from the Protestant school stated that they do not learn about the recent conflict, 
but they learn about different identities and traditions: 
S4: We learned about all the different flags (…) we didn’t learn about “the 
Troubles”. We have done like why they don’t like each other.  
S3: We have just done like where the Protestants and Catholics came from like. 
Or how the Protestants started out. 
S4: Yeah and how we don’t like each other and why there is so much ignorance 
there. (Focus Group 4, Protestant school)  




The descriptions in the last excerpt frame the conflict and its legacy as being about 
‘ignorance’ and do not refer to its political and historical dimensions. Therefore, across 
all schools, the concern emerges that the curricula and citizenship teachers avoid 
addressing the recent conflict and linking current events to their historical and political 
context. Whilst some students (S2 from the Catholic school) suggested that they learn 
about the conflict for example in history, the next section will demonstrate that it is only 
approached from one-sided and less contentious perspectives that do not broaden the 
students’ knowledge and critical understanding of the conflict.  
 




Bar-Tal and Salomon (2006) maintained that the choice of narratives about the conflict in 
conflict-affected societies is biased and driven by certain intentions such as mobilising 
support for the cause, delegitimising ‘the other’, depicting oneself as the ‘real’ victim of 
the situation and leaving little space for reflecting on one’s own ‘misdeeds’ (see also Bar-
Tal and Halperin, 2013). An examination of the narratives of the conflict that are 
addressed in the citizenship (or history) lesson shows that there is a tendency to focus on 
events that confirm the dominant narrative of one’s own community.   
For example, Protestant students referred to these events in the excerpts below, stating 
that they learn about King William III and orangeism61: 
A: Do you learn about the conflict in citizenship education? Or maybe more in 
history? 
S3: No, not really.  
                                                             
61 William the III or William of orange or ‘King Billy’ is remembered and commemorated by Protestants in 
Northern Ireland for his participation in wars against the Catholic kings Louis XIV of France and James II 
and VII of England. For an explanation of Orangeism see footnote 3.  




S2: We have learned about King Billy and all. (…) We have learned about the Irish 
famines. 
S1: We don’t really learn about it. (…) 
S2: We don’t really concentrate on that, we read like one page on it. (Focus group 
2, Protestant school) 
S1: Yeah more in history [learning about the conflict]. (…) We’ve been going 
through all of Irish history and how this has led up to everything that happened in 
Northern Ireland, like home rule. 
S3: We even did a project on orangeism and stuff.  
S1: All different things that shaped and caused that Protestants and Catholics here 
get angry and all fight each other. (Focus group 1, Protestant school) 
In terms of the reasons for the past and on-going violence, some Protestant students 
blamed democracy as a contributory factor, arguing that it led to the imposition of legal 
restrictions on their community. They explained that the decisions were imposed after a 
series of compromises with the Catholic/nationalist community, referring to the example 
of the decision to take down the Union flag from Belfast City Hall62:  
S2: Democracy and politics basically [are causing trouble]. (…) Stormont that 
like make like all these decisions that- (…) They said take down the Unionist flags 
and that sparked protests and stuff.  
S3: But how would that influence? 
S2: Because that’s what starts the actual protests. 
                                                             
62 In 2012, the Belfast City Council decided to fly the Union Jack at the Belfast City Hall only on designated 
holidays instead of throughout the whole year, following a motion introduced by Sinn Fein. This decision 
sparked protests among loyalist groups, who continue to oppose this decision (Melaugh, 2013). 




S4: Yeah, because like they chose to take down the Union flag. (…) Nobody else 
had a choice in it. It’s [be]cause Catholics didn’t want [it] (Focus group 2, 
Protestant school)  
Therefore, the students identified democracy as a source of conflict because it has 
pressured the Protestant/loyalist community to compromise with the Catholic/nationalist 
community. Instead of recognising the city council’s democratic decision, one of the 
students claimed that this decision was imposed on them (“Nobody else had a choice in 
it”) and constructed democracy as limiting the rights of the Protestant/loyalist community. 
Perhaps this reflects a sense of precariousness among Protestants in Northern Ireland that 
the unionist identity and culture is threatened by Irish nationalism (Nic Craith, 2003), as 
it was argued earlier in Chapter one. This sense of precariousness and threat might inflict 
on their willingness to grant cultural and national rights to Catholics. Moreover, Murtagh 
(2018) claimed that the flag protest was partly manipulated by paramilitary groups to 
reinforce group identities and ethnic loyalties. Thus, the incidence of the flag protest might 
amplify the students’ sense of group identity and loyalty, which can collide with 
democratic decisions or other group’s collective cultural rights.   
In general, when the students referred to the reasons for the conflict they concentrated on 
narratives that portray their community as the victim. The excerpt below exemplifies this:  
S1: Yeah sometimes there have been like Catholic kings who have mistreated 
Protestants. (Focus group 1, Protestant school) 
Similarly, in the Catholic school one of the teachers pointed to events that they discuss as 
part of the conflict’s history such as the Easter Rising 63 or the case of a Catholic boy who 
was the victim of a murder motivated by sectarianism:  
They do maybe look at 1916 the Easter Rising but they don’t look at the recent 
conflict, no. (Teacher 1, Catholic school)  
                                                             
63 See footnote 8.   




[T]here was a Catholic boy who was murdered in Ballymena and it’s a great 
newspaper article that we have on it and we would show what had happened with 
his friends, who were Protestants (…) we use that to make it a bit more real to 
them Aline, because sometimes I think my children would be weaker and if you 
don’t make it real, it’s very abstract and they can’t really understand it. So, if you 
do things like if you bring in something like that’s a newspaper article or the news 
then it’s real. (Teacher 1, Catholic school) 
The choice of these examples to teach about the historical conflict and on-going tensions 
are likely to be uncontroversial in this school. During the focus groups, it became evident 
that the dominant narratives from their communities influence students’ explanations for 
the recent conflict. Catholic students were specifically conversant about these narratives 
of which the following excerpts are an example:  
S3: When the British came over they banned speaking Irish and Catholicism. (…) 
And then it sort of started a political conflict. And then it stopped in the early 90s, 
mid-80s. (Focus group 4, Catholic school) 
S1: So, the British decided to come over here and they tried to take our country 
and we managed to get some of them out but some of them said and because so 
many people- so many like Irish people got killed from the British. Because the 
British claimed to have their own country that hatred stays in a lot of people. There 
is like so many stories where our people got killed by the British and everybody 
just hates that everybody just thinks like “These people are British, they killed so 
many of us like get them away!” that’s why it is like really tense all the time, 
especially like right by the [peace] wall. (…) And I know you’re just like “It’s 
happened and it’s not there it’s not the people’s now whose fault it is, it’s the fault 
from the British people in the past”- but they still kill so many innocent people! 
And they know the IRA did it too! I know the IRA did it too! … I know the IRA did 
kill a lot of them, but the only reason why the IRA was ever made was because they 
couldn’t stay in their own country. Like if they had left us alone nobody would 




have died, but nobody would have died here like needlessly.  (Focus group 3, 
Catholic school) 
In the last quote, the student (S1) defended the actions of the IRA. She claimed that the 
killings are a result of the partition and thus minimises the IRA’s responsibility, expressing 
perhaps sympathy with a republican-nationalist narrative of the conflict. This suggests 
that narratives, which students adopt from their communities are not challenged in the 
citizenship or history lessons. Their portrayals of the conflict appear one-sided, glorifying 
battles and violence and conforming the victimhood of their own community. This is 
reminiscent of research conducted by Barton and McCully (2012), who found that it is 
difficult for students in Northern Ireland to engage with alternative historical perspectives 
and reconciling historical narratives they learn from their community with those they learn 
at school. For teachers, this is a more ‘comfortable’ position to take than critically 
examining their own community’s role as a perpetrator of violence (Bar-Tal and Halperin, 
2013), which can, in turn, contest their students’ narratives.  
The argument that teachers are inclined to circumvent controversial issues is reinforced 
by the observation that they themselves have complex and structural understandings of 
the conflict. They describe “the Troubles” through the politico-historical context of 
colonisation, discrimination against the indigenous Catholic population, and (political) 
paramilitary violence. For example, Teacher 2 from the Protestant school referred to the 
plantation and colonialisation of Ireland as the root of the conflict:  
I think a lot of it was to do with wealth and poverty, as much as anything else. (…) 
when people are forced to live together in not great conditions, eventually they are 
going to rebel, you know. … [T]hey were restrained for hundreds of years (...) But 
there is still a legacy from it and people are still hurt, people don’t trust other 
people, you know, those who have been terrorists and they are now in government. 
(Teacher 1, Protestant school)  
[Y]ou had the Protestant community appeared (…) to be getting the good jobs, the 
best housing and the more investment into the schools. And you had the nationalist 
community, who was saying “What about us?”. And they mobilised and developed 




a civil rights movement to fight for their rights. And the conflict I think started at 
this stage because whenever the British army was being moved in to deal with the 
violence that started to occur. (…) it wasn’t about religion, for me it just was not 
about religion, it was about protection of cultures. (Vice-Principal, Protestant 
school)  
In the Catholic school, the teachers’ presentations also differ considerably from the 
students’ accounts and are similar to the Protestant teachers’ narratives, in that they offer 
a more balanced and complex account of the conflict. Teacher 2 framed the reasons for 
the conflict in terms of discrimination and oppression of the Catholic population by the 
dominant Protestant community that felt the need to protect itself:  
[Y]ou had one very dominant group politically and I suppose their ethos was to 
protect their own identity, even if that meant at the expense of the other community. 
I think that’s where it started. The Nationalist community or Catholic (…) sort of 
felt a lot of their rights were being denied and being overlooked and I suppose at 
the end a lot of people felt that there is maybe no political situation or political 
solution to the problem and that’s I think where the violence really started. 
(Teacher 2, Catholic school)  
Teacher 1 from the Catholic school admitted that it is difficult to teach about the conflict 
without having a sufficient understanding of it, referring to the need for training and 
education about the conflict for teachers. This suggests that while teachers can draw on 
their personal experiences to understand the recent conflict there is a lack of training for 
preparing them to teach about its political and controversial aspects, confirming findings 
from previous research by Barton and McCully (2012) on history education in Northern 
Ireland.  
In both schools, teachers stressed the importance of challenging students’ one-sided 
narratives and views. Yet, Teacher 2 suggested that there is not enough time allocated and 
that these issues are only dealt with superficially: 




 [Y]ou don’t get into massive depth into it you know, but you do listen to their 
stories and what they’re saying, what they have heard and what they have been 
told you know. But you know also try to show the other side of it too, you know to 
make them understand that they are not the only victims and the only ones, but you 
don’t judge anybody like saying “Oh they were right” or “they were wrong”, you 
just trying to give like … [a] broader concept, a broader understanding of what it 
was. (Teacher 2, Catholic school) 
Importantly, the different historical positioning of the Catholic and Protestant community 
appears to make it more comfortable for the Catholic teacher to teach about central events 
of the recent conflict. For example, the discriminatory laws (Darby, 1995; McKittrick and 
McVea, 2012), the civil rights movement and the Hunger Strikes are all events that 
affected the Catholic community (O’Leary and McGarry, 1993). They have been 
incorporated into the community’s narratives about the conflict and therefore Catholic 
students are more conversant in topics like equality and human rights, which are unlikely 
to be perceived as controversial in the classroom. The finding that teachers, students and 
policymakers from minority groups are readier to explore structural issues related to the 
conflict occurred across both contexts. Literature about the experiences of Black teachers 
in the United States brought forward a similar argument, claiming that Black teachers are 
readier and more conversant to address structural racism and inequality (hooks, 1994; 
Ladson-Billings, 1995; Milner, 2005; Tillmann, 2004). This is one of the central 
arguments of the thesis and will reoccur in the analysis and discussed in more detail.  
In the Protestant school, the vice-principal stated that his students lack knowledge and 
interest in the conflict. To counter this, he stressed the importance of teaching about it by 
providing them with more information and challenging the views that they grow up within 
their families and communities:  
And they have no knowledge of these things, you know and I’m showing them 
things that they never would have been told about. And it helps them maybe 
understand now some of the prejudices their parents still have. Or when they hear 
on the news, people talk about victims and the victims commission and people 




saying you know “We are victims because my father got murdered and he was a 
policeman” and they hear on the news somebody else say “Yes, but my husband 
was murdered and he was an IRA volunteer and he is as much as a victim as your 
dad, who was a policeman.” The children don’t understand that. So now whenever 
they see what their parents went through- there is a better understanding. (Vice-
principal, Protestant school) 
The excerpts presented in this section show that most teachers have complex 
understandings of conflict and consider it important to present their students with different 
perspectives and challenge entrenched views. Yet, students from both schools expressed 
a sense of victimhood that seems to be influenced by their communities’ narratives about 
the conflict. Protestant students, in particular, suggest that the state, which is commonly 
ruled by Catholics and Protestants does not protect their cultural, national or unionist 
identity. Drawing on Bar-Tal et al. (2014) and Bar-Tal and Halperin (2013), communities 
affected by conflict seek to build their identities on narratives and collective victimhood 
and the delegitimization of the ‘rival’ community as a victim. These narratives affect the 
students’ willingness to grant equal cultural rights to the other community or to 
acknowledge the other community’s narrative of the conflict. The accounts of the students, 
teachers, and principals indicate that teachers generally sidestep addressing the conflict in 
the classroom. Therefore, the imbalanced political knowledge that young people gain from 
their families, peers and communities is not adequately challenged. The reasons for 
teachers’ avoidance are more thoroughly explored in Chapter five.  
ISRAEL 
 
In Israel, previous research established that the narrative of the conflict in curricula and 
textbooks is dominated by a nationalistic (Zionist) perspective (Pappé, 1997; Podeh, 2000; 
Shohat, 2003). Arab-Palestinian policymakers and students confirmed this impression 
during the interviews. In the excerpts below are examples where students argued that they 
only study the conflict from a Zionist perspective, whilst Arab or Palestinian perspectives 
are marginalised in the curriculum:  




They teach about the conflict from the Zionist perspective. It’s like what is in the 
books, and the case in Israel is that the Arab people learn about the Jew[s], learn 
about their history, learn Hebrew, about all the Hebrew writers and- but the Arab 
people don’t learn about themselves! (…) Jews don’t learn about Arabs, they don’t 
know about Arab people, they don’t know about the narrative of the Arab people, 
they don’t learn about society, they don’t learn the Arabic language. It’s not like 
they are supposed to learn, it’s like Arab people are supposed to learn Hebrew. 
(Policymaker 5, Israel)  
You know several historical events like land-day of 197664, this is kind of the most 
important event in the history of the Arab-Palestinian minority in Israel. (…) There 
is, of course, no talking about the Palestinian characters you know poets, writers, 
politicians. (Policymaker 1, Israel) 
 [F]or example 97 percent of the Jews according to a poll65 they don’t know about 
the crimes of the occupation, what is happening in the West Bank yeah. They don’t 
know for example about the confiscation of land. (…) [M]ost of the Jews don’t 
know about it, they don’t know about the confiscation of the lands, about the whole 
struggle of the Palestinians in Israel for their rights (…) (Policymaker 1, Israel)  
Their claim that there is a lack of knowledge among Jewish-Israeli students about the 
conflict was partly confirmed in the data from the students themselves. In the excerpt 
below, Jewish-Israeli students referred to historical events to support their argument that 
the Palestinians are not willing to end the conflict and that they are responsible for the 
                                                             
64 This event named ‘Land day’ is commemorated annually by Palestinians to remember the events of 30 
March 1976 where Palestinians resisted the Israeli government’s decision to expropriate land for reasons of 
security and settlement.  
65 I could not find the poll he mentioned, but the Israel Democracy Institute published a report in which 
about 70 per cent of the population reported finding the term ‘occupation’ inappropriate for Israel’s control 
over the West Bank and Gaza (Hermann et al., 2016), which suggests that they might not be well informed 
about the events in these areas.   
 




current situation. It becomes clear that they lack detailed knowledge about these events, 
tweaking facts to bolster their argument66.  
S2: Because we gave the Sinai and nothing happened.  
S1: They continued to fight. … [I]n 1948, we wanted to give them 45 percent of 
this country but they said no. This is their problem! 
S4: They want more! Something is not enough. 
S1: They want more, more, more! And we are more than them, we have six million 
Jewish people in Israel and they are only 2.5 million. We can’t give them more 
than 50 percent, the maximum. (Focus group 2, Jewish-Israeli school)  
Related to this, students described Israel as the victim of international critique (“they are 
wrong”) and complained that outsiders do not understand their situation: 
S1: I’m so upset with all the world because everyone is angry about Israel but they 
don’t really understand what is going on here. It’s not what really happens and 
all the people in the BDS [movement] are so crazy because when you- 
S2: When you live in Israel you can understand- 
S1: We are so angry about what all the people say about us because it’s not right, 
they are wrong. (Focus group 2, Jewish-Israeli school) 
They mirrored a dominant discourse among the Zionist political elite that depicts Israel as 
the victim of international institutions and organisations, such as the United Nations (see 
                                                             
66  The students refer to the events of 1948 when the United Nations General Assembly adopted the 
Resolution 181, which recommended the creation of an independent Jewish (57 per cent) and Arab state (43 
per cent). Important to note here is that the Arab population at that time was about double the Jewish 
population. The plan was recommended by the UN General Assembly and only accepted by the Jewish 
general agency. The events of the Six-Day war that one student referred to was a conflict between Israel, 
Egypt, Jordan and Syria and led to the annexation of the Sinai Peninsula by Israel, which was later returned 
to Egypt in 1978 on the basis of the Camp David Accords. Consequently, the student conflates the 
Palestinian population with the political leadership of Egypt and ignores the fact that Israeli forces captured 
the Sinai Peninsula previously. Additionally, the numbers of population that the student cited are incorrect. 
Altogether the current population in the occupied territories comprises 4.75 million Palestinians, while 1.47 
million live in Israel (PCBS, 2015). This number does not include the Palestinian refugees living in other 
countries, who aspire to return to a future Palestinian state.   




for recent examples BBC, 2016; 2017; Beaumont, 2016). Bar-Tal (1998a) argued that 
these discourses are rooted in historical societal beliefs about the victimisation of Jews 
and anti-Zionism has been taken as evidence for a continuation of an old anti-Semitism. 
Societal beliefs about positive self-presentation and self-victimization have been 
incorporated as part of the national ethos and education to strengthen patriotism and unity, 
supporting the justification and continuation of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 1998a; 2001). 
Compared to their students and reflecting the situation in Northern Ireland, some teachers 
demonstrated a more balanced and structural understanding of the conflict. Teacher 3 
clarified first, that there is a power imbalance between the Israeli and the Palestinian 
leadership, indicating that the latter is weaker and second, that the conflict is political, 
referring to the claims of nation states to territory:  
We both want the same territory for a very very long time and one side is stronger 
than the other and the other side is very frustrated. And our leaders, unfortunately, 
don’t see it. (…) I don’t accept the people who say that “We were here first”. First 
of all, because it is not true! Historically it is not true! We were here together. And 
both nations want the same territory. So that’s what made the conflict. (Teacher 
3, Jewish-Israeli school)  
Like in Northern Ireland, teachers seemed to circumvent addressing the conflict in the 
classroom since the school and the curriculum also do not explicitly encourage discussions 
about the recent conflict. Teacher 1 from the Jewish-Israeli school lamented the fact that 
his students have no knowledge about the conflict, which is not surprising, considering 
that students are not taught about it at school: 
[T]hey know nothing, they really know nothing. (…) They don’t know the history, 
they don’t know what their rights are, they don’t know what the Arabs’ rights are, 
they don’t know what is happening in the [occupied] territories, or even in Israel, 




they don’t know anything. They don’t know where the borders are67. (Teacher 1, 
Jewish-Israeli school) 
Consequently, students in Israel and Northern Ireland can only draw on the information 
that they gain from their families, communities, peers or media. It was argued earlier that 
the knowledge that they gain from other subjects like history or geography is shaped by 
the dominant Zionist narrative. Whilst the interviewed Jewish-Israeli students reproduced 
a narrative that defends and glorifies the actions of Israeli political leaderships, Arab-
Palestinian students rejected the narrative presented in the textbooks on the grounds that 
it is in their view one-sided:  
S1: It’s an important subject [citizenship], but what they teach most of the time 
doesn’t reflect the truth. (Student interview, Arab-Palestinian school)  
S3: We hear about what happened, but we don’t feel what they [Jewish-Israelis] 
feel. (Focus group 3, Arab-Palestinian school)  
S1: It’s their [Zionist] perspective like they are qualifying the books, they are 
saying that they are alright, so they don’t teach what they don’t want us to be, 
what they don’t want us to know. (…) 
S2: … the government controls the books, so we don’t see the whole picture, we 
only see the side of the picture that we should see.  (Focus group 1, Arab-
Palestinian school)  
Generally, Arab-Palestinian policymakers and students argued that perspectives of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the curricula and textbooks are one-sided, which is also 
supported by previous research (Bar-Tal, 1998b; Firer, 1998; Al-Haj, 2005; Pinson, 
2007b; 2013). While the curriculum specifies that students only learn about the ‘rifts’ in 
                                                             
67 The lack of knowledge among high school students in Israel regarding the borders has been demonstrated 
by other studies (Ben-Ze’ev, 2015; Fleishman and Salomon, 2008) outlining that many students do not know 
where (or even what) the green line is, which Ben-Ze’ev (2015) argues is also the result of contradictory 
portrayals of the borders by the school curricula. The green line is the term for the border that predates the 
1967 war between the State of Israel and the West Bank, which was agreed in the 1949 Armistice agreements 
between the armed forces involved in the 1948 war.   
 




Israel’s society, the Arab-Palestinian teacher implied that there are other ‘ways’ to address 
the conflict: 
[There are m]any ways to express yourself about the conflict. We have something 
about conflicts in Israel; some of it, there is this conflict between the Jews 
themselves, and the politics between right and left, and economic and Arabs and 
Jews, the national conflict between Arabs and Jews. (Teacher, Arab-Palestinian 
school) 
His statement referred to concepts and current issues during the lesson, which allow the 
discussion of aspects of the conflict, for example, diversity, human rights violations and 
equality. This will be discussed in more detail in the next section about racism and 
sectarianism.  
Like students from the other three schools, Arab-Palestinians also learn about the (Israeli-
Palestinian) conflict outside of school. The principal (cited earlier, page 140) hinted at this 
when she referred to her students’ everyday experiences. During the focus groups with 
Arab-Palestinians, the conflict was ever-present, even when it was not explicitly the topic 
of the conversation. When the students talked about themselves or other young people, it 
became clear that the conflict is an important feature of their everyday reality and how 
they make sense of the past and the present. Many of them reported their families’ 
narratives and the consequences of the 1948 Israeli-Palestinian war68, as the excerpts 
below demonstrate: 
S1: Yes, we don’t want to forget that this house was in the past for a big family 
that in the war, in … 48, they went to other countries and they left their house. (…) 
We can’t forget this! And some families that I know, my parents’ cousins in Jordan, 
they lived here in 48 and now they want to come to their house, but they can’t. 
(Focus group 4, Arab-Palestinian school)  
                                                             
68 The 1948 Israeli-Palestinian war was fought between the State of Israeli and a military coalition between 
different Arab states following Israel’s declaration of independence.  




S2: I think the most important thing to people is to know all about your history. 
Everything that happened to your grandma and your grandpa. (Focus group 3, 
Arab-Palestinian school) 
S3: My grandfather was in the war. 
S2: Mine too.  
S3: When they speak about this some of them cry. It’s hard for them- 
S2: It’s hard for them but maybe we can learn- 
S1: From their perspective. (Focus group 3, Arab-Palestinian school)  
This knowledge that they gain from their families and their community presents ‘counter-
knowledge’ that challenges the dominant Zionist narrative about the conflict. For Arab-
Palestinian students, this is an alternative way to learn about the conflict and events that 
the teacher feels restrained to discuss in the classroom. Drawing on these narratives they 
develop an alternative understanding of the conflict to the Zionist narrative, which is based 
on the dispossession of land and discrimination:  
S3: Because the Jews came and they stole our land and until now they deal with 
us on another level like we are Arabs on another level- 
A: Because you don’t have the same rights? 
S3: Yeah. It’s not the same deal, the way they deal with us like they deal with the 
Jews. (Focus group 3, Arab-Palestinian school) 
However, some students and the teacher referred to the curriculum’s narrative about the 
‘rifts’ in Israel’s society as the major source of the conflict. It was argued earlier, that this 
is an avoidance strategy that decontextualizes the conflict, as it glosses over its historical, 
political, and structural context. The two excerpts below exemplify how the teacher and 
one of his students described the conflict as being between religions, specifically between 
Muslims and Jews:  




I think now it [the conflict] is not national, now it’s religious between Muslims and 
Jews. It’s not only national because everything is about the religious things. It was 
maybe before about national, but now it’s has become more religious. (…) And 
now with the prayers in Jerusalem, the Al-Aqsa mosque, so it’s not only a national 
issue, but it takes a religious side.  (Teacher, Arab-Palestinian school)  
S1: It’s kind of funny because now the problem is not only about Arabs and Jews, 
it’s more like Muslims, Christians, and Jews. (…) (Student interview, Arab-
Palestinian school)  
In the light of the recent tensions in the old city of Jerusalem (Berger et al., 2017), one can 
argue that the religious dimension of the conflict has become more visible. However, 
describing the conflict as religious overlooks its political dimension, which draws on 
religion and nationality as ideological resources to justify ownership and belonging to the 
land. The emphasis on the religious dimension can reflect different understandings of the 
conflict: on the one hand, these statements reproduce the division strategy employed by 
the Israeli state, which seeks to widen and exploit the gaps among the Arab population, 
between Druze, Christians, Muslims, and Bedouins (Lustick, 1980; Yiftachel, 1999). Yet, 
on the other hand, the recognition that there is a conflict between the different religious 
groups can point also at the existing gaps among Arab-Palestinians. Christian Palestinians 
are privileged compared to their Muslim counterparts in Israel in terms of resource 
allocation and historically they have benefitted from higher educational attainment (Okun 
and Friedlander, 2005) and higher occupational success 69  (Kraus and Yonay, 2000). 
Hence, this statement by the Christian teacher could be an expression of superiority that 
he feels as an Arab-Christian towards Arab-Muslims while he sidesteps addressing the 
political dimension of the conflict.  
Nevertheless, compared to the other schools Arab-Palestinian students demonstrated a 
more complex understanding of the conflict and seemed generally more politically literate 
                                                             
69 Kraus and Yonay maintain that members of the Christian community are often preferred among the 
Jewish-Israeli community, since they are constructed as “closer … to the Western culture they identify with” 
(p. 531) and thus mirroring racist attitudes towards Muslims that are common in Western cultures (for 
example Said, 1978). 




during the interviews, arguably because they are exposed to different narratives in schools 
and through their family and community. This exposure to different perspectives allows 
them to view their own community more critically. For example, they criticised the 
Palestinian leadership and individual Palestinians that use violence or murder Jewish-
Israeli civilians:  
S3: Also in class, we are saying “you know guys the Arabs are not the poor guys 
here, they also do-” 
S2: Some horrible stuff, for example, the Hamas, and the Fatah- 
S1: Not necessarily, sometimes it’s like simple citizens they also- 
S2: They are trying to defend themselves but they also kill some civilians so it’s 
not cool. 
S1: And there are lot of Jewish people that are good and nice people and better 
than Arabs and they know it doesn’t necessarily have to be this way.  
S3: We are not justifying it for anyone.  
S2: There is no “poor guy” in this conflict. We are both involved in this, but there 
are some people who are trying to kill- it’s like a jungle, like two tigers in a jungle. 
(Focus group 1, Arab-Palestinian school)  
Arab-Palestinians students are the only group that voices a clear denunciation of violent 
political acts by individuals and organisations that claim to represent their community. 
While most Protestant and Catholic students also seem alienated by violent and criminal 
actions by the paramilitary groups, they do not openly criticise them. Some Jewish-Israeli 
students were critical towards the current right-wing government, yet they did not question 
violent acts committed by their governments or individuals from their community. This 
lack of criticality could be influenced by the strong notions of nationalism/unionism that 
these young people are socialised into, which hinders them from criticising or questioning 
the glorification of their own communities’ narratives as Bar-Tal and Salomon (2006) 
have warned.  Referring to Banks (1994) and Jenks et al. (2001) this prevents them from 




developing cross-cultural competency since they avoid the critical examination of their 
own beliefs regarding minority groups’ experiences and cultures and how this has 
determined the development of dominant knowledge, values, and beliefs.  
 
AVOIDANCE OF STRUCTURAL APPROACH TO RACISM AND SECTARIANISM  
 
This section discusses how the curriculum, schools, teachers, and students define racism 
and sectarianism. It is connected to the previous section about the conflict as it also 
elaborates on the difference between cultural-psychological and structural explanations of 
racism and sectarianism. Chapter one discussed how a structural, anti-essentialist 
approach to racism frames it as a system of advantage based on race (or religion) 
(Wellman, 1993). This system of advantage goes beyond problematising prejudice as 
resulting from a lack of information or contact. Instead, a structural perspective sees 
racism as being used to justify a political system, institutional policies, and cultural 
messages that privilege people based on race (or religion) (Dixon et al., 2012; Tatum, 
2000). Similarly, Liechty and Clegg (2001) defined sectarianism as connected to a system 
of power that exists at an individual, communal, and institutional level. This 
understanding of racism and sectarianism reflects a critical multicultural approach that 
problematises power and privilege; framing racism as a result of the history of oppression 
as opposed to conservative and liberal approaches to multiculturalism that individualise 
and psychologise racism (see McLaren, 1995). Forms of polite or acceptable sectarianism 
that mask power and accept exclusion have been also criticised since they leave structural 
sectarianism unchallenged (Liechty and Clegg, 2001). Consequently, racism and 
sectarianism are linked as they both sustain systems of advantages and privilege.  
Chapter two outlined how educational policies tend to promote conservative and liberal 
approaches to multiculturalism that fail to address the structural nature of 
racism/sectarianism by framing it as individual prejudice (Gilborn, 2004). Curricula are 
presented as objective, value-free, colour-blind and omit that students who are privileged 




in terms of race, religion, and class benefit most from the current education system 
(Giroux, 1997; Ladson-Billings, 2005). 
In the discussion of the data below, it becomes evident that conservative multiculturalism 
dominates across all schools. However, in the Arab-Palestinian and to some extent in the 
Catholic school, teachers and students demonstrate a more critical, structural 
understanding of racism and sectarianism. This finding is connected to Arab-Palestinians’ 
and Catholics’ experience of being part of a minority group that is or was structurally and 
institutionally discriminated against by state policies and laws. Yet, whilst Arab-
Palestinians are currently affected by structural discrimination, Catholics represent a 
historical minority group that has successfully negotiated legal, political and socio-
economic inclusion70 in Northern Ireland (Ruane and Todd, 1996). Nevertheless, both 
groups draw on these experiences and narratives to understand the conflict and 
racism/sectarianism.  
CONSERVATIVE MULTICULTURALISM AT THE POLICY LEVEL 
 
The citizenship curricula in Northern Ireland and Israel include statements promoting 
diversity, pluralism and/ or mutual understanding. There is vast literature presented in 
Chapter two (see for example Banks, 2001; 2004; 2008; Gilborn, 2006; Ladson-Billing, 
2005) and previous studies in both contexts (see for example Bekerman, 2007; 2016; 
Donnelly, 2004a; 2004b; 2008) claim that there is a need to carefully assess the impact 
and effectiveness of educational policies that promote conservative or liberal 
multiculturalism, which both individualise and psychologise racism and social injustice 
(McLaren, 1995).  
Previous policies in Northern Ireland such as the curricular initiative Education for Mutual 
Understanding (EMU) have been criticised among other concerns for their overemphasis 
on contact and politeness. It was argued that this has negatively impacted on teachers’ and 
                                                             
70 Depending on the perspective it might be argued that full equality (political, cultural and socio-economic) 
of both traditions in Northern Ireland requires an Irish dimension, meaning that Irish unity as a goal to be 
achieved by peaceful means cannot be ruled out and thus given equal weight to the Protestant commitment 
to the Union (Ruane and Todd, 1996).  




students’ ability to address issues of division and conflict in the classroom (Gallagher, 
2011; McEvoy, 2007; Richardson, 1997; Smith and Robinson, 1992; 1996). Gallagher 
(2011) stated that there was a danger that ignorant (or sectarian) views were not 
challenged. Similarly, whilst EMU provided means to address individual prejudice, it did 
not sufficiently meet the need to approach prejudice and discrimination on a structural 
level (McEvoy, 2007).  
In contrast, it was argued that LGC has a greater potential to provide a structural response 
to the conflict and sectarianism (McEvoy, 2007). Yet, one policymaker contended that its 
continuous development and funding is neglected by the political leadership, which 
focuses on other educational policies such as Shared Education that promotes contact 
across communities among other purposes: 
 [T]he reality of it is, there isn’t any [teacher training for citizenship], not from the 
Education Authority, there might be a small group of [another organisation] (…) they 
would be more community relations because it’s a push to community relations. (…) They 
are shifting it to this community relations stuff again as opposed to citizenship. 
(Policymaker 3, Northern Ireland)  
He argued that educational policies continue to be dominated by the community relations 
paradigm and that citizenship education as a form of a structural response does not receive 
sufficient political support. For him this policy approach becomes evident through the fact 
that programmes like SE, which he sees as supporting the cultural-psychological approach 
receive more generous funding (£25 million for SE from the Department of Education and 
the Atlantic Philanthropies, see DE, 2017a) and political support, while there is a 
concomitant lack of support for the promotion of citizenship education. The political 
leadership’s tendency to draw on conservative and liberal approaches to multiculturalism 
influences how schools approach citizenship education, as the next section will 
demonstrate. 
The dominance of conservative and liberal multiculturalism is also reinforced by the 
inclination of some policymakers to minimise the issue of racism. During the interviews, 




some policymakers questioned whether the focus on sectarianism in citizenship education 
is still relevant: 
I think more and more schools are becoming increasingly diverse anyway. And 
maybe sectarianism isn’t the biggest issue, maybe it’s racism, it’s homophobia, 
it’s those other types of things that are coming in. (…) [T]he values system there 
is about valuing diversity and promoting diversity and celebrating it. (Policymaker 
1, Northern Ireland)  
He claimed that racism and homophobia are perhaps more pressing issues than 
sectarianism since schools are becoming more diverse in Northern Ireland. Additionally, 
he suggested that these issues should be addressed by promoting and celebrating diversity, 
framing it as a form of conservative or liberal multiculturalism (see McLaren, 1995). 
Whilst racism is indeed a concerning issue in Northern Ireland (Knox, 2011), sectarianism 
continues to affect Northern Ireland’s society (Engel, 2017; NASUWT, 2016). Knox’s 
(2011) study found a link between racist and sectarian attitudes in Northern Ireland. Both 
ideologies have historically sustained a system of advantage in Northern Ireland (and 
beyond) and thus refer to the same problem of oppression and privilege.  It will be 
discussed below that minimising sectarianism is an avoidance strategy that is reproduced 
by schools and teachers.  
It was argued earlier in Chapter one that historically educational policies in Israel were 
characterised by attempts to assimilate and to exclude parts of the population (Abu-Saad, 
2004; Dahan and Levy, 2000). Even though the curriculum promotes values of pluralism 
and tolerance (Ichilov, 2003), this happens under the umbrella of (European) Zionist 
dominance. Eventually, this can lead to a dilution of structural racism and discrimination. 
Arab-Palestinian policymakers criticised that the Ministry of Education does not address 
the issue of racism in educational policies. Similar to teachers from minority groups, these 
policymakers might be more aware of the lack of education against racism (hooks, 1994; 
Ladson-Billings, 1995; Tillmann, 2004):  
Officially there is no[t] something called “conflict”, or racism according to 
Ministry of Education. Even though there was a programme few years ago for 




education against racism and it was cancelled. (…) Because this is part of the 
policy that … they say that “we should increase Jewish education. And we should 
increase Zionist education.” We, on the other side, say, “we should increase 
citizenship education, we should increase education against racism”. So, they 
don’t actually recognise that there is a problem of racism. (Policymaker 1, Israel)  
In Chapter one, it was argued that there is a tendency to address racism through the prism 
of anti-Semitism (Rosenberg, 2013, cited in Cohen, 2017). Another policymaker referred 
to this in the following excerpt, explaining that the focus is laid on anti-Semitism instead 
of racism as a broader phenomenon: 
[I]n civic education in Israel they don’t learn about racism. They don’t learn about 
racism! It’s not part of the formal education programme ... It’s an extra if they 
want to do it, they do but it’s not- they don’t have it in civics or in another 
important [subject]. They teach about anti-Semitism, but they don’t learn about 
racism as a universal phenomenon. They don’t learn about racism against other 
people for example … it’s a choice. (Policymaker 5, Israel)  
The framing of racism largely as anti-Semitism is supported by a review of the textbook 
for citizenship education (Ministry of Education, 2017a). When racism71 is mentioned in 
the text it refers to laws against incitement, anti-Semitism, the context of the United States 
or the argument that nationalism and Judaism do not promote racism. Arguably the 
oppression of Jewish people throughout history is a good example of racism. Yet, focusing 
only on the victimhood of Jewish people strengthens the dominant Zionist discourse and 
narrative (Porat, 2004; Resnik, 2003) and essentialises racism as a particular experience 
of the Jewish people, perhaps omitting its universal and structural character as a system 
of advantage (McLaren, 1995; Tatum, 2000; Wellman, 1993).  Therefore, this as an 
avoidance strategy to circumvent addressing structural racism in Israel and it will be 
demonstrated below how it is reproduced by teachers and students. 
                                                             
71 Translated from Hebrew [תונעזג]. 




Contact initiatives that bring together Jewish-Israelis and Arab-Palestinians mainly rely 
on the support of committed non-governmental organisations, educational institutions or 
individuals. Some policymakers recount from their own experience of these meetings that 
there are also various practical issues with these encounters such as a lack of preparation 
and follow-up sessions. For policymaker 2 these shortcomings could be also attributed to 
the lack of political and institutional support:  
I learned that the percentage of students that do it in schools is very very low. It’s 
very, very complicated and sometimes even schools that do it, they treat this as 
something that has to be done (…). And sometimes they bring the students to these 
meetings with really no good preparation and with no really good discussion 
afterwards, like analysing and reflecting that. And without that, it’s like you know 
it’s something which is more like folklore meetings, it’s not really something deep. 
(Policymaker 4, Israel)  
And most of the programmes for co-existence, it’s from the NGOs [name of NGOs] 
and they are small programmes. It’s like all the year they learn about something 
and one or two days, they have a meeting with the other group. They don’t know 
anything about this group and they don’t understand. And sometimes because they 
don’t know, the effect of these activities is negative. (…) it’s a small activity for 
some schools that believe in democracy, but most of the schools they don’t have 
this. (Policymaker 5, Israel)  
During the interviews, it became clear that these encounters are permeated by the 
structural issues that dominate politics in Israel, which is well documented in studies about 
the bilingual schools (Bekerman, 2005; 2016). For example, many Arab-Palestinian 
participants emphasised that encounters with Jewish-Israelis had become especially 
difficult during times of political tensions, such as the Intifada or the recent Gaza war.  
Another Arab-Palestinian policymaker criticised these encounters as a fairly superficial 
form of contact. Importantly, he suggested that these encounters should promote equality, 
democratic values, and knowledge about the ‘other’ side that goes beyond the stereotypes 
propagated by the media:  




So sometimes we say that “Ok we are not against co-existence, but co-existence 
exists when the two parts exist, not that one part exists above- it should be kind of 
equal”. So, we are not against it but still- (…) There are conditions, it’s not like 
“ok we will come and play soccer together and eat lunch and go back” if it does 
promote more understanding if it does promote equality if it does promote 
democratic values, so it’s very positive (…) No soccer game can be part of it, but 
it’s not the only thing. Like for example most of the Jewish population, the Jewish 
youth, they do not know anything at all about Arabs [except] the things they get 
from the media. (Policymaker 1, Israel)  
Since policymakers argued that most contact initiatives do not go beyond the facilitation 
of contact, none of these initiatives, nor the curriculum in citizenship and history that 
concentrates mainly on teaching about anti-Semitism provides a structural response to the 
conflict or racism in Israel. 
In the following section, I split the part about conservative multiculturalism as an 
avoidance strategy into a section for each school, because each school frames this 
avoidance strategy differently, reflecting their own community ethos.  
PROTESTANT SCHOOL: MINIMISING SECTARIANISM AND CONSERVATIVE MULTICULTURALISM  
 
In general, teaching about sectarianism and identity in the Protestant school is 
characterised by an overemphasis on racism and a conservative/liberal multicultural 
approach that defines racism as a result of individual prejudice and lack of contact. Like 
the policymakers [cited in the section above] Protestant teachers and the vice-principal 
belittle sectarianism as a problem. For example, the vice-principal in the Protestant school 
suggested that teaching about racism has become more relevant: 
[A]ll of the training that I went on … it was about sectarianism, that was the key 
focus. Now, to be truthful with you, from 2004 to 2005, now to 2006, those areas 
are no longer as relevant. So, the children in the class don’t struggle as much as 
with what we refer to as “the other side”, you know, most our kids come from 
Protestant working-class families, they don’t really seem to have any issues now 




with Catholic working-class families. Our problem now, in terms of what you teach 
is about ethnic minority groups. (…) they would have been very racist. (…) I think 
Northern Ireland has changed- (…) whenever I started teaching here and I would 
be teaching about diversity in Northern Ireland, I would have had symbols of the- 
Irish symbols you know. Now, the kids aren’t interested (…). In terms of the 
sectarian divide, it’s pretty much not there now. (…) the kids in my class don’t 
have a clue, I could have put up pictures of political representatives of the you 
know Sinn Fein, which would have been the Republican party and our kids back 
then in [the previous school] would say, oh yes that’s Gerry Adams, oh yes that’s 
Martin McGuiness, they would know. (…) And they would have been figures of 
hate. I would put up a picture of Martin McGuiness now and he’s Deputy First 
Minister, our kids couldn’t tell who he is, they wouldn’t have a clue.  (Vice-
principal, Protestant school)  
He rightfully described growing racism towards other minorities in Northern Ireland as a 
concerning issue (Knox, 2011). However, he separated teaching about sectarianism and 
racism, not recognising the obvious link between the two as systems of advantages.  
Emphasising racism over sectarianism in Northern Ireland is a complex avoidance 
strategy and ignores that sectarianism is a form of racism (McVeigh; 1998; McVeigh and 
Rolston, 2007). Framing this problem solely in terms of racism ignores the historical 
legacy of sectarianism as a system of advantage in Northern Ireland. Despite teachers’ 
structural understanding of sectarianism and the conflict outlined above, they avoid 
transmitting this to their students.  
Instead, their teaching approach to racism reflects cultural-psychological understandings 
of it that frame racism as the result of individual prejudice and a lack of information about 
other ‘cultures’. In the following excerpt, one teacher explained how she challenges 
stereotypes through the celebration of different cultures. Interestingly, she avoided using 
the term racism:   
No, they [majority group students] don’t think about it [racism] very often, you 
know. It becomes more of a – I don’t want to say an issue – but some negative – I 




mean it’s been heightened more because we have a lot of what we call newcomer 
children in school. So, you have people, who are from Poland, who are from 
Romania, who are from Africa, different parts of Africa, and you know there have 
been tensions because unfortunately there would be children that say they’re 
coming here to take our jobs that type of thing. And they tend to stereotype them 
and put them all in one group, so it’s trying to – again broaden the mind and get 
them used to working with each other and to bring the newcomers in, so they feel 
part of it and we can celebrate their diversity, their culture as well. (Teacher 1, 
Protestant school)  
Her approach was praised by the vice-principal as a good example of using ‘active 
learning strategies’72: 
 [Teacher 1] for example … was looking at for example differences in society and 
one of things she did was she brought in home-made meals, like there was a 
Chinese dish and there was a Japanese dish and an Italian dish and she brought 
these meals in and brought the kids around and “Let’s eat and let’s talk about the 
different- you know why would they eat a lot of rice in these countries and why 
they would eat a lot of pasta”. So, we – very much about active learning, as 
opposed to “Here is the textbook and this is what it says about Europe read that 
there and answer these questions”. (Vice-principal, Protestant school)  
Active learning is understood as going beyond more traditional teaching methods such as 
memorisation and summarising, meeting different people inside and outside the classroom 
as well as different activities during the lesson. While ‘active learning’ in the curriculum 
refers to the facilitation of discussions and mind mapping (CCEA, 2000a), the examples 
given by the teachers convey only superficial ideas about multiculturalism, following the 
credo of ‘celebrating difference’ and not addressing issues of racism in a more critical 
manner. I observed one lesson by Teacher 1, where she sought to encourage students to 
think about the situation of refugees and to take their perspective, drawing on active 
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learning strategies (she mapped out the journey of the refugees and students had to follow 
this path imagining themselves as being a refugee). While the perspective-taking method 
seemed to get students to think about the refugee’s experience from a different angle, the 
lesson felt a bit rushed and there was no time to discuss the situation of refugees after they 
arrived in the UK or Europe. It focused on encouraging compassion and understanding 
among the students but did not address structural issues of discrimination and racism that 
refugees experience in Western Europe. Whereas active learning strategies can provide a 
valuable alternative pedagogy that goes beyond traditional approaches of studying 
textbooks and memorisation, these examples demonstrate that it can be used as an 
avoidance strategy that distracts from engaging critically with the concepts of human 
rights, sectarianism, and racism.  
Similarly, racism was also described as resulting from a lack of contact. The vice-principal 
described contact as an important tool to challenge students’ stereotypes and he claimed 
that the best way to learn about ‘difference’ is to bringing people from different 
backgrounds together:  
[T]he best approach, whenever you want to deal with difference is to bring the 
difference together. (…) you know when you are dealing with diversity and 
inclusion of ethnic minorities, bring ethnic minorities in and let them speak about 
how they feel and let them speak about their experiences. (Vice-principal, 
Protestant school) 
Again, framing racism as stemming from a lack of contact and information ignores its 
structural character as a system of advantage. Consequently, despite their structural 
understandings of sectarianism, teachers in the Protestant school formulate racism 
according to cultural-psychological understandings and conservative multiculturalism.  
Another strategy of avoidance among citizenship teachers in the Protestant school is to 
approach the conflict through the teaching of interpersonal conflict resolution strategies 
that are developed within the classroom rather than referring explicitly to the political 
conflict. This strategy is outlined in the following excerpt: 




Yes, [we teach about the conflict] and conflict resolution. We tend to do a lot more 
of that with the old[er] ones in GCSE, it is an actual part of the syllabus. So, you 
have to look at, you know things like mediation, things like how people resolve 
conflict, so we do some like that as well. (Teacher 2, Protestant school) 
Importantly, the teacher also explained that this approach to conflict resolution is part of 
the curriculum. McEvoy (2007) has raised concerns about this “future-oriented” approach 
in the citizenship curriculum, which makes it easier for teachers to avoid contentious 
issues (p.147). It is less contentious for the teacher to approach the topic of conflict by 
introducing them to conflict resolution skills. Similarly, the same teacher also described 
that she teaches about the conflict in a global context, referring to wars and conflicts in 
other places such as Rwanda. Again, this sidestepping is facilitated by the flexibility of 
the curriculum that affords teachers the autonomy to circumvent contentious but important 
aspects. 
Niens and Reilly (2012) have warned about the potential of avoidance in their research. 
They argue that even though education for global citizenship has been successful in raising 
awareness among students about global issues, they were unable to draw connections 
between global and local issues within their own community and country. According to 
Niens and Reilly, this stems from a tendency among teachers to circumvent discussions 
about remaining inequality and power imbalances in Northern Ireland.  
 
CATHOLIC SCHOOL: BETWEEN CRITICAL AND CONSERVATIVE MULTICULTURALISM 
 
The approach to sectarianism in the Catholic school differs from the Protestant school. 
The different approaches to teaching about sectarianism seem to be connected to the 
teachers’ and the students’ background as a historically oppressed minority in Northern 
Ireland. Whilst politically and legally Catholics in Northern Ireland are granted now equal 
status, their understandings of themselves as a community are connected to the experience 
of structural sectarianism as a form of oppression and disadvantage. The Catholic 
teachers’ understandings of the conflict are similar to those described by the Protestant 




teachers. Yet, Catholic teachers are provided with a safer and more comfortable 
environment to address examples of oppression in the context of structural sectarianism 
in Northern Ireland in their classroom, since these resonate with the students’ narratives 
about their families and community. 
During the focus groups, Catholic students referred to events and aspects central to the 
history of oppression of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland, such as religion, Irish 
nationality, the IRA, British rule, and “the Troubles” in terms of identities that are 
important to young people (see Figure 14; 15 and 16). One student told in the focus group 
how her uncle took part in the Hunger Strikes. Moreover, there are two memorials near 
the school, reminding of people who died in the Hunger Strike and who were killed during 
“the Troubles”. By growing up in this community that continues to commemorate events 
of the recent conflict, Catholic students seemed more mindful that sectarianism is still an 
issue in Northern Ireland of which the following excerpt is an example: 
S3: Yeah and it is still going, a lot of prejudice.  
A: You think it’s still going on? 
S2: Like when the Protestants march it goes like a wee bit- 
A: Oh yeah like 12th July- 
S3: And then they are trying to cover up murders.  
S2: And bombings. (…) You see with the Troubles and what happened hundred 
years ago, it’s still going on today.  (Focus group 4, Catholic school) 
They also described citizenship education as having an important role in addressing the 
conflict between Catholics and Protestants:   
A: And do you think actually that citizenship is an important subject?  
S4: Especially here like. 
S1: Yeah over in Ireland.  




A: What do you mean like especially- 
S1: Like to help us get on cause like usually there is a lot of controversy between 
us and Protestants so like if we learn more about it and we like both say “let’s 
come together” and it’s not as bad as it is.  (Focus group 1 Catholic-Irish school) 
Due to the responsiveness on part of their students to these events, it is not surprising that 
Catholic teachers are perhaps more confident in addressing the local context in their LGC 
lesson. Thus, Teacher 1 argued that there is not enough emphasis on the local context, 
countering the avoidance of the local context that is promoted on the policy level: 
Maybe there is not as much emphasis on local issues as global, maybe. Obviously, 
you could re-do the racism you could look at racism in Northern Ireland and you 
can look at sectarianism in Northern Ireland, so you know. But I think it is more 
important to children to see their own community before they start looking out, 
maybe. (Teacher 1, Catholic school) 
She referred to the problem that racism tends to be addressed by looking at segregation 
and the civil rights movement in the United States, while it is obviously an issue in 
Northern Ireland itself. However, like the teachers from the Protestant school, she also 
suggested that sectarianism has become less relevant despite admitting that it is still a 
problem: 
Sectarianism … obviously, it is a big thing here and you know our children would 
be divided you know because we are a Catholic school (…) I think it still is an 
issue but maybe not as much as it used to be, I would like to think. (…) You know 
is it because of the education that they are not as bigoted as they used to be? You 
know but then you look at the news and you know- it’s going on still! (…) It could 
be because a lot of my children where they come from- they just stay in their own 
area. So, you know they don’t maybe mix a lot with other people you know. 
(Teacher 1, Catholic School)  




The other Catholic teacher stressed the connection between sectarianism, racism, and 
homophobia, referring to the challenges of countering students’ stereotypes and the 
importance of addressing the recent conflict: 
You know it can work, it’s gonna be a slow process you know because sectarianism 
was so rife in Northern Ireland for so long. (…) You know you can’t skim over or 
try to brush it all under the carpet because it did happen, it [the recent conflict] 
lasted for 40 years! And I think if they [the students] could maybe understand or 
see how that has developed, it might help them to deal with the new challenges the 
like of the homophobia and the like of the racism and say “look there was a model 
of something that was really bad and has improved, now this is the next problem, 
can you take some of those ideas and bring it into that situation and help to resolve 
it.” (…) sectarianism was there and now it’s sort of in the wane, but there are new 
issues coming out, the likes of racism, the likes of homophobia, all these sort of 
things and they still have to be addressed. (Teacher 2, Catholic school) 
Yet, in the following descriptions of how they address sectarianism and racism in the 
classroom, it becomes evident that their teaching is also mostly limited to a cultural-
psychological approach. Teacher 1 described how she addresses sectarianism and racism 
by drawing on ‘active learning strategies’: 
[W]e would look at the topic of you know looking at racism, sectarianism and then 
I would get them to design a superhero, somebody who is going to save the world 
and stop racism, stop sectarianism and the children love it Aline! Yeah, they do 
their drawings and then they design like a super-power they give them a slogan, 
they give them you know all of these things. (…) They learn about the racism, what 
it is, what are the causes of it, what are the consequences of it, and how can it be 
tackled. (…) [W]e would do like “show racism the red card” (…) [it’s a] campaign 
on football and the children- (…) they [the English team] had quite a few black 
players and the Spanish supporters were making monkey chants and there is a 
great clip on it. It makes it very real to the children (…) a lot of children in school 




don’t really see them as being black or different you know, they are just 
footballers! (Teacher 1, Catholic school) 
Other examples of teaching about racism she referred to were activities like ‘People 
Bingo’, the ‘Diversity map’ (which is part of the official curriculum material) and a card-
sorting activity, where students are asked to match people’s faces with their hobbies and 
areas where they live. These approaches commonly address racism/sectarianism as 
individual prejudice instead of approaching them as structural issues. Statements made by 
the other teacher also suggest that there is a tendency to approach racism as individual 
prejudice since he claimed that racism did not exist in Northern Ireland until a few years 
ago because there was no immigration. This statement stands in contrast with his earlier 
quote (see page 181) where he argued that racism and sectarianism are linked:  
[S]o but we never addressed the likes of homophobia, racism [in the initial teacher 
training]- there was no racism in Northern Ireland because nobody would come 
to Northern Ireland! (Teacher 2, Catholic school)  
McVeigh (1998) has commented on the common denial of racism in Northern Ireland. He 
exposed the claim that there is no racism in Northern Ireland due to the absence of 
minorities as racist by itself because it suggests that the presence of minorities causes 
racism instead of viewing it as a social construct by society. This refers to an 
understanding of racism as a cultural-psychological issue, instead of a historical concept 
to sustain power and privilege (McLaren, 1995; Tatum, 2000; Wellman, 1993). McVeigh 
concluded that this denial of racism in Northern Ireland is not a sign of its absence, but 
the absence of a discussion about racism. The dilution of racism through conservative and 
liberal multiculturalism in the Protestant and Catholic school sustains his argument.  
This section demonstrated that there is a greater tendency among Catholic teachers and 
students to frame sectarianism and the conflict in terms of structural explanations. This 
arguably stems from the historical positioning of the Catholic community as having 
suffered under structural and institutional sectarianism. However, when it comes to 
racism, teachers also tend to frame it as the result of individual prejudice. Therefore, while 
the assumed prevalence of racism over sectarianism is used as an excuse not to address 




sectarianism, the data suggest that neither structural racism or sectarianism are actually 
addressed.  
 
JEWISH-ISRAELI SCHOOL: FOCUS ON ANTI-SEMITISM AND ASSIMILATION  
 
The section above referred to the danger that racism might be only discussed in relation 
to anti-Semitism, which narrows the issue of racism and restricts a fuller discussion of the 
issue. For example, Teacher 3 decided to confront her students with the problem of racism 
towards Ethiopian Jews instead of Black people in Israel in general. She invited a friend 
from a (Jewish) Ethiopian background who works as an officer in the military, to share 
with the students his experiences of racism:  
[F]or some of the kids it was the first time for them to even hear or meet someone 
who came from Ethiopia and some of them don’t know the difference between a 
refugee from Kenia and a Jew that came from Ethiopia. (…) Some were in shock 
because he told them that when he and his wife wanted to buy a new apartment 
and they spoke on the phone and arranged to meet the owner … and they knocked 
on the door and he opened the door and he saw them- and he closed the door. And 
this happened this year and not in the Middle Ages- and it [racism] is there, it 
exists. (Teacher 3, Jewish-Israeli school) 
Her choice to focus on the experience of racism by a Black Jew might appear to be simply 
a choice of convenience because she could draw on the help of a friend. Yet, she also 
emphasised the difference between Ethiopian Jews and (non-Jewish) refugees, suggesting 
perhaps that the former is a more ‘legitimate’ member of Israel’s society. There appears 
to be a preference to refer to examples of racism where Jews are the victims, even though 
in this case Jews are also the perpetrators of racism. This argument is reinforced by the 
quote below from another teacher who explained that Jewish-Israelis view antiracism as 
part of their ethos: 
T1: Yeah because nobody wants to admit [being racist]. To be a racist is in Israel, 
more than any other state in the world, it is the worst thing that you can be because 




you spoke about ethos, our ethos is about the Holocaust. So, and our ethos is that 
we suffered from racism, so in Israel, most of the people won’t admit to themselves 
that they are racist and they will be very very offended if you will call them a racist.  
A: I see because it’s somehow part of their identity- 
T1: Yeah part of our identity! (Teacher 1, Jewish-Israeli school)  
While the school’s emphasis on the ethos of the Holocaust certainly teaches a lesson 
against anti-Semitism, it presents it as a particularity, overlooking the obvious connection 
to other examples of racism as systems of advantage. Consequently, they are also unable 
to see the connection between Jewish immigration and other immigrants such as non-
Jewish guest workers or refugees. During the focus groups, students described the latter 
as causing problems and illegitimate immigrants, while Jewish immigration is legitimated 
through the law of return73: 
S4: But there are some people who really come to Israel because they love Israel 
and they are Jewish and they want to be in a Jewish country. (…) Because they 
feel like it’s a holy country so they like to go to Jerusalem and live there. (…) They 
come really because there is a reason. (Focus group 4, Jewish-Israeli school, Year 
9) 
They referred to a special right or privilege that Jews should receive due to their religious 
connection to the land and the oppression caused by anti-Semitism. Drawing on this 
special privilege, they assert that other citizens or immigrants receive unequal treatment. 
For example, in the following excerpt, they justified that citizenship and the state’s 
identity is Jewish:  
A: Is there something about citizenship that causes trouble? Or is everything great 
about citizenship? 
S3: No, the Arabs don’t think that.  
                                                             
73 The Law of return was passed in 1950, granting Jews the right to come and live in Israel and to gain Israeli 
citizenship.  




S4: [T]hey don’t give citizenship to everybody. And if you are born in Israel, if you 
are not Jewish, you don’t get it. And in the United States, if you are born there, 
you get citizenship. 
S2: If you are Jewish, I think you have to live three years in Israel and then you 
can get- 
S1: But it’s ok it’s a Jewish country.  (Focus group 4, Jewish-Israeli school, Year 
9)  
Therefore, Jewish-Israeli students reproduce a republican understanding of citizenship 
that foregrounds obedience and commitment to the community (Faulks, 2000; Heater, 
1990), which is also supported by the fact that military service as an essential aspect of 
citizenship in their drawings (see Figure 19;20;21;22 and 23). They partly reproduce an 
‘ethnic’ concept of citizenship that determines ‘Jewish’ as a ‘master identity’ as Mouffe 
(1993) described it, and an exclusive notion of belonging based on ‘ethnicity’ (Ghanem 
et al., 1998; Shafir and Peled, 2002; Yiftachel, 2006; Smooha, 1997). This understanding 
of citizenship is reminiscent of strategic essentialism (Spivak, 1988), since historically 
(and to some extent still today) Jews as an oppressed minority draw on essentialism as 
part of their political struggle, reclaiming their identity.  
Arab-Palestinian policymakers argued earlier that racism is not addressed in the 
educational policies in Israel. Some teachers in the Jewish-Israeli school reproduce this 
‘blindness’ in regard to racism. One teacher claimed that there is no ‘gap’ between 
Mizrachim and Ashkenazim in the school: 
And the situation [division or gap] of the Mizrachim-Ashkenazim is not seen, we 
don’t feel it here in this school. (Teacher 2, Israeli-Jewish school) 
However, racism by white, European Jews towards Jews from Mizrachi, Sephardi or 
African backgrounds, which is documented in the literature (Offer, 2004; Shalom Chetrit, 
2010) is also prevalent in the school. During the focus group activities, students described 
Mizrachim by relying on ‘oriental’ stereotypes (see Said, 1978). Mizrachim were labelled 
as being interested in sports, partying, Mizrachi men as dominant and as having low-paid 




jobs. In contrast, Ashkenazim were portrayed as hardworking, intellectual, focused on 
money and career-oriented (see Figure 24 ‘Mizrachi citizens’ represented on the left and 
‘Ashkenazi citizens’ on the right).  
The section below will show that Arab-Palestinians are portrayed in similar terms as 
Mizrachim when Ashkenazim contrast ‘European’ and ‘Arab’ culture. Additionally, 
negative and racist portrayals of Arab-Palestinians (and Muslims in general) are often used 
to justify the ‘security’ measures that limit their freedom and rights (Abu-Saad, 2004). 
Interestingly, one of the Jewish-Israeli teachers referred to this in the following excerpt: 
[I]n Israel, racism is out[…] of … question, everybody agrees that racism is not 
good. You have to manipulate them in order to show them they are racist. (…) 
Even when they speak about Arabs, they will say these things, not from a racist- 
maybe they are racist in their heart, but when they speak about it, they will speak 
about it from the security point of view. (…) they will speak about security … “of 
course I believe everybody is equal and should get equal rights, but it’s very 
dangerous with them because they want-” 
A: “They want to kick us out”? 
T1: Exactly! And so, I believe most of them are racist, but most of them will hide 
it from themselves. (Teacher 1, Jewish-Israeli school)  
These racist attitudes that the teacher described also surfaced during the focus groups. The 
students suggested that Muslims (Arabs) pose a threat to Jews in other countries and the 
‘terror’ caused by them is a reason why many Jews immigrate to Israel:  
S5: And we know that we don’t have any other place, because in the world people 
hate us and in here it’s good. (…) 
S5: We saw a lot of people in the last year that came to Israel because of all the 
terror and things like that and just here they feel safe.  
S4: Because in every place there are Muslims so. (Focus Group 4, Jewish Israeli 
school, Year 9) 




The students described Israel (from their point of view) as the only safe country for Jewish 
people, a Zionistic lesson from the Holocaust that remains common also among young 
people (Lazar et al., 2008). 
Yet, while the teacher criticised his students’ racist attitudes, later during the interview, 
he resorted to the same discourse when he described his (left-wing) students as too naïve 
for believing in a two-state solution74: 
So also, the Palestinians are saying “our goal is to kick you all out of Palestine!” 
(…) as I told you that many of my left[-wing] students don’t know what they are 
talking about, they think that if we will give them a state “oh everybody will be 
happy and that’s the solution.” But it’s not like that because even though you will 
give them a state they will still want you to kick you out to the sea. And they say it! 
And they say it and they teach it in their schools. (…) They [his students] are very 
good children, they want to be friends with everybody, “we will give them 
some[thing], so everything will be ok.” (Teacher 1, Jewish-Israeli school)  
This statement demonstrates how the teacher reproduces the same argument that 
compromising with the Palestinians in the two-state solution will lead to the expulsion or 
killing of Jewish-Israelis. In his previous statement, he exposed exactly this argument as 
racist among his students, being unaware that he expressed similar views.  
Besides this description of Arab-Palestinians as the enemy and a security threat to the 
Israeli state, teachers reproduce other ‘orientalist’ stereotypes. In the following quote, the 
same teacher referred to the challenges for meetings with Arab-Palestinians, singling out 
the behaviour of Arab-Palestinian boys towards the other sex as a major barrier: 
[I]t’s not that easy [these meetings] because as I told you there are much more 
barriers for us. …[M]ost of my female students are wearing the same thing you 
wear [pointing and me wearing a T-shirt that exposed part of my shoulders]. And 
if you will go to the Arab society, the boys will really like you … but it will take 
                                                             
74 The term “two-state solution” refers to the potential solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the 
establishment of two independent states: the State of Israel and the State of Palestine.  




less than an hour of free time until someone will put his hand on you, ok. And our 
girls do not understand why …  because they grow up “My body is- I can wear 
whatever I want.” And you won’t even dare to stare! (…) it’s really difficult for an 
Arab guy that saw a woman who walks around like that but only in specific kind 
of movies that he saw on his computer on late night- And he knows what this 
woman- what happens. So it is always when there is free time in the contact 
between Israeli-Arabs and- always there are problems. (Teacher 1, Jewish-Israeli 
school)  
This teacher portrayed Arab-Palestinian men as aggressive and traditionalist drawing on 
racist and orientalist stereotypes that Jewish-Israelis are socialised with through the media, 
literature, film, public discourse and education (Bar-Tal and Teichmann, 2005). Bar-Tal 
and Teichmann state that the analysis of school textbooks also shows that “(…) over the 
years, generations of Israeli Jews have been socialized in light of the negative, derogating, 
and often delegitimizing view of the Arabs.” (p.175). Therefore, it is perhaps not overly 
surprising that the students and their teachers reproduce these images. In the following 
excerpt, the same teacher also emphasised that there are essential differences between 
Arab-Palestinians and Jewish-Israelis, outlining a clear distinction between ‘us’ and 
‘them’:  
In Israel, they don’t look like us, they don’t behave like us, we don’t understand 
what they say, and most of the pupils here never saw an Arab kid or adult. The 
same about Palestinians, the only Israelis they have seen are settlers or soldiers. 
(Teacher 1, Jewish-Israeli school) 
The principal further contrasted Arab-Palestinians with Jewish-Israelis, describing the 
latter as more ‘European’, which reminds of the colonialist rhetoric of ‘civilised’ white 
Europeans who described Arab culture as inferior and backwards (see Fanon, 2008/1952; 
Said, 1978): 
I think that the culture difference between them and us is too great [big]. We are 
like a European people, you know Western people and they are like Arabs and it’s 
different- really different. (Principal, Jewish-Israeli school) 




Their reliance on stereotypes is reminiscent of what McLaren (1995) defined as 
conservative multiculturalism, based on white colonialist, racist attitudes, and 
essentialised identity constructions that rely on fixed images of identity and culture 
(Fanon, 2008/1952; Hall, 2000). Said (1978) explained these identity constructions were 
in the past (and arguably are still) underpinned by a political colonialist project, in this 
case, to justify the Zionist hegemony, which is reproduced by the students and teachers in 
their descriptions of ‘the other’.  
These racist images of Mizrachim and Arab-Palestinians are combined with a strategy of 
assimilation. Students reproduced this strategy of assimilation of Jews from different 
backgrounds, describing Israel as a ‘melting pot’ for Jewish people: 
S2: [F]rom all of the places the Jews come and we become one part. (…) 
S1: Israel it’s everything in one, it’s like Jewish together- 
S2: Yeah, we make them become one. We don’t split them because we are together. 
(Focus group 4, Jewish-Israeli school, Year 9) 
Al-Haj (2002) exposed the idea of the melting pot as “a cover for an ideology of 
assimilation dominated by Whites” (p.93), wherein the case of Israel the (white) 
Ashkenazi culture presents the dominant norm. Hence, students rely on a discourse which 
has historically demanded assimilation into a predominantly Ashkenazi (European) 
culture (Shohat, 2003; Swirski, 1999).  
Even though Arab-Palestinians are generally targeted by the Israeli state with a strategy 
of exclusion from political and socio-economic resources (Abu-Saad, 2004; Ghanem, 
2010; Lustick, 1980; Rouhana and Ghanem, 1998; Smooha, 1990; Yiftachel, 1999), they 
are also partly addressed through an assimilation strategy. The students reproduced these 
strategies in the focus group by describing Arabs as their ‘cousins’; while elsewhere 
during the interview they described them as ‘terrorists’: 
S2: The Arabs are also a big part of our life. 
S3: The what? 




S2: The Arabs. The cousins- what it’s called. 
S4: Because all our life we are always talking about Jewish and Arabic all the 
time.  
S2: Palestinians and Arabs.  
S1: And we are protecting them. (Focus group 4, Jewish-Israeli school, Year 9)  
In the last statement one student claimed that they (Jewish-Israelis) are protecting Arab-
Palestinians, which is reminiscent of the Zionist historical narrative presented in the 
textbooks that Palestinians were protected during the events of 1948 (see Podeh, 2000) 
and the discourse in Israeli society that seeks to justify policies such as the occupation or 
the discrimination of Arab-Palestinian citizens, arguing that they have a better life in Israel 
and under the occupation than in other (Arab) countries (for this discourse see Heller, 
2017). Therefore, it seems that these students reproduce this discourse as part of justifying 
Israel’s policies towards Arab-Palestinians.  
It is interesting that the students claimed that they speak about Jews and Arabs “all the 
time” and that they are “a big part” of their lives, while policymakers, teachers, and other 
students suggest that young Jewish-Israelis and Arab-Palestinians rarely encounter each 
other. Perhaps, it indicates an interest to discuss and learn more about the relationship 
between Israelis and Palestinians in the classroom. This could be a result of the general 
lack of discussing diversity in the classroom, suggested by one teacher who argued that 
teaching about identity is not sensitive or controversial in this school since the student 
population is very homogenous and the students are not aware of the issues related to 
diversity within Israel’s society:  
It’s not so sensitive because the students are very homogen[eous] (…) [If] I 
[would] teach students that are not Jewish, they are Muslims so they are not 
Jewish, then it is sensitive. Then a little bit- but the students are homogenic, so it’s 
not a problem to teach it in this school. In [another adjacent town with a more 
diverse (mainly Jewish) population] it will be more of a problem. … [T]here are 
Ethiopians, there are Russians, there are poor people- here it is homogen[eny] … 




it’s a problem that we are not part of Israeli society. It’s a problem! They recognise 
the problem […] of the society in Israel only in the army. Here, they don’t know 
the problematic. They don’t feel it- only in theory. (Teacher 2, Jewish-Israeli 
school)  
He described how teaching about diversity remains uncontroversial in this school, where 
most students come from a more affluent, Jewish (Ashkenazi) background and do not get 
to meet other societal groups before they start their military service. Yet, this is 
reminiscent of McVeigh’s (1998) argument that racism or diversity is not controversial in 
this school not because it is absent, but because it is not discussed. Teacher 2 claimed that 
the students understand diversity and racism only during their military service, where they 
mix with people from different groups of Israel’s society, except for Arab-Palestinians 
who do (usually) not enlist. His cultural-psychological understanding of racism is similar 
to Teacher 2 from the Catholic school since they both describe racism only as existing in 
a diverse society. 
In general, teachers and students reproduce the curriculum’s approach of the ‘rifts’ in 
Israel’s society or as “The Challenges of Co-existence75 in Israeli Society” (Ministry of 
Education, 2017a:495). These challenges were also addressed during the citizenship 
lesson and activities that I observed, which dealt mainly with the political gaps between 
conservative and left-wing Zionists in Israel and the role of right-wing extremism. While 
the teachers used the method of perspective-taking to encourage students to reflect on the 
views of different groups in Israel’s society, they did not refer to the conflict or Arab-
Palestinian perspectives. This suggests perhaps that the topic “The Challenges of Co-
existence in Israeli Society” tends to focus on the diversity and challenges among the 
Jewish population and avoids addressing the situation of Arab-Palestinians in Israel.  
Moreover, this approach towards “co-existence” is devoid of analysing structures of 
power and domination that sustain racism. Instead, teachers and students frame racism or 
stereotypes as resulting from a lack of contact with other groups. Teacher 3 and Teacher 
                                                             
75 See page 173-4 for critical discussion about ‘co-existence’ as an empty signifier, which resonates with 
the depolitised understanding of racism.  




2 confirmed this impression during the interviews, as outlined earlier in this section. The 
students reproduce these forms conservative and liberal multiculturalism, illustrated by 
the quotes above and by the drawings from their focus groups in which they refer to 
stereotypes (see Figure 25; 27 and 28). 
However, despite the socialisation into these views about their own (Jewish-Israeli) 
community and the other (Arab-Palestinian or non-Jewish) community, some students 
demonstrated their awareness about racism towards Arab-Palestinians:  
S4: The Arabs think that Israel belongs to them and we think that it belongs to us 
by the bible.  
S3: They think that our land belongs to them and we think the opposite. 
S5: It’s because we don’t know each other! We hear things and rumours- 
S3: Not all the Arab[s] think that- 
S1: We talk about it so much that we can’t like figure a way out of this like to share 
it.  
S5: We’re stuck a bit. 
S2: And when one Arab does something bad to our people, we think that all of 
them are like that.  
S1: In the United States, they have a lot of racist people like the black and white 
thing, here it is Jewish and Arabic. (…) And people don’t understand that there 
are like good people and bad people that are Jewish and good people and bad 
people that are Arabic. (Focus group 3, Jewish-Israeli school, Year 9) 
Whilst this definition of racism is reminiscent of individual prejudice resulting from a lack 
of knowledge about ‘the other’, at least these students acknowledge the existence of 
racism. In another excerpt, students referred to the need to meet the ‘other’ side and to get 
to know their perspective, which indicates their interest in learning more about Arab-
Palestinians and the conflict.  




S3: [We would like to meet] People that are different- 
S2: We want to know them! 
S5: Yes, not to know them just because of what we hear, we need to meet them to 
see them, it will maybe cause a little bit peace.  
S2: To see it from their side.  
S4: Maybe we will understand their opinion, not just ours. (Focus group 3, Jewish-
Israeli school, Year 9) 
To summarise, in the Jewish-Israeli school the focus is laid on teaching about anti-
Semitism instead of teaching about racism in Israel’s society. When teachers address 
racism, it is usually framed in terms of liberal or conservative multiculturalism and some 
teachers displayed ‘orientalist’ (racist) attitudes towards Arab-Palestinians. 
Unsurprisingly, students reproduce these views and one-sided narratives or racist attitudes 
do not seem to be challenged. Yet, some students also demonstrated awareness about 
structural racism and expressed a wish to learn about Arab-Palestinian perspectives and 
narratives. Whilst teachers sidestep teaching about structural racism in Israel, the data 
indicate that some students learn about these issues outside of school.  
 
ARAB-PALESTINIAN SCHOOL: BETWEEN ANTIRACISM AND ASSIMILATION 
 
The data from teachers and students show that like the Catholic minority in Northern 
Ireland, Arab-Palestinians in Israel are conversant about experiences of racism. Like in 
the Catholic school, these experiences make it easier for the teacher to recognise the issue 
of racism in Israel’s society and also to address it in the classroom. Teachers in Israel are 
restricted in their criticism towards the Israeli state and in discussing the historical 
experience of oppression by Arab-Palestinians (this refers to the Nakba law and other 
educational policies mentioned in Chapter one. I will discuss this in more detail in Chapter 
five). The Arab-Palestinian teacher also explained that the curriculum does not address 




racism in Israel. Yet, he stated that he discusses racism through the concepts of equality 
and discrimination during the citizenship lesson: 
There is nothing about racism [in the curriculum], but you know you have the right 
of equality, and from it, we can talk about racism and the different ways of practice 
with one and another, you know discrimination. So, we talk about it and of course, 
we talk about Arabs and Jews. (Teacher, Arab-Palestinian school)  
This is a different approach to multiculturalism than in the other schools as it politicises 
racism and frames it as a problem arising from discrimination and the lack of equality, 
referring to a system of advantage, privilege, and power (McLaren, 1995; Tatum, 2000; 
Wellman, 1993). Moreover, this approach resonates with the Arab-Palestinian students’ 
experiences of racism. The previous section about the conflict showed that many Arab-
Palestinians referred to narratives about discrimination and suffering that their families 
experienced. In contrast to Catholic students, they have their own personal experiences of 
structural racism and discrimination in a society, which denies them equal rights and 
citizenship (Adalah, 2017; Yiftachel, 1999).  
S1: I think each one [pupil] said something about it, same situation when there 
was someone racist towards them. 
A: Ok so everybody has some experience with racism? You have all experience 
with it- 
S1: Yes. (Focus group 3, Arab-Palestinian school) 
The students’ understanding of racism and discrimination is structural because they relate 
it to a system of privilege based on ‘ethnicity’ or religion that marks the differences 
between Jewish, non-Jewish or Arab-Palestinian citizens in Israel: 
S2: There are many many examples [of how their rights are restricted]. We want 
and we expect from the country to treat everyone the same way! Not this because 
he is Jewish ok- 
S1: Unfortunately, it doesn’t happen because the country is Jewish. 




S2: You work, you go to study and then “Because you are Arab, we can’t accept 
you to work here.”  
S1: I hear that the government supports Jewish schools with more money than our 
schools.  
S2: (…) And [the president] gives more money to the school, which- they didn’t 
teach anything only the Torah. And the schools need all the support to study 
Arabic, Hebrew, history- (…) We expect from the government, to be honest, to be 
with all the people. (Focus group 2, Arab-Palestinian school)  
Their framing of racism is paired with a critical approach to citizenship, which has been 
documented in previous research by Pinson (2008) who found that Arab-Palestinian 
students in Israel tend to resist citizenship due to the discrimination that they experience 
(Pinson, 2008). In the following excerpt, one student connected structural racism to 
citizenship in Israel, explaining how citizenship becomes diluted or meaningless to him 
as a result of discrimination:  
I don’t feel like a normal citizen in Israel. It’s a very racist country. Jewish people 
don’t accept us, I feel like I’m the one who should accept them and I’m looking for 
their acceptance. So, about citizenship, I’m not connected to [it], I don’t feel it. 
(…) The country doesn’t treat me like a citizen. (…) It’s unfair, it’s like I have to 
deal with a lot of obstacles that most of the people in the country don’t need to. 
(…) I can’t apply to every job I want, I cannot learn [study] whatever I want, 
because I know I won’t find a job in this. My [family’s] lands are being taken. (…) 
[I]t’s not important [citizenship]. It doesn’t mean anything. (Student interview, 
Arab-Palestinian school) 
However, at the same time, other students and their teachers stressed the importance of 
citizenship as a ‘channel’ to claiming their citizenship rights and defined the important 
task of citizenship education as teaching them about these rights:   
S1: Yeah, it’s [citizenship] important. It’s important to learn and to know about 
our rights.  




S2: To know how to deal with the situation. (…) 
S1: If something happens we have to know what we have to do, what they 
have to give us. To know if I’m oppressed or not. Then I know how I can 
deal with the problem. (Focus Group 4, Arab-Palestinian school)  
To know their rights [is the most important goal of citizenship education]. 
Especially here as Arabs, to know our rights. So they don’t have to say that- we 
don’t have rights. We have rights and we have to fight to get them, to get our rights 
in the legal way, not in the illegal way. They told us in the book that all of the 
people are equal, so you have to, you have it here. So you have to learn to know 
the rights, to get it. (Teacher, Arab-Palestinian school) 
Previous research by Agbaria (2016a) established that by teaching about rights, Arab-
Palestinian teachers have found a way to address the discrimination of Arab-Palestinian 
citizens and seek to empower their students, even if this is not the goal of the official 
curriculum. According to Agbaria, on the one hand, teachers are aware of the challenging 
conditions and discrimination that affect minorities in Israel and on the other hand they 
see the opportunities that are granted through socio-economic mobility and the legal 
system that protects against the discrimination through granting individual rights. 
The students were aware of how Arab-Palestinians in Israel are constructed as a security 
threat in political and public discourses. For example, in the excerpts below they referred 
to their experience of being subject to increased security checks during the last war in 
Gaza:   
S1: [A]lthough we are far from Gaza and we don’t feel the war, but when you go 
to the mall and stuff like this the security checks us very carefully. They check us 
all the time but when there is a war or something like that they do it more.  (Focus 
group 4, Arab-Palestinian school)  
Moreover, the following excerpt shows their attentiveness to how they are deliberately 
portrayed by the media reproducing stereotypes in line with the dominant representations 




of Arab-Palestinians in political discourses or educational textbooks (Bar-Tal and 
Teichmann, 2005): 
S3: And if you look at the media and at you know the news, whenever they want to 
do an interview with Jews and Arabs, they tend to go for an Arab who is not very 
confident, who doesn’t express himself right (…) 
S2: [He] is like an underdog, they bring a qualified Jew for the job, he knows what 
he is talking about and this is his language [Hebrew], he is prepared, and then 
they bring an Arab who is not very qualified for this argument. (Focus group 1, 
Arab-Palestinian school)  
However, the data also indicate that some students essentialise Arab-Palestinian 
nationalism. This stems perhaps from the circumstance that students mainly draw on 
narratives from their homes and community to understand the conflict and racism. Chapter 
1 outlined that a strategy of Palestinian nationalists was the denial of Jewish-Israelis 
common nationality (see page 42, Bechor, 1995 quoted in Ghanem, 2013). In the excerpt 
below, two students seemed to reproduce this strategy:  
S1: He is Muslim and we are Christian but our nationality is Arab. But Jews- like 
they are Jewish (…) 
S2: No but some of them are Polish, some of them are German, some are Lebanese-  
S1: They don’t have a certain like- [nationality] 
S3: We are all divided, the only thing that is common to all citizens is human 
beings. As human beings, we should be getting the same rights, it’s human beings’ 
rights- it’s basic! And it’s not given equally. (Focus group 1, Arab-Palestinian 
school) 
Student 1 and 2’s claimed that ‘Arab nationality’ is more valid or real than ‘Israeli 
nationality’, overlooking the socially constructed character of nationality as a political 
claim to superiority and ownership of territory, which suggests a form of strategic 
essentialism (Spivak, 1988). Yet, Student 3 countered this claim to some extent, referring 




to common humanity as a ‘better’ basis for rights. He promoted a ‘strategic universalism’ 
(Gilroy, 2000) that stresses humanity as a collective identity and basis for rights.  
During the focus groups, Arab-Palestinian students also de-constructed the particularity 
of the Holocaust that is emphasised through the teaching about anti-Semitism. In the 
following excerpt, the students challenged the dominant narrative about the Holocaust’s 
uniqueness (importantly, while not denying it or its significance):  
S3: We’re not saying that the Jews haven’t suffered, but they also have done the 
second part of their jobs! They have been through a lot but they can’t just ignore 
the fact that they have made people suffer under them! It’s like “we are the poor 
guys – feel sorry for us! Come to our country to help us to build ourselves”. 
S2: That’s also because six million Jews died in the Holocaust, but it doesn’t give 
them the right to kill another two Palestinians. They took lands from other people. 
S1: And they felt how bad it is, so why are they doing it to others? (Focus group 
1, Arab-Palestinian school)  
They adopted a more structural approach to racism and sectarianism as a system that seeks 
to establish superiority and inferiority. In contrast to the other groups, they seemed more 
aware of how racism/sectarianism operates across contexts beyond their personal 
experiences of racism. For example, they understood the ‘rifts’ in Israel’s society as a 
result of institutional racism and lack of equality, adopting a more critical perspective than 
their counterparts from the other schools:  
S2: Even inside the Jewish community there is no equality, the white people in the 
Jewish community get more rights than the black, the Eastern and the Western.  
S3: And if there were no Arabs in this country, the Jewish people would just fight 
each other. (Focus group 1, Arab-Palestinian school) 
Being exposed to the Zionist narrative, Jewish-Israeli culture, language, and media in 
addition to their own narratives and experiences allows Arab-Palestinians to develop a 
broader, structural understanding of the conflict and racism.  




However, besides this counter-discourse against the dominant Zionist narrative, the 
teacher and some of the students also reproduced discourses of assimilation. In the excerpt 
below, one student referred to this tendency of resorting to assimilation that leads Arab-
Palestinians to accept their situation: 
A lot of the Arabs decided to accept the situation “ok, we have to live with it, we 
can’t do anything about it”. They will continue in their way and some of them will 
say to you “we have it better than people in Egypt, we live better than people in 
Libya and in Syria” But if we live better, it doesn’t mean that we live good. They 
are like thankful that we are not in Syria. You will hear about this side a lot if you 
talk to Arabs. (…) So, in the region I’m from, I see the racism in other places. In 
[the city where the school is located] it’s less because people started to get used 
to each other. There is racism, but less. But you don’t have to go very far to find 
the racism. (Student interview, Arab-Palestinian school)  
He claimed that by comparing their situation with people in other conflict-affected 
countries they overlook the issue of racism that exists in Israel. The following excerpt 
reinforces his point. It presents a discussion between three students who represented those 
two opposing perspectives when they talk about the quality of life (referring mainly to 
rights, security, and health) for Arab-Palestinian citizens in Israel:  
S3: There are people who think that it’s not enough what they give us, but I think 
that it’s enough – for me. I study here, I have family-  
S1: Shall I tell you why you feel so good- because you compare yourself to the 
Arab countries where there is no study, no family-we should compare ourselves to 
a better place, not to a bad place. (…) You think our life here is perfect because 
you see on the TV on the news- 
S2: That there is people who have a worse life than us.  
S3: Yeah compared to them we have a good life. 
S1: So, I think if we want a better place, we should compare ourselves to a better 
place. Not to the worst place, so we feel it’s ok, I’m happy, I study- yeah it’s right 




you have a family, you can study- but there [are] things you can’t do, you can’t 
say in the street whatever you want. (Focus group 3, Arab-Palestinian school)  
These students disagreed on whether they have sufficient rights in the Jewish democratic 
state, or whether they should demand rights and privileges that they are entitled to, based 
on citizenship in a democratic state, which Israel claims to be. This discussion refers to an 
assimilation strategy that demands from Arab-Palestinian citizens to be grateful to the 
Israeli state, which claims that it protects them and grants more rights than other 
neighbouring (Arab) countries (for this discourse see Heller, 2017). Jewish-Israeli 
students also reproduced this assimilation strategy (cited earlier on page 189-92), which 
is part of a larger discourse that I refer to throughout the thesis that seeks to integrate Arab-
Palestinian citizens into parts of Israeli society and institutions, such as the military. 
Torn between assimilation and reclamation of their national identity, Arab-Palestinians, 
in general, seemed to be more aware of structural reasons for the conflict, compared to all 
other groups. Consequently, they described the conflict and racism as a political instead 
of an interpersonal issue, demonstrating a critical approach towards multiculturalism and 
a complex understanding of racism as a system of privilege:  
S1: We have like as simple citizens we can get along with each other, we can work 
it out, but the government is not helping so much. (Focus group 1, Arab-
Palestinian school)  
S2: Here we live in peace and we are friends, but at the heart, you feel that you 
are not important, you don’t feel accepted. (…) 
S1: They don’t give you all your rights. (Focus group 2, Arab-Palestinian school) 
We have here you know meetings between Arabs and Jews from the different 
schools, but it’s still on the person[al] [level], not on the political. So, we have the 
Jews, our Israeli friends and they are our neighbours, but you see in the whole 
side of policy, there is racism. But if I talk with my friend [Jewish friend] it’s 
different. On the personal level. But there [are] more problems between Arabs and 
Jews on the whole politics you can see it. (…) you see the difference between the 




[Arab and Jewish neighbourhood]? (…) Yeah, you see it. And here [in this city] 
it’s mixed-up. So, when you go to [a village] it’s different. You see the difference 
between an Arab village and- and yeah we don’t know why- we know why but you 
can’t tell them, you are a democracy, so what is a democracy? (Teacher, Arab-
Palestinian school)  
These statements by the teacher and his students define the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as 
political, referring to structural issues such as racism and the lack of rights. This is 
reminiscent of the critique raised by academics that the roots of the conflict do not lay in 
the lack of interpersonal encounters with the ‘other’ side, but in wider political, social and 
economic structures. The Arab-Palestinian students’ broader knowledge derives from the 
fact of being exposed to different narratives of the conflict through the education system 
and the personal experiences of discrimination by their family and community. 
CONCLUSION 
 
This Chapter discussed how cultural hegemony in citizenship education in Northern 
Ireland and Israel is expressed through avoidance. It introduced three major avoidance 
strategies that dilute the critical (political) potential of citizenship education: the absence 
of critical political thinking, the decontextualization of the conflict and the avoidance of 
structural approaches to racism and sectarianism. Arguably, these avoidance strategies are 
all intertwined and reinforce each other. Structural approaches to conflict, racism, and 
sectarianism depend on critical pedagogy that questions and challenges the status quo and 
vice versa.  
Whilst the citizenship curriculum officially offers a space for teachers to address issues 
related to the recent conflict and it advocates the use of critical teaching methods, the level 
of flexibility in the policy text leaves it up to the teachers and schools whether and how to 
teach about the past. In one sense this seems to respect the professional autonomy and 
expertise of the teachers, yet, it offers legitimacy to avoidance.  
Despite the dominance of avoidance, most teachers and some students have complex 
structural understandings of the conflict, sectarianism, and racism. Especially among 




Arab-Palestinian and Catholic students and teachers, it became evident that personal 
experiences and community narratives of structural sectarianism or racism enhance 
teachers and students’ critical understanding of these concepts. Arab-Palestinian and 
Catholic students tend to be more politicised and have more knowledge about the recent 
conflict, through narratives from their families (see Chapter four). However, they gain and 
negotiate this knowledge mainly outside the classroom.  
Across all schools, there is also a tendency to focus on narratives and perspectives that 
portray the own community as the victim of the conflict and only the Arab-Palestinian 
school appears to be an exception to this. Between Protestant and Jewish-Israeli students, 
the extension of democracy and citizenship rights to other groups and diversity are 
constructed as a threat to their identity (see for a general argument Giroux, 1997). Some 
Protestant students described democracy as limiting the rights of their community (for 
example the flag protest mentioned on pages 153-45). Similarly, some Jewish-Israeli 
students justified that Israel is a Jewish state and that citizenship rights towards non-
Jewish citizens are limited. Both groups construct diversity as a threat to their own cultural 
integrity and (national) identity (Giroux, 1997). In contrast, Arab-Palestinian and Catholic 
students appear to have a better understanding of concepts such as human rights, 
democracy, and equality, which they connect to their communities’ narratives of the 
conflict and they link their collective rights to these concepts.  
When identity-related issues are addressed, principals and teachers usually adopt a 
conservative or liberal approach to multiculturalism that intentionally avoids dealing with 
sectarianism and racism in a critical manner (see Tatum, 2000; Wellman, 1993). Since 
these perspectives are the most ‘comfortable’ and less contested in the classroom, 
teachers, and students appear to sidestep challenging racist/sectarian or one-sided 
perspectives, which dilutes the critical political potential of citizenship education. 
Therefore, citizenship education becomes complicit in essentialising culture and identity 
as well as reproducing stereotypes and racist/sectarian attitudes.  
This raises the question why schools, teachers, and students tend to circumvent having 
these discussions in citizenship education. Whilst educational policies do not encourage 




the critical and transformative potential of the subject, the next Chapter will argue that 
avoidance is reinforced and facilitated by censors that allow this ‘self-censorship’ by 
schools, teachers, and students.   




This Chapter introduces the argument that schools, teachers, and students draw on 
avoidance strategies in citizenship education, presented in the last Chapter because they 
are censored in formal and informal ways. These censors are so powerful that they impede 
teachers’ and students’ capacity to harness the critical potential of citizenship, despite their 
intentions and abilities to do so.  
There are similarities and differences regarding these censors in Northern Ireland and 
Israel. In both jurisdictions, the overarching censor is the managerialist culture. 
Managerialism is an ideology that serves to sustain cultural hegemony and cultural 
reproduction in the education system. This is manifest through curricula and educational 
policies that impose a managerialist approach on schools, directed by the demands of 
parents and societal elites. In Northern Ireland and Israel, the education system is 
structured and directed by a culture of performativity that increasingly assesses schools, 
teachers, and students in terms of measurable outcomes (Ball, 2003). The discussion of 
the data demonstrates how cultures of performativity and managerialism subject teachers 
to maximise performance and limit their space to develop students’ critical political 
thinking and to address the conflict, racism, and sectarianism.  
While the national identity of the state in Northern Ireland remains contested and there is 
no agreement on common national citizenship (Smith, 2003), this issue is not contested 
on the political level in Israel, at least not among political elites and the majority 
population. The Jewish character is manifested through the declaration of independence, 
through laws and policies, including citizenship education. Due to its officially 
uncontested character, ethnic-religious nationalism in Israel serves as a powerful censor 




of discussions about the state’s character. I will outline how this process of censoring is 
reinforced through educational policies and the preparation for the military service, which 
is interpreted by Jewish-Israeli participants as an integral part of citizenship education.  
By contrast in Northern Ireland, censoring is not mainly promoted on an official political 
level, but through communities. It was mentioned in Chapter two that paramilitaries 
remain active in some working-class communities across Northern Ireland (Jarman, 2004; 
Shirlow and McEvoy, 2008). This Chapter will argue that this environment influences 
what is considered safe to talk about in the classroom. For example, the data suggest that 
schools and teachers fear consequences for criticising the paramilitaries and their actions 
and thus this criticism is censored. 
Criticism towards the state and its actions during the conflict is also censored in Israel. 
Whilst the data is less conclusive than in Northern Ireland regarding the fact that 
communities censor criticism, schools, and teachers are censored mainly by educational 
policies in Israel. Consequently, in both Northern Ireland and Israel, schools, teachers, and 
students fear repercussions when discussing controversial issues related to the conflict. 
This Chapter discusses how the managerialist culture and identity politics act as censors 




Critical educationalists (for example Apple, 2004; Giroux, 1997) have outlined how 
education is permeated by neoliberal politics that foreground individualism and 
performance. Giroux and Apple maintain that instead of promoting empowerment and 
social change, neoliberal approaches to citizenship education turn the subject into a form 
of domination, producing future citizens who best serve the economic and political elites.  
Public institutions and organisations are increasingly invaded by a managerialist culture 
(Kilkauer, 2015; Simkins, 1998). Kilkauer defined managerialism as a combination of 
tools and ideology that seeks to establish itself systematically across organisations and 
institutions in society, running these as corporations. Its purpose is to justify managerial 




techniques across all areas of work and society, underpinned by the belief that consumer 
capitalism is a superior ideology. Simkins (1998) claimed that schools in the United 
Kingdom were increasingly affected by managerialism in the form of non-financial 
control mechanisms that constrain schools’ choices of how they allocate their resources. 
As examples, he referred to the regime of regular inspections, published tests and 
examination results that measure the performance of schools.  
Drawing on Gramsci (1971/1929) and Bourdieu and Passeron (1990), managerialism is 
an ideal ideology to sustain cultural hegemony through cultural reproduction in education. 
It contributes to the protection of the status quo and privilege of dominant elites by 
establishing itself as the ‘common-sense’. This is reinforced by the determination of 
managerialism to present itself as ‘neutral’ (Kilkauer, 2015).  
This section contends that the managerialist culture, which permeates the education 
systems in Northern Ireland and Israel, acts as a censor of the critical potential of 
citizenship education. It is distributed through different channels: firstly, through the 
curriculum by defining young people’s role as citizens as consumers and contributors to 
the economy; secondly, by recasting citizenship as a low-profile subject compared to other 
subjects deemed more expedient to the managerialist culture and finally, through an 
emphasis on performance that directs teacher training towards increasing students’ 
performativity. Additionally, since the ‘quality’ of education is measured according to 
students’ performance in examinations, this pressures teachers to focus on the knowledge 
that will be tested in the examination (Apple, 2004). Therefore, the managerialist culture 
also influences the selection of knowledge that is taught.  
 
YOUNG PEOPLE AS CONSUMERS AND CONTRIBUTORS TO THE ECONOMY 
 
Mitchell (2003) argued that processes of globalisation and neoliberalism led to a shift in 
multicultural education to be more ‘person-centred’, raising skills-based individuals that 
are able to succeed in an environment of global competitiveness. These trends are reflected 
in citizenship education in Northern Ireland and Israel, which shape young people’s 




identities as consumers and contributors to the economy. The revised curriculum in 
Northern Ireland employs a language of managerialism by setting one of its goals to 
educate young people as contributors to the economy or through the strands of ‘personal 
development’ and ‘employability’ that define the citizen primarily as an individual (see 
CCEA, 2017). One example that shows how the managerialist approach is manifest in the 
classroom is the inclusion of ‘active learning strategies’. A guidebook for teachers 
provides a detailed description of these strategies, stating that the intention is to empower 
students and to develop their critical thinking among other goals (CCEA, 2000a). Yet, a 
closer analysis of the language reveals the functional and instrumental values that seem to 
underpin the curricular offering.  For example, the idea of ‘employability’, expressed 
through terms such as “potential”, “optimize” or “effective thinking” (CCEA, 2000a: 1) 
capture the extent to which the curriculum is framed as a ‘tool’ by which students enhance 
their ‘marketability’ in a competitive labour market. Hence it might be argued that active 
learning is promoted only so far as it will ‘empower’ young people to serve the economy.  
During the focus groups, young people reproduced this individualistic understanding of 
citizenship. In their drawings, they described citizens as elitist, sophisticated, having a 
university degree and articulate (see Figure 12), reflecting the ‘employability’ aspect of 
the curriculum (see Figure 13):  
Citizens earn money from jobs. If you work harder the more money you get and 
you will be happy and the hard work pays off (Focus group 4, Catholic school) 
Citizens help out with work in the community which can help the economy grow 
(Focus group 4, Catholic school)  
Individualistic forms of citizenship are also featured in the focus group discussions and 
mind maps from the Protestant school, where some students constructed citizenship as 
elitist or as only relevant for people who pursue higher education (citizens as wearing 
suits, see Figure 5):  
S1: I always imagine a citizen as someone who is really sophisticated like with a 
suit, something like that. (Focus group 3, Protestant school)  




A: Do you think citizenship is something that really matters to young people?  
S1: Not really, no. 
S2: Not really, because they are not really thinking about that. 
S1: Well it depends if they want to know about the stuff like if you want to go to 
university. (Focus group 3, Protestant school)  
These descriptions of citizens across both schools refer to how students reproduce the 
concepts of citizenship that are mediated to them through the education system in 
Northern Ireland.  
In Israel, the curriculum foregrounds a nationalistic-republican notion of citizenship (this 
concept of citizenship is outlined in Chapter Two). However, it is argued that since the 
1980s, educational policies in Israel are increasingly directed towards privatisation, 
performance, standardisation, and testing (Dahan and Yonah, 2006 cited in Agbaria, 
2016b), suggesting a reinforcement of individualism. The new focus on the ‘self’ and 
individual success appear to go hand in hand with a lack of interest in politics and in the 
conflict as the Jewish-Israeli principal described in the following excerpt. She excused 
this focus on the ‘self’ as a result of growing up in a conflict-affected society:  
 [M]aybe a lot of pupils don’t listen to the news, are not so interested in you know- 
Trump, Clinton. And I think Israel (…) every day you turn on the radio, the news 
and you hear about bomb here and bomb there and so people just want to go to 
the school, to work, music and you know Buddha, yoga- and not to be involved, 
most of the people. (Principal, Jewish-Israeli school)  
This trend is reinforced by descriptions of young people’s identities that include aspects 
of leisure, materialism, and lifestyle (see Figure 25). However, instead of viewing the lack 
of interest in politics as a feature of conflict-affected societies, perhaps it reflects a more 
general trend of individualism that is promoted by neoliberal policies (see Dahan and 
Yonah, 2006 cited in Agbaria, 2016b). This is reinforced by the fact that despite the strong 
interest in the conflict and politics that I observed among Arab-Palestinian students, the 
culture of performance exerts a strong influence on their school and pressures students 




generally to focus on their individual educational success, which will be discussed in the 
following sections. 
 
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION AS A ‘LOW-PROFILE’ SUBJECT 
 
It is argued that as part of neoliberal trends, public policies associate economic growth 
with developments in science and technology (Olssen and Peters, 2005). Therefore, it is 
not overly surprising that citizenship is not seen as a subject that contributes to economic 
growth among conservative and liberal educators and administrators who demand to focus 
on science and technology-oriented subjects (Mitchell, 2003). The excerpts below show 
how students reproduce these neoliberal trends, viewing citizenship not as a useful subject 
for their personal career and employability. Generally, they described STEM subjects or 
English as more conducive for their future professional development: 
A: Do you think other subjects are more important than citizenship? 
S2: I think just the usual Maths, English maybe Science. (…) I think it [citizenship] 
is still an important thing to learn, but you have to think about getting a good 
GCSE or something, to get a job. It’s just nice to have you know, but the main 
things are Math, English, and Science maybe.  (Focus group 2, Catholic school)  
A: Would you say that citizenship is an important subject?  
S2: Maybe whenever you get older.  
S1: Yeah when you are doing GCSEs or something.  (Focus group 3, Protestant 
school)  
Students defined work and ‘having a job’ as important aspects of citizenship and describe 
citizens as “hardworking” (see Figure 6). They diminished citizenship as a subject that is 
“nice to have” (P2, focus group 2) and that prepares young people mainly as contributors 
to the economy, instead of empowering them as critical and transforming citizens (for 
example see Banks, 2008).  




These perceptions of citizenship education result from a policy that prioritises subjects 
like STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics). One policymaker argued 
that this is expressed through the amount of funding that citizenship education receives, 
compared to these subjects:  
[I]t doesn’t have a high enough profile in schools, I don’t think it has a high 
enough profile politically (…) they do it for other subjects you know like STEM 
science, technology and what I see in here is a cycle, where things become popular 
like, STEM because of the economic implications so any of these subjects are fine. 
Citizenship then at that time because we were coming out of “the Troubles” and 
you know we were all talking about a post-conflict society- but they became 
complacent and now well they just think “oh probably then we are alright”. 
(Policymaker 3, Northern Ireland) 
The vice-principal of the Protestant school, who argued that citizenship is taken less 
seriously in grammar schools in Northern Ireland, also lamented the fact that citizenship 
education is not viewed as important. He claimed that in grammar schools citizenship is 
not considered as relevant or prestigious as STEM subjects or languages. While there is 
currently no documented research from Northern Ireland that supports his claim, the data 
generally suggest that schools reproduce educational policies that foreground subjects and 
knowledge, deemed to serve the economy well and prepare the individual student to 
compete in the job market. Hence this turns citizenship into a subject that is redolent of 
the neoliberal agenda (Gilborn, 2006). 
A consequence of this lack of funding that is allocated to citizenship education is that there 
is an absence of teacher training and support in particular for teaching about the critical 
aspects of the subject, such as controversial issues, the conflict, and racism. Between 2005 
and 2011 when citizenship education was introduced in Northern Ireland, it received 
generous funding (it was anticipated that £1.4 million was required for teacher training, 
see Arlow, 2004). Yet, at the time of writing the education authority does not offer training 
for citizenship education about how to harness students’ critical capacities and how to 
address the recent conflict.  




Related to the lack of adequate preparation and training for citizenship teachers, another 
issue that has been raised mainly by policymakers in both contexts is the professional and 
academic background of citizenship teachers. One policymaker from Northern Ireland 
suggested that teachers who decided to teach citizenship as an additional subject often 
have a background in a subject other than politics, sociology or social science:  
I’m guessing citizenship teachers are not pure citizenship teachers, they are the 
science teachers who want to do something out of the area or so you know. So, I 
think the school system needs more support for the teachers full-stop in the 
subjects that they are dealing with. (Policymaker 4, Northern Ireland)  
This issue was addressed by one of the Catholic teachers. In her school, the coordinator 
for the subject tries to encourage school leaders to allow only those teachers who have 
completed the specific training to teach: 
You know in our school we fought very much that the people who were trained in 
citizenship taught and for most of the time that has been the case. But there have 
been a few anomalies where people have been given it on their timetable and have 
paid lip-service to it, they are literally “Give me the booklet and I’ll do the booklet 
work” you know, where [name of another teacher] and I would be active 
methodologies (…) we would deal probably more with contentious issues then 
people who are just given it on their timetable you know. (Teacher 1, Catholic 
school)  
According to her, teachers who did not participate in the initial teacher training would 
focus on memorisation and summarising as methods and tend to avoid contentious issues. 
This might not be overly surprising, considering the fact that these teachers do not receive 
sufficient training in understanding and delivering complex concepts that are part of 
citizenship education. Policymakers in Israel also lamented the fact that citizenship 
teachers often come from other subject areas: 
[S]ome of the teachers didn’t go through the teacher training of becoming a civics 
teacher. Some of them are history teachers, or literature teachers and so on. (…) 




They didn’t study in university political science or in law school or something like 
that. (…)  [T]hey don’t know the content so well, the knowledge is not so deep. 
(Policymaker 4, Israel)  
Out of 100 percent, 70 percent of teachers are not from social science, not from 
political science, and not from sociology, they come from history, geography and 
stuff like that. Not from the main core of the profession, ok. So, they needed to have 
a very quick (…) training programs through the Ministry. (Policymaker 2, Israel)  
A previous study conducted with citizenship teachers in Israel suggested that teachers who 
come from disciplines other than political science and sociology tend to emphasise less 
the development of critical (political) thinking, as their knowledge about complex 
concepts such as democracy and citizenship might be more superficial (Muff and 
Bekerman, 2017). Educational policies and schools do not require or encourage teachers 
to develop a deeper understanding and knowledge of these contested and complex 
concepts in citizenship education. The fact that it is not seen as a priority that citizenship 
teachers have completed specialist training and education to be able to teach these 
complex concepts and skills, suggests that teaching about controversial issues and 
encouraging critical political thinking is not a priority on the educational agenda of the 
political establishments in Israel and Northern Ireland.  
Teachers and policymakers refer to this issue, complaining about the lack of training in 
these areas of citizenship education.  For example, the vice-principal in the Protestant 
school emphasised the difficulty of challenging the views that the young people grow up 
within their communities and the need for teacher training to deal with these controversies:  
[I]n Northern Ireland … not so much now as maybe in the past but you’re 
challenging some of the cultures that the children have been brought into, were 
born into and you’re challenging the cultures of the families that they live in and 
that they go home to, you know.  So, that’s a really complex thing and yet there 
isn’t the training for it. (Vice-principal, Protestant school) 




Reilly and Niens (2005) argued that the lack of adequate training to deal with controversial 
issues in the classrooms in Northern Ireland results in a lack of confidence to have these 
discussions with their students. Similarly, McEvoy (2007) maintained that teachers are 
not provided with a helpful framework for addressing issues related to the conflict and its 
legacy at the individual and the structural level. While CCEA published a booklet on 
teaching controversial issues at key stage three in 2015, widespread teacher training in 
this area has not been provided at the time of writing, although one policymaker remarked 
that future training was planned by CCEA.   
In Israel, the content of teacher training needs to be approved by the educational 
authorities, which leads to the situation that teachers only receive official training that is 
in line with the dominant political agenda, as one Arab-Palestinian policymaker explained. 
He argued that training that prepares and educates teachers about multiculturalism, 
including different narratives about the conflict and Arab-Palestinian culture is unlikely 
to be approved by the current educational authorities. According to another policymaker 
from Israel, most of the teacher training (95 percent according to him) does not address 
(sensitive) issues of identity and the conflict in Israel. Some policymakers stated that 
initial teacher training in this area is more balanced, academically rigorous and includes 
teaching about democracy and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, whereas the in-service 
training follows a more nationalistic approach. Therefore, one policymaker concluded that 
there is not enough training for in-service teachers in areas such as human rights, 
democracy or co-existence, because the Ministry of Education does not always approve 
these programmes and there is no legal requirement for training to teach these concepts:  
[T]here is no law that every teacher is supposed to learn about human rights or 
democracy about all the co-existence or other values. Also, we [an organisation 
that offers this kind of teacher training] don’t [teach] in this training what we 
want. Because (…) the ministry has to agree to our training (…) if you want to 
[offer] a training by the education ministry, sometimes we compromise about some 
ideas. (Policymaker 5, Israel)  




In both jurisdictions, there is a lack of funding for those aspects of citizenship education 
that sustain its critical potential like teaching about controversial issues, the conflict, 
human rights education and antiracism. This influences how schools integrate this subject 
into their curriculum. The data across schools demonstrated that school leaderships do not 
view citizenship education as an important subject and also do not believe that it 
contributes to conflict transformation. For example, one teacher from the Catholic school 
lamented that the school leadership ridicules the subject’s importance: 
R4: I think in our school a lot of people see it as a wee- it’s useless.  
A: Ok, so it’s not considered an important subject? 
R4: I don’t think so, not in our school no. Definitely not like there would have been 
a running joke in our school. Our principal used to say to me that there was a wee 
boy and he used to call it “citizen-shit” instead of citizenship and she thought this 
was funny. (Teacher 1, Catholic school) 
Similarly, the vice-principal from the Protestant school argued that in some schools (not 
in his own) citizenship becomes a “mickey mouse subject”. He suggested that in contrast 
to other subjects it is not considered as relevant for parents’ and students’ career 
aspirations in the competitive job market. 
Principals and teachers generally diminished the subject’s empowering and transformative 
potential. The Arab-Palestinian principal defined citizenship education as being a good 
pupil, knowing the rules, following the correct rules and being “a good person” in general 
(Principal, Arab-Palestinian school), reflecting a quite shallow and conservative concept 
of citizenship with an emphasis on obedience.  
Mirroring this view of citizenship education, the teacher from this school elaborated on 
the role of citizenship as contributing to students’ future professional career. He 
emphasised the importance of education as a means of social advancement for the Arab-
Palestinian community in Israel. 
You know just to teach the pupils, to go to study, get high jobs, and then university 
and after all that you can have your rights, not only your rights but you can live 




like a human being, equality! Because there is nobody who will stop you and [take] 
your job, so we have professors and doctors, because they have studied! If you 
want to say “The government do[es]n’t let us study so we will stay workers” – No 
you have to study and you can! (…) Our str[ength] is education. We are strong in 
education. (Teacher, Arab-Palestinian school)  
While he argued that a better socio-economic position will enhance Arab-Palestinian 
citizens’ individual opportunities, he defined citizenship as an instrumental subject for 
individual success and suggested that it is possible to achieve equality through a good 
qualification in education. Agbaria (2016b) and Pinson and Agbaria (2015) suggest that 
this is a general culture promoted in Arab-Palestinian schools in Israel, where there is a 
stronger focus on individual success and socio-economic mobility that function as 
mechanisms of control. Other research demonstrated that Arab-Palestinian students (and 
arguably their parents as well) have strong aspirations and expectations towards higher 
education, compared to other minorities in Israel (Khattab, 2002; 2003; Yair, Khattab, and 
Benavot, 2003). Despite these aspirations, Arab-Palestinian students are disadvantaged in 
pursuing higher education and in the labour market under the discriminatory socio-
economic conditions in Israel (Pinson and Agbaria, 2015). Agbaria (2016b) argued that 
while the illusion that every student can succeed in the system by investing in potential 
success in education is promoted among all students, it affects Arab-Palestinian students 
in particular. In contrast to Jewish-Israeli students who are advantaged by the public 
sphere that is dominated by their collective identity, interests, and ideals what is left for 
Arab-Palestinians is a focus on individualism and professionalism in education (Agbaria, 
2016b; Pinson and Agbaria, 2015).   
This contributes to the de-politicization of citizenship education, which is not viewed as a 
subject that can support conflict transformation in Israel and Northern Ireland. The Arab-
Palestinian teacher explained that it could increase students’ knowledge about the conflict, 
but not contribute to transformation. 
No, [citizenship education can contribute] just only to know, not to fix the 
situation. (Teacher, Arab-Palestinian school)  




A teacher from the Protestant school also diminished the potential of citizenship to 
contribute to conflict transformation. She argued that it might be “a good thing” (Teacher 
2, Protestant school) that students do not know a lot about the conflict (as a result of not 
teaching it in citizenship class), since they are living during a time of relative peace and 
they have other opportunities nowadays than getting involved in politics. It is an odd 
statement for a politics teacher, not wanting her students to get involved in politics, but it 
exemplifies how some teachers avoid discussing politics in the citizenship lesson, as 
argued earlier in Chapter four.  
Similarly, the Jewish-Israeli principal also stated in the excerpt below that citizenship 
education in her school does not contribute to conflict transformation. Additionally, she 
suggested that the major goal of the citizenship lesson is to prepare her students for the 
final examination: 
Not civic education like that in school [can contribute to conflict 
transformation], because the teacher just prepares for the bagrut (…) (Principal, 
Jewish-Israeli school) 
This is important because it demonstrates how the education system, in general, is 
permeated by a culture of performance that limits the subjects’ critical potential. This 
impression was reinforced during the observation of the citizenship lesson. The lesson 
focused on memorising and summarising the workings of the Israeli parliament, which is 
a topic that is covered by the final examination. In the following section, I will discuss the 
data that refers to this culture of performance. Together with this neglect of citizenship 
education’s critical potential through educational policies, the focus on performance 
further dilutes its critical content and discourages and restrains teachers from addressing 
it in the classroom. 
 
THE FOCUS ON PERFORMANCE AND TEACHERS AS PERFORMATIVE WORKERS 
 
This section discusses how the delivery of citizenship education is limited by the 
preparation for the final examination, as the Jewish-Israeli principal already indicated 




above. Educational policies are increasingly infiltrated by a culture of performativity, 
which controls the education system through its measures of productivity or output quality 
(Ball, 2003). Ball maintained that under performativity, teachers and schools in general 
are assessed according to measurable outcomes that demonstrate ‘effectiveness’ and 
‘excellence’. The data presented in this section shows how educational practices are 
dominated by the focus on the preparation for the final examination as a tool for 
measurement of performativity. As a result, schools, teachers, and students are pressured 
to focus on pedagogical ‘technologies’ that maximise students’ performance in the 
examination. This affects the content of the teacher training, the time allocated to 
citizenship education by the school leadership and the time that the teacher can spend on 
cultivating students’ critical political thinking, discussing the conflict, racism, and 
sectarianism.  
The Protestant vice-principal concluded that there is an absence of training because the 
training offered to citizenship teachers focuses on the preparation for the final 
examination: 
[T]here is a complete absence of training, complete absence, there isn’t the money. 
So, the only training you have now for citizenship will be for the GCSE and it’s 
how to mark the work, how to moderate the coursework, they call it like a 
coursework clinic, so whatever you know. (…) It’s technical about the rubric of 
the course as opposed to what is the best method of teaching (…) about diversity 
and segregation. (Vice-principal, Protestant school) 
The situation in Israel is similar, as a policymaker from the Ministry of Education 
described in the excerpt below. She expressed optimism about the training and claimed 
that when she delivers teacher training she seeks to address issues such as the conflict and 
identity with her students. Hence, she blamed the teachers for wanting to discuss the 
preparation for the examination:  
I bring a lot of expertise of different identity groups and we talk about the conflict 
… the main thing that I did and it made a lot of noise that instead of talking about 
what will be in the exam, we talked about how we can be better in class, what we 




need to talk about, the hard issues and how you make the difference or how you 
can meet the children. But you know it’s hard for me to say what I planned and 
what really happen[s] because the teachers still they want to know what is in the 
exam. (Policymaker 6, Israel)  
Teachers’ reluctance to address the conflict and other controversial issues in class or their 
lack of interest in teacher training about these issues are not surprising when educational 
policies are underpinned by avoidance, a managerialist culture, and a focus on 
performance. This requires teachers to focus on the topics relevant to the final 
examination. Another policymaker from Israel referred to this issue in the next excerpt. 
He explained that teachers are not obliged by policies to teach about controversial issues, 
whereas they are required to prepare their students for the final examination.  
The bagrut is something that most teachers feel they are obliged to, they need to 
prepare the students for the bagrut. (…) the[re is a] tension between teaching for 
the bagrut, the final exam, and between educating and dealing with controversial 
issues that are not really in the curriculum or that you are not obliged to deal with 
it if you want to prepare your students, but it’s very important and from [an] 
education[al] point of view, if you don’t do it, it’s a pity. So many teachers have 
this dilemma, how [much] energy to put inside. (Policymaker 4, Israel) 
Consequently, teachers need to be granted latitude to address controversial issues and to 
develop critical political thinking among their students. However, in the following 
excerpts teachers complained about how they are constrained by the focus on performance 
in the final examination.  
Teachers from the Catholic school described how interactive approaches and progressive 
pedagogy (active learning strategies, described on pages 176-77; 181-182) are subjugated 
in favour of examination performance.  
 
 




When teachers prepare children for the examination, they are more clearly motivated by 
memorisation, learning of specific concepts, and definitions. 
The first three years are great you have all these interesting activities (…) and all 
of a sudden it becomes “you have to read this, you have to learn how the 
government works, you have to understand our laws maybe, you have to 
understand human rights” but there is actually no, there is no participation in that 
anymore at that stage. (…) it seems such a pity to have spent three years 
developing those skills with the children to all of a sudden saying “right you have 
to get a qualification in this so now we stop doing all of these things and now you 
have to write about it” – it doesn’t follow through! You know the whole structure- 
and it’s almost like it’s going backwards (…) with citizenship you are building up 
these skills and this empowerment and this knowledge and then all of a sudden, all 
the participation stops.  (Teacher 2, Catholic school)  
[Y]ou have to prepare them for the exam you don’t have time to do all the wee 
activities, you know. (…) I think it needs maybe to have more time on the timetable. 
(Teacher 1, Catholic school) 
These excerpts demonstrate how assessment processes undermine the teaching of content 
and the pedagogical value of citizenship education. This is also indicated by one Protestant 
teacher, who criticised that topics that require an in-depth examination are only addressed 
superficially: 
I actually think it’s far too much they try to cover, you know, it’s quite an in-depth 
subject. And I think, I feel personally they are trying to gloss over things. You 
know, you are doing this and then next week you say, “Right we’re moving on to 
this” and then we are going back to this (…) You don’t have time to really focus 
on anything, in my opinion, if you want to develop that kind of critical thinking. 
And there are aspects of it that are difficult for pupils to understand you know, 
unless they read a lot, watch the news, talk to people. (Teacher 1, Protestant 
school) 




Similarly, citizenship education in Israel promotes skills development such as discussions 
of current events, analysis, and critical thinking. Yet, these pedagogical methods become 
less relevant closer to the preparation for the final examination, shifting the focus onto the 
memorisation of concepts:  
I think that the test is too hard. Because they want them to memorise a lot of 
definitions and I think it is not necessary. I think it is more important that they 
understand the concept and not this word or that word and it’s a lot [to learn]. 
(Teacher 3, Jewish-Israeli school)  
The curriculum is also- it is trying to avoid the controversies. (…). So, it becomes 
informative and no controversy (Teacher 2, Jewish-Israeli school) 
Through assessment citizenship education becomes an almost mechanical subject that 
promotes a form of ‘technical’ citizenship through the memorisation of details of the 
democratic system, values, and features of the state and society as McLaughlin (1992) and 
Torney-Purta et al. (1999) have warned. In fact, in both Israel and Northern Ireland a 
review of the past final examinations from 2017 has shown that they were dominated by 
questions that required the memorisation of concepts, policies, laws, and definitions 
(Ministry of Education, 2017b; CCEA, 2017).  
Perhaps it is also significant that the final examination for LGC in Northern Ireland 
assessed the understanding of the conflict either through expressions of cultural identity 
or through conflict resolution on a global level, mirroring the avoidance strategies outlined 
in Chapter four (CCEA, 2017). In the final examination in Israel, students were confronted 
with a newspaper article that argued for the need of a common identity and portrayed 
pluralism as a threat to unity (Ministry of Education, 2017b), reminiscent of what Giroux 
(1997) framed as conservative multiculturalism that portrays diversity as a “threat to 
democracy” (p.245). Additionally, students were expected to provide definitions of 
ethnocultural nationalism and a social-democratic approach towards pluralism that 
promotes equality as equal opportunities in the form of liberal multiculturalism, but 
arguably under the umbrella of the Zionist narrative (Ministry of Education, 2017b; see 
also textbook for definition: Ministry of Education, 2017a). Consequently, in both 




jurisdictions, the questions and tasks in the final examination mirror the avoidance 
strategies of decontextualization of the conflict, one-sided accounts, and the avoidance of 
structural racism and sectarianism, which were all discussed in the previous Chapter. 
Teachers have little incentive to address controversial issues in the classroom in a context 
where the focus is set on learning and memorising knowledge for the final examination. 
Therefore, these avoidance strategies are primarily a consequence of educational policies.   
Teachers have also identified parents and students as censors since they direct the focus 
on the preparation for the examination. Teacher 1 from the Jewish-Israeli school described 
this issue in the following excerpt:  
They [the students] don’t see in him [the teacher] a figure that they can speak with 
about it [values]. They believe what they believe- it’s very different and they want 
the teacher to help them to get passed the exam. And they don’t understand why 
he is speaking with them about values, “no you don’t speak with us about values, 
you have to help us to pass the exam” and also their parents are very strong 
opinionated about that. So, and what happens even in the teacher training- you 
can see most of the teachers what they want from the teacher training, how to 
teach the kids better how to pass the exam! (…) Yes, so the teacher trainer didn’t 
want it to be that way, it will be that way because all of the teachers that are in the 
training- this is what they want, this is what they came for. Yes, they want to help 
their students to do that. (Teacher 1, Jewish-Israeli school)  
Since the teacher training is tailored towards preparing students for the examination, this 
consumes most of the little training that is offered, leaving less time to train teachers in 
other areas of citizenship education such as how to discuss the conflict or other 
controversial issues. The teacher in the last excerpt also mentioned the pressure from 
parents, who participate as ‘consumers’ exercising choice over different schools to prepare 
their children, in their view, for entry to competitive schools and universities (Connell, 
2013). 
The policymakers quoted above described how the goal of education in both jurisdictions 
is to pass the final examination in secondary education, following the “logic of the market” 




(Giroux, 1997:241) and the managerialist culture (Kilkauer, 2015). This places teachers 
under pressure to focus on the content that is relevant to the examination, regardless of 
whether they consider it to be important or empowering knowledge and learning 
themselves (see also Castro, 2010). Empowering knowledge and learning has been 
described in Chapter two as incorporating discussions of controversial issues (Hess, 
2004a; Hess, 2004b; Hess and Avery, 2008) and critical political thinking (see Banks, 
2008; Burbules and Berk, 1999; Johnson and Morris, 2010).  
The lack of teacher training as reported by policymakers, principals and teachers has three 
major implications: first, it demonstrates that citizenship is not considered an important 
subject in terms of the managerialist culture since it does not contribute as significantly to 
students’ future ‘employability’ as other subjects. Second, the way it is assessed and how 
teachers are trained is directed towards technical and individualised notions of citizenship 
that gloss over its controversial and critical aspects and reproduce the dominant neoliberal 
hegemony promoting performance. Third, the focus on the acquisition of knowledge to be 
tested in examinations allows the political elite to control and define what they see as 
relevant knowledge and to pressure schools, teachers, and students to follow this path that 
they have set. 
 
IDENTITY POLITICS AS A CENSOR 
 
Another reason for heated and emotional discussions during citizenship lessons is the 
politics of identity that is reproduced by teachers and students in the classroom. Identity 
politics draws on identity as either a source of resistance or domination and can serve as 
a powerful hegemonic or counter-hegemonic tool, as described in Chapter two (Bauman, 
2004; Bondi, 1993; Butler, 1993; Hall, 2000). The data presented in this section suggests 
that identity politics limits citizenship education’s critical potential by silencing 
discussions about the conflict, racism, and sectarianism. Generally, identity politics is 
mediated subtly through community cultures that seek to promote and defend the interests 
of the community. For example, the data have shown that young people in Northern 




Ireland and Israel are socialised into narratives that seek to justify their community’s rights 
as a collective, as a nation or a state. The main argument of this section is that pressure is 
exerted on students and teachers to submit to dominant views, or at least to leave them 
unchallenged.  
In Northern Ireland, this pressure stems from the communities, parents, and students that 
‘censor’ teachers and other students’ alternative views by creating an atmosphere of 
discomfort and fear, as will be discussed below. Additionally, in Israel, identity politics is 
woven into official policies and educational programmes (such as the preparation for 
military service) that promote dominant narratives and identities and protect them from 
criticism. In both societies, there is fear of criticising and questioning dominant views and 
discomfort among teachers and students. Consequently, this denies space for critical 
political thinking, discussions of controversial issues, and exchanges of different opinions 
in citizenship education.  
 
CENSORING CRITICALITY AND ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVES (ISRAEL) 
 
Chapter one outlined policies that sanction schools and teachers when they teach about or 
commemorate the events of the ‘Nakba day’, on which Palestinians remember their 
expulsion and flight from the territory that is now the State of Israel (Peled-Elhanan, 
2012). In addition to this restriction, which limits discussions in schools about narratives 
and historical events that challenge the dominant Zionist narrative, other policies restrict 
criticism towards the State of Israel and its institutions.  
For example, in 2016 the Ministry of Education published a circular that presents 
guidelines on discussing controversial issues in the classroom, stating that: 
Teachers should be encouraged to discuss with the students the positions that are 
legally and socially legitimate in the country while at the same time resisting the 
expression of illegal attitudes, including those that preach violence or racism. 
(Translated from Hebrew) (Ministry of Education, 2016:1) 




It could be argued that the purpose of this guideline is mainly to protect the classroom 
environment from incitement and hate speech. Yet, it also limits the teachers’ freedom to 
criticise state institutions, including the Israeli Defence Forces (p.1). This becomes clear 
in the summary that outlines the changes to the previous instruction, providing the reason 
for the publication of this circular: 
The circular sharpens the commitment of the speakers, teachers and external 
bodies to students to the very existence of the State of Israel and the State 
Education Law, and emphasises the prohibition against harming the legitimacy of 
the State of Israel and its state institutions. In addition, the circular stresses that 
external factors and external spokespersons whose activities include, inter alia, 
encouraging racism, discrimination, incitement, calling for violence, party 
propaganda (…) and a discourse that undermines the legitimacy of the State of 
Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.  Speakers who have committed a 
disgraceful offence or an organization acting in violation of the laws of the State 
of Israel or of a body whose activities undermine the legitimacy of state bodies 
(such as the Israel Defence Forces and the courts) will not be allowed to enter 
[the classroom]. (Ministry of Education, 2016:2)76 
Consequently, this circular permits the Ministry of Education to discipline teachers who 
open the discussion about the concept of the Jewish and democratic state or the actions of 
the Israeli Defence Forces. While the curriculum seeks formally to encourage critical 
thinking (see for a description Bekerman and Cohen, 2017), the restrictions imposed on 
citizens to challenge the state and its institutions are also ingrained in citizenship 
education, as an older circular pointed out that it should teach citizens to be ‘faithful’ or 
‘loyal’ to the state:  
The education system seeks to educate its students to be engaged, active, law-
abiding, moral and virtuous citizens with a critical sense, who serve the state 
faithfully. (Ministry of Education, 2009) 
                                                             
76 This has been translated from Hebrew.  




Whilst the last quote mentions, on the one hand, the capacity of citizenship to possess a 
“critical sense”, it emphasises, on the other hand, the ideal of “law-abiding” citizens that 
are faithful to the state. This understanding of citizenship is contradictory and can only be 
understood by considering that critical thinking is limited by the Zionist ethos of the state 
and its institutions of which criticism is restricted.  
This censor on criticism affects Jewish-Israeli and Arab-Palestinian schools and teachers 
in Israel. The cases of Adam Verta and Adar Cohen illustrate that Jewish-Israeli teachers 
have also been placed under more pressure recently (see Introduction, page 6). These 
incidents have shown that it is risky for teachers to address controversial issues or views 
that are critical of the state’s ideology or the military. In the excerpts below, one 
policymaker referred to these mechanisms of censoring and explained how teachers are 
pressured to avoid or even to fear to address certain topics in class: 
And I think maybe in the last five to ten years, also in civics studies it is considered 
a very problematic subject matter at schools, so teachers might think “No they 
should be in line and that’s all not going to the right or to the left.” (Policymaker 
4, Israel) 
Formally, every teacher can talk about their opinion in the class, but in the reality, 
it’s a problem, because many teachers, Arab and Jewish teachers- now more Arab, 
because [there is] a security system [that] controls. But also in the Jewish system 
now, in the [last] seven years we have a problem for Jews [from] the left-wing (…) 
like Adam Verta or Adar Cohen and another person that [got kicked] out of the 
education system, and they are afraid to talk, because maybe- it’s not just the 
government, also there is a lot of right[-wing] activities. (Policymaker 5, Israel)  
Another policymaker added that Arab-Palestinian teachers have been and are still 
monitored by intelligence agencies (Agbaria et al., 2015 Agbaria, 2016):   
Like controlling the education system was like part of controlling the Arab 
population. (…) [The] military government, from 48 till 66, there was like the 
military was governing in the Arab cities, the Arab societies. (…) And this is what 




it was like for 20 years and this is part of when I talked about the teachers and 
how they are afraid, they are still living this period. (Policymaker 1, Israel)  
Since 1948 and under the Zionist leadership the education system in Israel has functioned 
as a form of social control of the Arab-Palestinian population (Al-Haj, 1995). In the 
following focus group excerpt, Arab-Palestinian students were asked if they have 
alternative ways to learn about their history outside of school. They explained that while 
the Internet provides them with alternative information, they also fear being observed by 
the national intelligence services: 
S3: You know you can’t look at anything on the Internet without having somebody 
else seeing what you are looking at. So, the second you write something wrong on 
the Internet, from their [Jewish-Israeli] perspective- 
A: Do you feel scared sometimes? 
S3: Yeah of course! You can’t write anything you want. 
S1: You’re watched like! 24/7! But I don’t know I guess it should be fine like we’re 
watched but we’re not doing anything wrong. 
S3: Yeah but- 
S1: Ok we are not terrorists just because we’re Arabs- so ok watch us! 
S3: Alright watch us, but the second you write something that you want to check 
out about yourself, they will explain it in the wrong way. They can take your 
information and turn it against you. (Focus group 1, Arab-Palestinian school)  
The students felt that their access to information and the freedom to express their opinion 
is limited. Additionally, they expressed fear that their activities and expression of their 
political views are observed and that they have to face consequences. In the next section, 
I will discuss another aspect that contributes to this self-censorship, which is military 
education as part of citizenship education. 
 




CITIZENSHIP AND MILITARY CONSCRIPTION: AN INEXTRICABLE LINK (ISRAEL) 
 
Chapter one demonstrated that the inclusion of preparation for military service as an extra-
curricular activity makes manifest the nationalistic nature of citizenship education (see 
Lemish, 2003). In the textbook, military service is described as part of citizenship, as a 
duty of the citizen (p.20), and enlisting in the army is termed as an expression of “civil 
identity”, as part of being a member of the democratic state (Ministry of Education, 
2017a:88).  
Arab-Palestinian policymakers criticised the fact that preparation for military service and 
the service itself form part of citizenship education in Israel. In the following two excerpts, 
they outlined how the values promoted through military service clash with the values of 
democratic education and argued that these values reinforce the image of Arab-
Palestinians as “the enemy”:  
Israel i[s] also a militaristic society. And one of the goals of the education system 
is to prepare the students to be good soldiers, it’s part of the citizenship education 
in Israel. After 12 years they finish the school and immediately they [become] 
soldiers. (…) And in education, it’s a contrast between if you want to build 
democratic citizenship and people who believe in peace and … co-existence …. 
it’s in contrast to if you want them to be a good soldier! It’s not the same, you have 
a contrast because in one case the Arabs are human[s] … and they have rights … 
but in the other case as a military soldier, you are supposed to see the Arab people, 
if they are people, as the enemy. (Policymaker 5, Israel) 
The values are very nationalist[ic] values, that the state, the symbols of the state, 
it’s kind of a national education, not civi[c] education. And there is no questioning 
for example of the status of the Arab minority, there is no question about the issue 
of democracy, about the rights … not only for Arabs but also, for example, the 
right to obey or not obey in the army. It’s all like the state is above everything. (…) 
[T]hese Jewish students that learn these things at the age of 16, 17- a year later 
they go to the army and they stand on the cross-border [control] and they stand at 




the checkpoints and they are oppressing the Palestinian minority and these are the 
citizens of the future! So, this is raising a society in which democracy is not a 
value. It’s like a tool in order to make sure that the Jewish state will keep existing. 
(Policymaker 1, Israel) 
According to them, ideas that underpin the preparation for the military or the service itself 
express a nationalistic understanding of citizenship; promote patriotism and obedience to 
the state and a sense of duty to protect the country from its ‘enemies’ (see also Lemish, 
2003). Consequently, this does not allow for questioning the state’s status quo, since this 
would jeopardise these values of patriotism and the promotion of military service among 
young people. Both policymakers contrasted the image of the citizenship student with the 
soldier: whereas the former is educated about the values of democracy and human rights, 
the latter obeys orders and defends the country by force.   
The support for the military and its importance is mirrored in the education system 
(Lemish, 2003). In the excerpt below, the Jewish-Israeli principal emphasised the 
importance of military service in general and as a central aspect of citizenship education: 
Don’t forget that in Israel the main obligation for all of us is the army. (…) [It 
forms] all the parts of their personality. Where he [the pupil completed] the army, 
it was with value for him, it’s very very important. If somebody in our school, boy 
or girl will tell you that he is planning not to go to the army … he has to think 
about good reasons. (…) So the civic education does not begin [with] and does 
not finish [with] school. (Principal, Jewish-Israeli school)  
She also described the military service as a very valuable aspect of citizenship education 
that shapes the personality of the students. Significantly, these values resonate with those 
of republican citizenship, such as obedience and commitment to the community (Faulks, 
2000; Heater, 1990). Importantly, while she rejected the capacity of citizenship education 
as a school subject to promote conflict transformation (cited earlier on page 215, she 
argued that the army can provide a means for bridging what she describes as “cultural 
difference” between Jews and Arabs:  




[M]aybe in the army, because in the army you meet people from all over Israel, so 
not just like the kibbutz and here and the villages, all the towns and the [different] 
economic situation and everything. (Principal, Jewish-Israeli school)  
Whilst it is unsurprising that the Jewish-Israeli school reproduces these policies and 
includes them as part of its ethos, the principal of the Arab-Palestinian school was also 
supportive of the military service. She contended that Arab-Palestinian citizens would 
receive more rights if they serve in the army, suggesting that the lack of rights is connected 
to a lack of loyalty towards the Jewish state. Consequently, both principals claimed that 
the inclusion of Arab-Palestinians in the military service can promote their inclusion into 
Israeli society. They reproduce an assimilation strategy that is also referred to in the 
textbook. The Defence Service Law from 1986 describes military service “as a way to 
integrate Israeli Arabs into Israeli society and to increase their identification with the 
state” (Ministry of Education, 2017a: 105). It overlooks the narrative and often dual 
national identification of Arab-Palestinians, suggesting that the discrimination and 
structural exclusion of Arab-Palestinian citizens could be solved through their 
assimilation into the Zionist ideology.  
Therefore, it is not surprising that Jewish-Israeli students defined the military service as 
the most important aspect of citizenship, demonstrated by the following excerpt:   
A: So, what do you think is the most important thing about citizenship that you 
have been working on? 
S1: Army. 
S5: Yeah, I think the army is the most important one. Because every child that 
grows up in Israel knows that he will go to the army, it’s not a question and it’s 
not a- 
S2: It’s a fact. 
S4: And even if you don’t like it you need to, I think it’s very important. We have 
to. 




S5: To protect our country.  (Focus group 4, Jewish-Israeli school, Year 9)  
In both schools, the military service was seen as an aspect of citizenship education. Yet, 
while Jewish-Israeli teachers and students emphasised its importance, in the Arab-
Palestinian school only the school leadership supports the military service.  
 
COMMUNITIES AS CENSORS: NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
Identity politics also plays an important role in censoring citizenship education in 
Northern Ireland. Yet, in contrast to Israel, it is not framed through the same nationalistic 
citizenship that provides the rationale for the status quo of Zionist dominance. Researchers 
in Northern Ireland suggested that there is a “culture of avoidance” in Northern Ireland 
(Lomas, 1997), also phrased by the famous poet Seamus Heaney in his poem “whatever 
you say, say nothing” (Heaney, 1975). It is argued that this atmosphere of politeness and 
avoidance to address the conflict allows maintaining ignorant and sectarian views under 
the surface (see Gallagher, 2011). One policymaker maintained that this culture of 
sidestepping is mirrored in the curriculum text: 
[B]ecause the curriculum was generated by adults, it was often the hang-ups that 
adults have that found their way into the curriculum. (…) But it shows you how 
the curriculum has been put together by adults with adults thinking that these are 
the issues that young people will have. (…) I think the problem came from the 
teachers and from the adults.  (…)  I think they have been through the last 20 or 
30 years and it is still a very sensitive issue and you know there is still things you 
don’t talk about and these would have traditionally been things you don’t talk 
about. And now they are expected to stand up in a class and discuss them openly, 
so I think you know- They had issues with identity and diversity. (Policy-maker 1, 
Northern Ireland)  
This statement reinforces the argument that educational policies in Northern Ireland avoid 
addressing the structural and political dimension of the conflict and its legacy. An 
environment that seeks to discourage from challenging ingrained, one-sided perspectives 




on the conflict and the other communities perpetrates this ‘culture of politeness’. This 
section discusses how communities censor teachers’ autonomy to discuss the conflict in 
the classroom.   
Despite the progress made by the Good Friday Agreement, disadvantaged areas in 
Northern Ireland continue to be affected by paramilitary violence (Knox, 2002). One 
policymaker referred to this in the next excerpt. He stated that paramilitary groups 
maintain their influence in both communities; an issue that he claimed is often not talked 
about since it is not in the interests of the political elite, who try to keep the paramilitaries 
“quiet”, as he put it: 
The money in a sense is the reason that these troubles continue, in my mind. 
Paramilitary groups are still being funded, they have a hold in our society and 
there is money to be made out of it. “The Troubles” generated money for both 
groups. When people come into this new, the first thing you look at you see there 
is Protestants and Catholics (…) what isn’t coming out in a lot of the research and 
sadly isn’t coming out- but I can maybe see why- is the role that the paramilitaries 
have played in creating this division and keeping this division. And (…) that 
politicians haven’t necessarily helped. (…) [B]oth sides of the community then 
established themselves and just dividing their opposition as defending the 
community, but what you found was both sides of the community w[ere] effectively 
mafia! And still [are] in the communities! (…) they had their own form of justice 
within their communities. (…) And all sorts of things were going on and to my 
mind that still continues – except it is not talked about, we pretend it doesn’t 
happen. What has happened now with the paramilitary groups, they became 
community leaders and they get funding! And in my mind, they get funding to keep 
them quiet, because if you don’t fund them then they start causing trouble again.  
(Policymaker 3, Northern Ireland) 
Shirlow and McEvoy (2008) stated that the political elite in Northern Ireland frequently 
draws on the narratives of violence and selective victimhood to mobilise either unionism-
loyalism or nationalism-republicanism. They argued that the on-going political violence 




is censored by the media or denounced as criminal, instead of referring to its politically-
motivated character. The Protestant vice-principal suggested that this mutual relationship 
of reciprocal benefit and dependency between the paramilitaries and the political elite is 
still prevalent:  
[I]t’s about keeping the local communities that they [the political elite] represent, 
happy. As opposed to bring in a new vision, you know. And particularly in the 
Protestant working-class community (…) [T]he Unionist politicians have been 
referring to [the lack of aspiration, lack of academic performance among East 
Belfast working-class boys] and saying, “We need to make change because look 
at our community.” So, there is a wee bit like “There is a problem.” But they don’t 
do anything about it you know, they say “We know there is a problem”. And the 
problem was, you know the minister of education is a Republican, so what they 
are doing is they are using the difficulty that they can see in their community to 
beat the minister with because we hate him because he is a Nationalist Republican. 
So, it’s all about party politics, you know “Let’s beat Sinn Fein.” So, it is really 
backward like. (Vice-principal, Protestant school)  
Related to this, one policymaker claimed that the sidestepping of controversy and the 
maintenance of the status quo is part of a broader strategy of compliance in education in 
Northern Ireland: 
I think because of the way society works and the school system, you are basically 
taught to be compliant, obey authority, don’t ask questions or at least not too many 
and behave in certain ways and accept the status quo. (…) From my point of view, 
I think politicians would have been complacent for a long, long time. (Policymaker 
3, Northern Ireland) 
Consequently, he concluded that teachers’ avoidance of controversial issues is a result of 
censoring by the broader ‘culture of politeness’ or silence:  
 [T]eachers often don’t have these sorts of conversations and it is that 
controversial issues thing (…) teachers will avoid talking about things that they 




consider to be an issue because it can raise some sort of problems for them. 
(Policymaker 3, Northern Ireland)  
He argued that addressing controversial issues can cause ‘problems’ for teachers and in 
some communities, teachers struggle with “what is safe to talk about and what is not safe 
to talk about” (Policymaker 3, Northern Ireland).  
The Protestant school is located in such an area. Chapter one discussed how paramilitary 
groups retain control over working-class neighbourhoods in Belfast (Jarman, 2004; Knox, 
2002); by exerting an informal justice system mainly through ‘punishment’ beatings and 
shootings, through violence and organised crime (Jarman, 2004). Jarman (2004) stated 
that young people are either ‘recruited’ and attracted to paramilitary groups or rebel 
against them. This issues was raised by Protestant students during the focus groups. They 
described the violence promoted by paramilitaries as a cause for on-going tensions and 
how young people get involved in paramilitary activities:  
S5: But there is like- people are being shot. (…) 
S3: There is always riots like where I live like I look from my bedroom and see 
them all running about and throwing bricks. (Focus group 1, Protestant school) 
S4: Basically the paramilitaries say you have done something bad, (...) but the 
police wouldn’t want- [to do something about it] (…) If like the IRA, the UDA or 
the UVF found out, they were at your house and they would sort you out.  
S3: Like they blow your windows in or they like do your kneecaps.  
S4: (…) the IRA and the UDA can say something about that and say to the person 
like “If you don’t kneecap him- we will”. So that’s like actually kill him [a young 
person that got involved in criminal activities] like put a bullet in his head and all. 
That’s how serious it gets. (Focus Group 2, Protestant school) 
S2: Maybe the religious groups. And UVF and stuff, that’s citizenship. 
S3: Yeah probably religious groups- is that where it came from? 




S2: Because that’s what it is citizenship, that’s where it all originally came from, 
all citizens.  
S4: Yeah that’s where all the violence comes out, the IRA, UVF.  
S2: Because they’re all Unionists and Loyalists. 
S3: Yeah everyone’s war is on because- I don’t see the point of having wars now 
all over. (Focus group 2, Protestant school)  
A: What is it about citizenship [that causes trouble]? 
S1: About religion and the police- between Unionists and Nationalists. 
S3: Because people that’s what people think, that this is the right way.  
A: So, it’s about political views? 
S1: Yeah. (Focus group 1, Protestant school)  
 
S4: Also like behaviour as well like, it makes some more war, like what they 
[referring to paramilitaries] are doing.  
S3: And then there is people’s reactions as well to it, like say their parents found 
out that they are doing it and like they don’t really punish them. (…) (Focus group 
2, Protestant school) 
Interestingly, the last excerpt exemplifies the ambivalent attitudes that some young people 
have towards the paramilitaries. Jarman (2004) argued that the paramilitary is seen either 
as “a hero or an enemy”, acting as “a defender of the community” (p.435), sustaining itself 
through a “mix of threat and admiration” (Jarman, 2016:218). While students tended to 
refer to this atmosphere of threat, in the last excerpt they also confirmed the role of the 
paramilitaries as ‘correcting’ the ‘anti-social behaviour’ of young people when their 
parents fail to do so.  




The influence of the paramilitary groups is also present in the classroom. In the following 
excerpt, the vice-principal referred to his personal experience with raising controversial 
issues in the classroom. He suggested that it is difficult and even dangerous for teachers 
to address issues that could criticise their community or the paramilitaries: 
I have to be so careful when talking to the kids because, despite the fact I was 
brought up in a loyalist community and had friends whose family was in the UDA, 
my own personal perspective, I despise it! And I think they were murderers. But I 
can’t say that to these kids, because some of those kids, their fathers are in prison, 
you know. I mean one of the videos- this was actually quite dangerous-  I showed 
them a video of [an incident where someone from the UDA shot people from the 
IRA] (...) Now, I could have [the attacker’s] family contact the school saying “This 
was completely inappropriate”, but I was just showing a news article you know- 
just this is what was in the news! I was to show them these were the things that 
have happened- (...) So, it is really difficult, it is a minefield. And this is actually 
why in some schools the teachers just think “It’s too much risk- not gonna risk it”. 
(Vice-principal, Protestant school)  
He explained that due to the fear that parents or the community might complain or act 
upon the teacher challenging the views of the community or actions by the paramilitaries, 
some teachers sidestep teaching about these controversial issues. In another statement, he 
described the community ethos as shielding the community from criticism, formulating it 
as “[t]his is our community, you know and we believe in our community” (Vice-principal, 
Protestant school). 
Researchers (Jarman, 2004; 2016; Knox, 2002) argued that in some areas in Northern 
Ireland, communities and paramilitary groups promote a culture of commemoration that 
celebrates ancient battles or actions by ex-prisoners, wars, and a “culture of the gun” 
(Jarman, 2004:435). According to Jarman, this glorification of violence is concerning, 
since it serves to legitimise violence, killings, and murders, sustaining sectarian and racist 
attitudes by framing it as part of ‘the struggle’ or ‘resistance’. Like the vice-principal, 
other teachers in Northern Ireland also emphasised during the interviews that they see it 




as their task to challenge these attitudes and the glorification of violence in their 
communities. However, due to the fear of repercussions, they feel uncomfortable and 
restrained to criticise racist and sectarian views or one-sided accounts of the conflict.  
Another way of censoring that is particular to working-class communities was described 
by teachers from both schools. According to Jarman, in the aftermath of the Good Friday 
Agreement, policymakers have failed to provide economic opportunities in working-class 
neighbourhoods, which further marginalised young people who have sought opportunities 
through criminal activities. Unemployment and a lack of educational opportunities 
contribute to young people’s sense of alienation and their rejection of authority structures, 
leading some of them to get involved in minor criminal activities, labelled as ‘hoods’, who 
are known for rebelling against social norms (Jarman, 2004). Related to this, some of the 
students’ statements and mind-maps suggest that their background imposes on them a 
stigma, which is associated with low expectations and aspirations, as one teacher argued. 
In both schools, teachers explained that lower aspirations and ‘academic difficulties’ are 
a result of growing up in the respective environment: 
Coming from an area like this (…) our children would be very lacking themselves 
confidence (…) I suppose down through the years because of “the Troubles” and 
the crime down here they have almost become like- there were stereotypes and it’s 
almost as if they accepted that stereotype of failure and you know their community 
wasn’t as good as this or that or the other. (…). And I think the teaching of 
citizenship it broadens it out, it also shows them that (…) there are a lot of children 
that are worse of than they are. And I think through showing them things like that, 
through citizenship, it helps broaden their awareness and help develop their own 
self-confidence I think too and having respect for others. (Teacher 2, Catholic 
school) 
So, it’s a difficult enough area (…) the area itself would have had quite a strong 
paramilitary influence in the past … which maybe feeds in quite a bit too in terms 
of the academic difficulties that we have. (Vice-principal, Protestant school) 




The Catholic teacher’s statement is infused with hope that citizenship has the potential to 
empower his students. However, the stereotypes related to low expectations of potential 
academic performance imposed on young people from the lower social strata make their 
access to educational opportunities, in general, more difficult (Rist, 1970). In this sense, 
low aspirations act as another censor for citizenship education because they alienate 
students from citizenship. Earlier on pages 206-7, students from Northern Ireland 
described citizenship as ‘elitist’ or as being for more affluent parts of society and thus not 
for students with low educational aspirations and expectations. Whilst this understanding 
of citizenship by the students is in parts accurate (reflecting the idea that citizenship is a 
form of cultural hegemony as one of the central arguments of this thesis), the low 
aspirations and expectations imposed on them turn also into a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
This becomes clear when comparing the Catholic and Protestant working-class students 
with the Arab-Palestinian students. All three groups are alienated from citizenship, yet 
among Arab-Palestinian students, there are higher aspirations and an ethos of educational 
success that directs them to reclaim their individual rights as a central aspect of citizenship 
in Israel (see Agbaria, 2016a). Whilst this section discussed how communities act as 
censors, the next section extends this notion to parents and students, who partly reproduce 
a managerialist culture, performativity, and identity politics.  
 
PUPILS AND PARENTS AS CENSORS IN ISRAEL AND NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
The excerpts below show the challenges that citizenship education teachers are confronted 
within Northern Ireland and Israel. The formal and informal restrictions imposed on them 
make it very difficult to address the structural dimension of the conflict and to challenge 
racism and sectarianism among their students.  
The biggest challenges are not engraving even deeper negative prejudice in their 
own eyes. (…) I have to come planned and prepared when I’m talking about these 
things so that I don’t say something that’s gonna lead them into difficulty or lead 
me into difficulty. And the other thing that’s really difficult is that sometimes 




you’re presenting views that are completely contrary to their parents and so when 
they go home, because they do talk to their parents- when they go home, they will 
have the conversation about what we were doing today and “Mr [name of vice-
principal] was telling us about and he was telling us about this” and it could be 
completely contrary to what their parents believe. So, the parents rather than 
saying “Well that’s a different perspective”, they see it as “That was an attack on 
my culture (…)”- (Vice-principal, Protestant school) 
The vice-principal suggested that parents not only act as censors due to their role as 
consumers of education but also through their acceptance (or disapproval) of teachers who 
contest views, narratives, attitudes, and values that are dominant among the parents and 
their community. One policymaker from Israel also referred to this issue: 
If they [parents] hear that one teacher talked about the Nakba for example in 
Jewish schools, they can write a letter to the Ministry of Education, they talk with 
the manager and they talk with all the parents and the school. (Policymaker 5, 
Israel) 
Policymakers and the vice-principal cited above referred to parents’ fear that their children 
might become critical of their own communities’ values, beliefs, and narratives and to the 
possibility that they might complain to the school or even to the educational authorities. 
[S]ome parents are worried that their children are somehow turned to the other 
side, whoever the other side may be. Their parents don’t want them to know about 
other stuff in case you know it somehow stains them or you know or damages them 
you know. (…) And I think with the identity in Northern Ireland, there is that great 
fear that you somehow get your identity attacked. Yeah, I think there has to be 
somehow space for you to be content with your own identity but also not threatened 
by somebody else’s. (Policymaker 4, Northern Ireland) 
I would say families that have been involved keep throwing it at their children, 
because there is a bit of these things you know perhaps they want them to 
remember this you know that carry on and we’re this and we’re that and we- so 




there is another community thing of division that perpetuates and continues to do 
that. (Policymaker 3, Northern Ireland) 
[Y]ou’re challenging some of the cultures that the children have been brought into, 
were born into and you’re challenging the cultures of the families that they live in 
and that they go home to, you know. (Vice-principal, Protestant school)  
These excerpts suggest that coming to terms with the past is resisted by the communities 
who perceive critical reflection and self-critique as a ‘threat’, disrupting the reproduction 
of the community narrative of themselves as the victim. As discussed in Chapter four, the 
lack of scope for teachers to challenge these ‘entrenched’ views and attitudes towards the 
conflict, sectarianism, and racism leads to students developing one-sided accounts of these 
issues. Another Protestant teacher argued that it is difficult to talk about issues related to 
identity in the classroom, as this provides “a racist forum” or “a voice for the racists” 
(Teacher 2, Protestant school). This statement underpins teachers’ reluctance to challenge 
students’ views.    
In some focus groups, it became manifest that students also censor each other besides 
censoring their teachers. The interchange between Catholic students below illustrates the 
pressure that can be exerted (subtly on children) to subscribe to the common narrative:  
S4: Miss I give it a go- because it’s like because people think they are more 
superior to others like because of their race or their religion or- all of that and 
that’s about it.  
S3: No! 
S4: I haven’t really thought about it that much.  
S3: It’s all wrong! Ireland is one! One day Ireland and Northern Ireland will come 
together and will all 32 counties will be just one. (Focus group 3, Catholic school) 
In both schools in Israel, teachers and students describe how discussions about the conflict 
and racism can become very heated, which is discussed in the three excerpts below:  




S1: Yeah but it’s very complicated [talking about the conflict], so it gets a bit- too 
complicated, too heated. 
A: I see. Because everybody has their- 
S3: Opinion. (Focus group 1, Jewish-Israeli school)  
 
S1: There are some things that we can’t say, not everything you want to 
say you can. (…) 
S3: No. There is something we can’t say.  
S1: It’s not the right place and the right time. (…) Political things. 
S3: We can’t say everything like political things, we can’t say it here-  
S2: We need to find the right person. There [are] different opinions from 
different people, so it will be difficult for them to understand what we think 
about this.  
S1: There is people who don’t accept your opinion because it’s different 
from their own. (…) 
S3: It [discussion about racism] became a big fight in the lesson. 
A: Because did it get very emotional or- 
S3: Yes. This fight came because not everybody accepts each other’s experience, 
opinion so that’s why we fight. (…) 
S1: In school, I think it [the conflict] can’t [be discussed]- because it’s a 
political thing.  
S3: Nobody can say “I think that I think that”- 
S1: Teachers can’t do it. They cannot express their opinion in class. (Focus 
group 3, Arab-Palestinian school)   




Interestingly, the Arab-Palestinian students are aware that their teacher is not permitted to 
teach them about the impact of the 1948 war on the Palestinian population or that the 
recently published circular does not allow teachers to express views that are critical 
towards institutions of the state (Ministry of Education, 2016). Hence, one student 
concluded that the conflict cannot be discussed in the classroom also because students do 
not seem to trust each other. Their teacher elaborated on this lack of trust among his 
students and pointed to their different national affiliations:  
Maybe not in the class [to have discussions about different identities]. Because 
they know each other so maybe they are afraid to say what they think. Maybe in 
small groups, so they can [speak about] their identity more true[ly], they don’t 
have to listen to everyone. Because you know someone will tell you “I’m Israeli” 
and someone will tell you “I’m Palestinian”, so they will look at each other in a 
way. (Teacher, Arab-Palestinian school) 
Importantly, the teacher from the Arab-Palestinian school stated that there is disagreement 
or tension among his students when it comes to discussions about identity. They have 
different national affiliations and feel different levels of connection to Israeli citizenship.  
S1: Maybe that we are confused. We don’t know what our country is, what our 
nationality is. We are not sure about it. Sometimes we think we are Palestinians 
and sometimes we are Israelis.  
S2: Because we are born in Israel. 
S1: Because Palestine it is for our grandparents and we grow up with “This is 
called Palestine” and then we have an Israeli passport so when we go to the 
airport, we are Israeli. So, we don’t know if we are Palestinians or Israelis. And 
when we go to another country and they ask us “Where are you from?” so we 
don’t know if we have to say Palestinian or Israeli.  
S2: Because some countries hate the Jews.  
S1: When we go to Egypt and we say we are Palestinians they say “you mean 
Israel?” we say, “No it’s Palestine.” (…) And sometimes you can’t say that you 




are Palestinian, in some countries. (…) And some people don’t understand this 
and they think we don’t have a nationality.  (Focus group 4, Arab-Palestinian 
school)  
Describing oneself as ‘Israeli’ means claiming ones’ rights as a citizen and might be more 
appropriate in places where people are critical towards Palestine, whereas they define 
themselves as ‘Palestinian’ in places where people are critical of Israel. This refers to the 
ideological potential of these identities, which are both constructed in the political 
discourse based on the denial of ‘the other’. While cultural differences are 
incommensurable, ideological discourses might construct them as mutually exclusive 
(Bhabha, 1990; 1994). In the following excerpt, students argued that those who accept the 
status quo define themselves as ‘Israelis,’ while they themselves seek to reclaim their 
Palestinian identity by not ‘forgetting’ and resisting to normalise the reality of the 
discrimination in Israel:  
S1: For us, we think it’s important [citizenship] but maybe other young people [at] 
our age they forgot about it. 
A: Do you think other things are important for them? Or why is that? Or they are 
not interested? 
S1: Maybe, they don’t want to. They are saying “ok now we are living in Israel- 
so ok we are Israelis”.  
S2: It’s comfortable-  
S1: They don’t want to prove “No we are Palestinians. This area was Palestine in 
the past.” 
A: I see. So, for them, it’s easier to live with it and- 
S1: Yeah to forget and to keep this situation. (Focus group 4, Arab-Palestinian 
school)  
This disagreement in terms of identity is particular to the Arab-Palestinian school, where 
two ideologies are competing; on the one hand Palestinian nationalism and on the other 




hand the assimilation strategy used by Israel. This reflects how Arab-Palestinian students 
in Israel are socialised into two different and competing narratives, on the one hand from 
their community and on the other hand the one mediated through the curriculum.  
Censoring is likely to take place during the eruption of political violence between the two 
groups. One policymaker recounted her own experience of working on a project where 
children from the different communities play football together, which became tense during 
the Intifada: 
And it fail[ed] because of the first crisis in the Intifada, everything failed there. 
They weren’t able to sit and talk to each other- “You are a murderer! I’m afraid 
to grow because of you and your friends and family” and stuff like that. So, it’s 
without the infrastructure of patience and humanity and learning the culture of the 
other, there is no chance of really living together. (Policymaker 2, Israel)  
This example points to how discussions about the conflict, racism, and sectarianism are 
likely to be silenced and depoliticised. In Israel, it appears to be the case that meetings 
between Israelis and Palestinians are avoided to due to emotional adverse responses by 
the participants. Consequently, parents and students act as censors of these discussions in 
citizenship education, since their strong responses make it more likely for teachers to 




In this Chapter, it was argued that schools, teachers, and students are prevented from 
discussing the structural dimensions of the conflict, racism, and sectarianism due to two 
major censors: a managerialist culture that sets the focus on performance and identity 
politics that discourage criticism of major narratives promoted by the curriculum and/or 
communities. Although both censors are directed from ‘above’, they are reproduced partly 
by parents and students leading them also to act as censors. Parents and students demand 




that teachers prepare them in the best way of being successful in the final examination and 
are also influenced by the dominant narratives of their communities.  
Firstly, the focus on performance and the downgrading of citizenship as a technical and 
individualistic subject in the curriculum, oriented towards forming future citizens mainly 
as contributors and consumers of the economic system, gives some indication about the 
hegemonic culture behind the subject. Whilst a technical concept of citizenship tries to 
give the impression of teaching and examining ‘neutral’, apolitical knowledge (Giroux, 
1997), it is permeated by a political agenda that suits the interests of political and 
economic elites (Apple, 2004).  
The focus on the acquisition of knowledge to be tested in examinations allows the political 
elite to control and define what they see as relevant knowledge and to pressure schools, 
teachers, and students to follow this path that they have set. Additionally, the pressure of 
performance also serves as a distraction from discussing issues related to the conflict or 
identity, which is a difficult task for citizenship teachers who are usually not provided 
with adequate training to teach about these complex topics. While some policymakers 
blame teachers for their reluctance to address controversial issues and their inclination to 
focus on the examination, this problem mainly derives from the policy-level, since the 
curriculum and educational policies are dominated by a managerialist culture and a focus 
on performance. 
Closer towards the final examination, the pedagogical approach becomes more focused 
on the memorisation of difficult concepts as preparation for the test. As a result, the space 
to promote critical thinking and to address controversial issues becomes more limited. 
Whilst policymakers state that teachers are mainly interested in training that helps them 
to prepare their students for the final examination, teachers state that pressure is exerted 
on them by educational policies, schools, parents, and students. 
The data demonstrated how students reproduce the discourse of ‘employability’ and 
‘personal development’ in Northern Ireland. Students from both schools are 
predominantly from communities that are affected by unemployment, lack of aspirations 
and youth criminality among other issues (see Jarman, 2004). There is a strong emphasis 




in the Catholic school and to some extent also in the Protestant school to counter these 
effects, by fostering students’ aspirations and self-esteem. However, this seems to be 
linked to an individualistic, apolitical concept of citizenship.  
There is a similar tendency in the Arab-Palestinian school, where performance in the final 
examination and the integration into Israeli society is emphasised over the political 
struggle by the principal. While this trend is less prevalent in the Jewish-Israeli school, 
the principal still described an individualistic understanding of citizenship among her 
students and some teachers argued that their teaching is limited by the requirement to 
prepare for the final examination. Hence, in both societies, the managerialist culture and 
the focus on performance create a notion of citizenship as a minimal, passive and 
‘technical’ subject (Chapter two discussed this form of citizenship education in more 
detail, McLaughlin, 1992; Torney-Purta et al., 1999). 
Secondly, this Chapter discussed how identity politics is officially reproduced by policies 
and educational programmes and unofficially by the communities, parents, and young 
people. The excerpts presented earlier in Chapter four about students’ accounts of the 
conflict illustrated how they are influenced by the narratives from their families and 
communities. Yet, these provide only a partial account of the conflict. The discussion of 
the data in this Chapter suggest that this partial or one-sided understanding of the conflict 
stems from the fact that teachers and students circumvent discussing alternative narratives 
and challenging dominant views in the classroom.  
In Israel, three educational policy examples were mentioned that effectively censor 
criticality: firstly, policies were introduced that legally restrict teachers’ criticism towards 
political institutions and the military. Secondly, schools and teachers are reprimanded if 
they commemorate the events of the Nakba, which omits narratives of the conflict that 
challenge the dominant Zionist narrative. Thirdly, the preparation for the military service 
as a central aspect of citizenship promotes values that are running counter those promoted 
by democratic or human rights education, constructing the ‘other’ as an enemy instead of 
a human being as one policymaker described it (see pages 213-14). Therefore, it is 
unsurprising that identity politics is reproduced by students, parents, and partly by teachers 




themselves, creating an atmosphere where critical political thinking is discouraged. 
Additionally, these educational policies facilitate a form of assimilation, which becomes 
visible in both schools through the support for the military service by the principals or 
national affiliations with Israel by the Arab-Palestinian students.  
In Northern Ireland, the politicisation of identities has contributed to a culture of violence 
that has tolerated and mobilised sectarian fears and beliefs in the past (Fulton, 1991). 
Partly, this is still the case in working-class communities where paramilitaries continue to 
exert violence (Knox, 2002). This was confirmed by the data, as students described how 
paramilitaries remain active in their communities and wield influence over young people. 
Importantly, their identity politics is partly reproduced by communities, parents, and 
young people, influencing them to censor discussions about the conflict or sectarianism.   
Hence, the third ‘censor’ outlined in this Chapter are parents and students. In conflict-
affected societies like Northern Ireland and Israel, it can be emotionally challenging to 
discuss issues related to the conflict (Cooper and Nichol, 2015; Zembylas, 2007). Across 
all schools, teachers and students described how young people are influenced by the 
political views of their families (see Figures 7; 10; 15; 16; 17; 18; 25; 26; 35; 36). Some 
teachers state that they find it difficult to challenge these views among their students and 
both teachers and students report that discussions of controversial issues are sometimes 
avoided. For example, in the Arab-Palestinian school, students are divided along 
identifications as ‘Palestinians’ or ‘Israelis’, mirroring views that are either supportive of 
the integration of Arab-Palestinians into Israel’s society or that emphasise the collective 
national identity and history of Arab-Palestinians. Since these discussions can become 
very heated and personal, the teacher and the students state they often sidestep discussing 
these identifications in the classroom.  
This further suggests that emotion and affect play a central role in education about conflict 
and identity. Boler (1997; 1999) and Boler and Zembylas (2003) have stressed that 
education needs to address emotions that act as a form of hegemony and social control, 
achieved through subtle dominant discourses of emotions that underpin existing power 
relations. Students and teachers from Northern Ireland and Israel expressed emotions such 




as fear from authorities and communities, anger about being criticized or anger as directed 
at the ‘other’ community, or love for the land, country, and community. These emotions 
are partly evoked by powerful ideologies and arguably impede on students’ ability to 
engage in critical inquiry. Boler and Zembylas (2003) maintained that critical inquiry can 
cause feelings of anger, grief, disappointment, or resistance and thus charges teachers with 
a difficult task since they are also confronted with ethical questions by challenging 
students’ and their own comfort zones.   
As a result, the data from both societies demonstrate that it is safer and more comfortable 
for teachers to sidestep challenging dominant views on the conflict or to address structural 
racism and sectarianism. Additionally, the managerialist culture acts as a further 
impediment to critical thinking or discussing controversial issues. This is reminiscent of 
Giroux and McLaren’s (1986) claim that teachers are constrained by nation-state 
ideologies and by the increasing submission of education to the logic of the market.  
CONCLUSION 
 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of this study was to examine the state of citizenship education in relation to 
identity in Northern Ireland and Israel in the context of a Catholic, Protestant, Arab-
Palestinian, and Jewish-Israeli school. It has added to the existing body of research about 
citizenship education in these two societies: in Northern Ireland, it confirmed concerns 
expressed by McEvoy (2007) that citizenship education is misinterpreted by those who 
facilitate it as it does not provide opportunities for young people to engage with different 
narratives about the conflict and does not sufficiently address the violence and injustices 
of the past. The findings further underline Emerson and McCully’s (2014) suggestion that 
teachers might sidestep addressing the recent conflict in the classroom due to anxiety 
about students’ and their parents’ reactions. In Israel, the data reinforce findings by Pinson 
(2008) that Arab-Palestinian students are marginalised and alienated by citizenship 




education, while they are ‘empowered’ to some extent by their school through discourses 
of individual rights and performance (Agbaria, 2016a; Pinson and Agbaria, 2015). 
However, through sidestepping and censoring most young people only gather superficial 
knowledge about the past which impacts on their understanding of the recent conflict, as 
Barton and McCully (2012) warned in their research. Instead of learning about the 
complexities of the conflict in the classroom, students tend to reproduce selectively the 
dominant narratives from their communities, which are not challenged in the classroom 
(McCully, 2010).  
In his review of research conducted in citizenship education in Israel, Cohen (2017) found 
that despite its potential to provide a unifying pluralistic framework, the subject matter 
has been used as a means to advance sectarian views. He explained that changes to the 
subject matter do not only follow educational goals of creating competent citizens but also 
to promote the political agenda of those who seek to influence dominant conceptions of 
citizenship in Israel, which resonates with the findings of this study. Importantly, Cohen 
argued that there is a lack of engagement with different views and controversy (referring 
to Hess, 2009), suggesting a form of avoidance of controversial issues. He concluded that 
most research in the field of citizenship education focused on the study of documents and 
that there is a need for the study of different and competing interpretations of citizenship 
by teachers and students in the classroom.  
Hence, this thesis has added to the existing body of research by confirming and further 
clarifying previous findings and by providing a comprehensive study of the policy, school, 
and classroom level, combining interviews and observations with the study of documents. 
It has further examined the theoretical links and practical processes that reinforce 
citizenship education as cultural hegemony and demonstrated how these processes 
permeate different layers of policies, schools, and individual teachers and students.  
Following demands by Noguera (2004) who argued that research in education needs to 
shift away from focusing on status to a new focus on broader structures that influence 
educational opportunities; the qualitative approach of this study facilitated an exploration 
of structures and processes. I claim that a better understanding of structures also emerged 




from the fact that the study investigated how structures and cultural hegemony affect 
different communities, enabling a deeper theoretical understanding of cultural hegemony 
as Yin (2003) and Campbell (2010) suggested in the case study approach.  
Additionally, the cross-cultural case study approach has further highlighted the cultural 
specificity of citizenship education in terms how it needs to be responsive to the 
experiences of different groups in society. While citizenship education tends to reflect 
mainly the majority groups culture, histories, and identities (as in the case of the middle-
class Jewish-Israeli school) it often omits those of minorities (the Arab-Palestinian school) 
and alienates groups that are socio-economically disadvantaged (the Catholic and the 
Protestant school). Different groups and communities respond differently to concepts such 
as citizenship, human rights, democracy, or cosmopolitanism (see also Staeheli, 2010). 
Without taking these cultures, narratives, identities and experiences of minority and 
disadvantaged groups into account, citizenship will not be accepted as an inclusive, 
empowering, and valuable concept by others than the dominant groups in society. 
As a personal reflection, this research provided me with the opportunity to become 
familiar with two different societies. By keeping a reflective journal throughout the 
doctoral research, I can trace the development of my thinking and ideas about the people 
and life in Northern Ireland and Israel. Living in both places for more than two years each 
was a valuable experience not only in terms of researching the contexts more thoroughly; 
being confronted with different people, cultures, languages and viewpoints on a daily basis 
allowed me to grow as a person. By doing research with the head and the heart, I think 
one can learn the most from meeting people who are different from oneself and by being 
open to listening to their views.  
The central theoretical conclusions are outlined in the following, finishing with a 
discussion about how citizenship education can become a more meaningful subject in 
conflict-affected societies.  
 




HOW IS CULTURAL HEGEMONY EXPRESSED THROUGH THE OVERT AND COVERT CITIZENSHIP 
CURRICULA? 
 
The discussion of the data has shown that avoidance and censoring as processes in 
citizenship education, shape cultural hegemony. Chapter four outlined the different 
avoidance strategies that dominate citizenship education, such as the flexible approach of 
the curricula, the absence of critical (political) thinking, the decontextualization of the 
conflict and conservative/liberal multiculturalism. All these strategies share in common 
that they are supportive of a cultural hegemony that sustains the status quo and privileges 
of political and economic elites through ensuring the reproduction of their ideologies 
(Althusser, 1971; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990). Drawing on Laclau (1992; 1996; 2000), 
citizenship education policies are underpinned by a vocabulary of empty signifiers in 
Northern Ireland and Israel that have been presented throughout the thesis such as 
‘reconciliation’, ‘community relations’, ‘peace education’, ‘tolerance’, ‘equality’, and 
‘co-existence’ that fail to address the conflict’s critical aspects. By failing to provide 
alternative accounts of the conflict and to challenge structures of racism and sectarianism, 
these signifiers even reproduce conflict to some extent. For example, the community 
relations and peace education paradigm have been criticised due to failure to address 
structural issues related to the conflicts (Bekerman and Zembylas, 2012; McEvoy et al., 
2006; McEvoy, 2007).  Consequently, the universality of citizenship is undermined by the 
particularity of a dominant group, elite or class that dilutes the universal with their 
particular interests (Laclau, 1992; 1996; 2000).  
The avoidance of discussing the conflict comes to light in two different ways: firstly, 
citizenship policies and teaching de-contextualise the conflict by breaking the link 
between events in the past, current divisions as well as on-going violence in both societies. 
Since students are not provided with information about the conflict through citizenship 
education, they draw on narratives that they grow up within their families and 
communities. These usually present partial and one-sided accounts that are at risk to 
reinforce sectarian and racist attitudes.  




Secondly, identity tends to be approached in both societies through conservative/liberal 
multiculturalism that does not challenge structural sectarianism and racism (McLaren, 
1995); and it reinforces essentialised constructions of identity and culture. The result of 
these framings of conflict and identity is that they are de-politicised and constructed as 
resulting from individual prejudice. Giroux (1997) warned that the individualisation of 
social problems such as poverty and racism distracts from the responsibility of the political 
establishment to offer political solutions to these problems. This is reminiscent of the 
criticism from participants in this study who claim that this individualisation of 
responsibility represents a comfortable approach for the political elite as a policymaker 
from Northern Ireland suggested (see page 231, quotes from Policymaker 3, Northern 
Ireland) since it sidesteps addressing the political roots of the conflict and the need to find 
political solutions.  
While sidestepping is facilitated by policies that leave schools and teachers at liberty to 
avoid, this is further reinforced through censoring of discussing controversial political 
issues and critical political thinking. The first censor introduced in Chapter five was the 
managerialist culture (Kilkauer, 2015). The Chapter argued that in order to reproduce 
itself, the elite exerts a neoliberal/managerialist culture on society (Apple, 2004; Giroux, 
1997; Kilkauer, 2015), infused with an ethos of performance and individual educational 
success. Citizenship education is diluted in both societies by this managerialist culture that 
downgrades citizenship to an individualistic, marketized concept, forming citizens mainly 
as consumers and contributors to the economy. This culture is a powerful censor and 
expression of cultural hegemony since it foregrounds the individual as the source of social 
problems and not the system, giving the impression of a ‘false generosity’ by offering 
education to develop skills of employability, for example, as a response to broader socio-
political issues (Leonard and McLaren, 2002). 
Identity politics is another censor of the critical potential of citizenship education. It draws 
on essentialised images of identity (Bhabha, 1994; Butler, 1993; Grillo, 1995; Hall, 2000; 
Spivak, 1990), which reproduce sectarianism and racism in a sense that they maintain the 
existing system of power and privilege (Tatum, 2000; Wellman, 1993). In both societies, 
images of what it means to be a ‘Jew,’ a ‘Palestinian,’ a ‘Catholic,’ or, a ‘Protestant’ are 




conveyed that fail to represent the fluidity and internal diversity of these identities, for the 
sake of securing the integrity of each community. Moreover, these identities can be 
exploited to mobilise political interests such as to claim ownership of the land, to justify 
the communities’ privilege and the denial of privileges or rights of the ‘other’ community. 
Identity politics further restrains schools’ and teachers’ autonomy to address the conflict, 
racism, and sectarianism in a critical manner, since a critical examination of narratives 
and identities might challenge communities’ sense of patriotism and their particular claims 
of belonging to the contested land.  
In Northern Ireland, this discourse about identities and political claims is mainly sustained 
through the communities, but also through the political elite. Researchers (Jarman, 2004; 
Shirlow and McEvoy, 2008) previously suggested that politicians exploit sectarian 
attitudes and fears in order to mobilise political support from communities and some 
participants stated that this is still the case (see statements by policymaker 3 and the vice-
principal on pages 230-5).  
In Israel, the politicisation of identities is expressed through educational policies, security 
policies, and citizenship rights. While a Jewish-Israeli citizenship identity is prioritised in 
the public sphere, Arab-Palestinian citizens mainly maintain their own discourse about 
nationalism and belonging in the private sphere.  
The reality of how the conflict, racism, and sectarianism are dealt with is a product of 
educational policies in citizenship education in Northern Ireland and Israel. Citizenship 
education is largely cleared from controversial or critical content and infused with “a 
superficial and sanitised form of pluralism” (Gilborn, 2006:99) that does not challenge 
sectarianism or racism. The data presented bolster Gilborn’s (2006) critique of citizenship 
education as a ‘placebo’ for a public policy that pretends to treat racism (or sectarianism 
and the conflict) by promoting a liberal-universalist credo that only confirms the status 
quo of existing privileges and conflicts. Under the logic of the market and nation-state 
ideologies, education functions as a mechanism of social control (Apple, 1988; Freire, 
1985; Giroux, 1987). It is downgraded to a form of banking education (Freire, 1970), 




which is a tool for the powerful to maintain their domination (Mann, 1987), to domesticate 
the masses, and to turn them into “receiving objects” (Freire, 1970:77). 
 
HOW DO DIFFERENT SCHOOLS RESPOND TO CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION POLICIES? 
 
The strategies of avoidance and censoring that exist on the policy level trickle down into 
schools and classrooms. In response to the second research question about how different 
schools in Northern Ireland and Israel respond to citizenship education policies, two 
processes predominate in the data: cultural reproduction and resistance.  
Cultural hegemony is sustained through cultural reproduction (Althusser, 1971; Bourdieu 
and Passeron, 1990), which became manifest through participants' constructions of 
citizenship, the conflict, and identity. Students and teachers draw to some extent on 
essentialised identities, reproducing dominant discourses in each community about what 
it means to be ‘a Catholic,’ ‘a Protestant,’ ‘a Jewish-Israeli’ or, ‘an Arab-Palestinian’. 
These identity constructions that are built on narratives about one’s past, struggle, and 
victimhood (see Bar-Tal and Halperin, 2013), impact on how students and teachers 
understand the conflict. 
Despite teachers’ more balanced understandings of the conflict, they do not transmit this 
knowledge to their students; by avoiding challenging one-sided accounts and 
racist/sectarian attitudes. Teachers struggle to address controversial issues related to the 
conflict and identity in the classroom due to the lack of time and training to facilitate 
discussions of controversial issues and the (emotionally) strong reactions by students and 
their parents. Policymakers and teachers confirmed Emerson and McCully’s (2014) claim 
that teachers might avoid addressing the recent conflict in the classroom due to anxiety 
about the reactions by students and their parents or being seen as “complicit in 
indoctrination” (p.16). Moreover, teachers also fear repercussions for criticising or 
challenging these narratives. In Northern Ireland, teachers feel intimidated by the 
paramilitary influence on the communities while teachers in Israel are afraid of sanctions 
by the educational authorities for criticising state institutions or teaching about the Nakba.  




Consequently, teachers sidestep challenging or clarifying students’ (often one-sided and 
uncritical) accounts of the conflict and essentialised views of identities. It was mentioned 
earlier that this resonates with findings by Barton and McCully (2012), who warned that 
young people only gather superficial knowledge about the past that impacts on their 
understanding of the recent conflict. Consequently, students might reproduce selectively 
the dominant narratives from their communities (McCully, 2010). Other researchers 
described silence or sidestepping of the conflict as a common feature in post-conflict 
societies, which serves to “create a sense of ‘normality’” (p.504) and makes everyday 
encounters with the ‘enemy’ possible and more comfortable (Eastmond and Selimovic, 
2012), prioritising to keep a sense of harmony (Loader and Hughes, 2017).  
Additionally, it was mentioned earlier that the managerialist culture restrains teachers’ 
and students’ ability to discuss the conflict, controversial issues, and to perform critical 
political thinking. In Northern Ireland, the framing of citizenship as ‘employability’ and 
‘personal development’ embody individualistic and marketized notions of citizenship, 
reflecting the “future-oriented” (Arlow, 2004: 285) approach that makes it easier to avoid 
contentious issues as McEvoy (2007) has warned. Teachers and students reproduce these 
notions of citizenship. Some students described citizens as ‘hard-working,’ ‘having a job,’ 
or referred to citizenship as something for people from more privileged backgrounds (see 
page 206), while teachers criticise citizenship education as too ‘academic’ with a focus on 
performance (see section “The focus on performance and teachers as performative 
workers”).  
In Israel, citizenship is a mandatory subject in the final examination and thus towards the 
end of high school. In both contexts, teachers are pressured to focus on concepts and topics 
that will be tested, leaving only a small amount of time for the discussion of controversial 
and current issues and to harness students’ critical thinking. Hence, schools in Israel also 
reproduce the ethos of performance and individualism. These influences are particularly 
strong in the Arab-Palestinian school that sets a focus on individual educational success.  
Whilst cultural reproduction dominates citizenship education in both societies, the data 
also shed light on pockets of resistance, which is expressed through students' redefinition 




of mainstream citizenship education. The section ‘Partial accounts of the conflict’ (pages 
145-160) discusses how Jewish-Israeli and Protestant students partly resisted the universal 
character of citizenship, denying the granting of the same rights to others (Arab-
Palestinian or Catholic). In contrast, Arab-Palestinian and Catholic students to some 
extent emphasised these universal aspects of citizenship such as equality, democracy, and 
rights as the most important and connected them to their community’s history of struggle 
and experiences of racism and sectarianism.  
The latter is reminiscent of the literature on involuntary minorities in the United States, 
who tend to emphasise the importance of ‘survival strategies’ such as the struggle for civil 
rights to cope with the lack of opportunities, domination or even exploitation (Ogbu, 
1990). Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that Catholics and Arab-Palestinians, which are 
involuntary minorities according to Ogbu's (1990) definition emphasise these aspects of 
citizenship. Similarly, hooks (1994) and Tillmann (2004) found that Black teachers in the 
United States (as involuntary minorities) carry with them personal experiences of racism 
and narratives that have historically been silenced and can provide counter-stories or 
counter-narratives. Ladson-Billings (1995) argued that the possession of culturally 
relevant knowledge helps minority teachers to deconstruct the dominant discourses and to 
develop a more critical approach to multiculturalism. Catholic and Arab-Palestinian 
teachers and students tend to have a better understanding of structural racism and 
sectarianism, arguably because they can connect it to the (historical) experiences of their 
communities. During the focus groups, Arab-Palestinians students de-constructed 
identities as political and demonstrated how they are exploited by power interests, by 
referring for example to the construction of Arabs as a security threat and discriminating 
policies. The major difference between Arab-Palestinians and the other students are that 
they are socialised into different perspectives and narratives: they are acquainted with ‘the 
other’ narrative in school, they learn Hebrew, consume Israeli media and culture and thus 
have more access to the reality of Jewish-Israelis (Al-Haj, 1995; Yiftachel, 1999), while 
at home they usually speak Arabic and learn about their family’s and community’s 
narrative about the conflict. In contrast to their counterparts from the other schools, this 
equips them with counter-knowledge and experiences to challenge the dominant 




discourses and understandings of citizenship, whilst they are also socialised into these 
dominant discourses.   
However, among all groups including (historical) minorities, there are tendencies to 
assimilate and reproduce cultural hegemony. This becomes evident through the 
reproduction of the managerialist culture and identity politics. Across all schools, students 
draw on strategic-essentialism (Spivak, 1988), mirroring dominant discourses from their 
communities that base demanding collective rights on the existence of a collective 
identity, narrative, and history of struggle. Some students embrace nationalism (or 
unionism among Protestants) and the ‘culture of the gun’ (see Bar-Tal and Halperin, 
2013), viewing political violence as a legitimate part of their struggle.  
However, there are differences among the communities regarding their power to claim 
collective rights. Compared to the other groups, Jewish-Israeli students were the most 
privileged in terms of collective rights and being able to identify with citizenship, captured 
well by the following statement “I do feel like my citizenship in Israel is quite my 
identity.” (Focus group 1, Jewish-Israeli school). Protestant and Catholic communities are 
granted collective rights through citizenship in Northern Ireland (which was described in 
Chapter One) but suggested that their collective rights are limited. For example, some 
Protestant students referred to the flag protest as an example of how the rights of the 
Protestant community are restricted and some Catholic students mentioned the political 
goal to reunify with Ireland as an aspiration for self-determination. Since they are denied 
collective rights in Israel, Arab-Palestinian students adhere to individualist approaches to 
citizenship education, as previous research by Pinson and Agbaria (2015) and Agbaria 
(2016b) manifested.  
The data demonstrated that citizenship education across all schools is shaped by the 
neoliberal/managerialist culture. In Northern Ireland, citizenship education generates a 
notion that citizenship is reserved for the more privileged in terms of class background, 
which leads working-class Protestant and Catholic students to reject citizenship as an 
‘elitist’ concept. Again, this trend became most visible in the Arab-Palestinian school, 
where a liberal-individualist concept of citizenship is emphasised over republican or 




communitarian concepts that are not offered to Arab-Palestinian citizens. Obgu (1990) 
found a similar inclination among involuntary minority groups in the United States, which 
emphasise success through education and the belief in individual effort and hard work to 
overcome obstacles (Ogbu, 1990). These tendencies might explain why the Catholic and 
Arab-Palestinian school (which are involuntary minorities according to Ogbu’s (1990) 
definition) emphasise an ethos of social mobility. Hence, Catholic, Protestant, and Arab-
Palestinian students understand citizenship primarily as an individualist concept, which 
does not necessarily confirm their collective rights.  
Banks (2008) phrased collective rights as cultural rights of minorities and demanded that 
minority’s identities, languages, experiences, and narratives must be included in the 
curriculum, which is usually dominated by the majority group’s culture. These cultural 
rights affirm culturally relevant pedagogy that incorporates and is responsive to students’ 
home cultures (Ladson-Billings, 1995). The data suggest that when these cultural rights 
are absent (as in the case of the Catholic, Protestant (to some extent) and in the Arab-
Palestinian school), schools, teachers and students tend to adhere to individualist concepts 
of citizenship, whereas learning about one’s culture, narratives, and experiences takes 
place mainly in the realm of families and communities.  
 
HOW CAN CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION CONTRIBUTE TO CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION? 
 
Related to the previous research question it becomes evident that collective or group rights 
can play an important role in challenging cultural hegemony by including different 
identities and cultures. However, whilst the granting of group rights is an important step 
towards a more equal and inclusive society, they are insufficient in contributing towards 
(conflict) transformation. In response to the final research question, citizenship education 
needs to adhere to cultural rights of minorities (or all groups in society), but further, 
promote critical pedagogy to foster conflict transformation. Ladson-Billings raised a 
similar argument in her definition of culturally relevant pedagogy, which “helps students 




to accept and affirm their cultural identity while developing critical perspectives that 
challenge inequities that schools (and other institutions) perpetrate.” (1995:469).  
The previous two sections indicated that the potential of citizenship education in Northern 
Ireland and Israel to foster critical political thinking is limited. Davies (2015) argued that 
there is a danger in peace education that circumvents addressing political and structural 
causes of the conflict. She warns that it can be complicit in normalising past or on-going 
violence and this study demonstrated that it can ‘normalise’ racism and sectarianism.  
Yet, the findings also indicated that citizenship education has potential to conduce conflict 
transformation. In Chapter two, Lederach’s (2014) approach to conflict transformation 
was presented and it was argued that a long-term approach is required to address the 
context and relationship patterns of the conflict and that escalation to a certain degree 
might be necessary for constructive change (Lederach, 2014). Davies (2004) pinned this 
further down, explaining that in conflict-affected societies, education requires exposure to 
conflict. Both refer to the encounter with opposing views and narratives from ‘the other 
side’, which is reminiscent of Banks (2008), who demands the inclusion of cultural rights 
and the emphasis on dialogue and discussion as aspects of democratic education (Dewey, 
1964) and empowerment (Freire, 1970).   
The encounter with opposing or alternative views is necessary to develop a degree of 
political generosity. As mentioned earlier in Chapter two, the term ‘political generosity’ 
has been coined among others by Emerson (2012; see also McEvoy et al., 2006) as “the 
ability to legitimise the cultural and political identity of those with opposing views” 
(2012:290), which she based on the condition of having confidence in one’s own cultural 
and political identity and the right of others to hold these views. Knowledge and 
confrontation with other perspectives, narratives about the conflict and other political 
identities can enhance the capacity for political generosity (Emerson, 2012). 
However, drawing on critical pedagogy and the work of post-colonial theorists, ‘true’ 
generosity in opposition to “false generosity” (Freire, 1970:45) further requires readiness 
for criticality and specifically self-criticality by those who dominate/the colonizers/the 
powerful or the majority. While learning about one’s cultural and political identity can be 




empowering for those to whom it is denied (Banks, 2004), this needs to include the 
development of a critical consciousness among all groups. Following critical educators 
and post-colonialists (Fanon, 2008/1952; Freire, 1970; Hall, 2000; Ladson- Billings, 
1996; 2004; Said, 1978), a critical consciousness includes the ability to de-essentialise 
identities, locating them in the context of power relations. Since there is usually an 
asymmetry in terms of whose identity or culture dominates, claiming to represent the 
‘universal’ as Laclau framed it, there is a need to examine this asymmetry critically. This 
requires all groups, but the dominant group particularly, to be critical towards the identity 
constructions that are part of the ‘self’, exercising ‘self-criticality’ towards how one’s own 
national, cultural, religious or ethnic identities are exploited for political and economic 
interests. A critical consciousness exposes how essentialised identities draw on racist and 
sectarian ideologies that seek to sustain and ‘legitimise’ privilege and oppression. As 
mentioned earlier, Banks (1994) and Jenks et al. (2001) claimed that the development of 
cross-cultural competency involves “the critical examination of one’s own beliefs and 
values regarding culture, race, and social class; and an understanding of how knowledge, 
beliefs, and values determine one’s behaviour with respect to minority groups.” (Jenks et 
al., 2001:88). Self-criticality is central to political generosity since it illuminates privilege 
and oppression. Arguably, self-criticality is challenging in particular on part of privileged 
groups, as it requires questioning and de-constructing one’s own privileges and the 
beneficial status quo that secures the system of advantage, partly through racism and 
sectarianism. This idea of confronting privilege and power relations by examining the 
selectivity of our vision and emotional attention is also promoted by the concept of 
‘pedagogy of discomfort’ (Boler, 1999; Boler and Zembylas, 2003). The pedagogy of 
discomfort assumes that feelings of discomfort are an important aspect of challenging 
dominant structures, beliefs, and practice; as part of learning about the experiences of 
victims of injustice, and finally as providing potential for transformation (Boler, 1999; 
Zembylas, 2015).  
The potential for these processes of self-criticality and political generosity was also 
reflected in the data. Arab-Palestinian students have demonstrated their capacity for 
critical political thinking since they are aware of the hegemonic discourse and how it 




structures privilege and oppression in their society. Additionally, working-class Protestant 
and Catholic students partly dismantle citizenship education as something elitist, 
reflecting the gap between different socio-economic groups in Northern Ireland and how 
the peace process has disillusioned their communities. This is particularly true for young 
Protestants as the data reflected, while young Catholics still might feel a sense of 
empowerment when offered the space in their citizenship class to share their narratives 
and negotiate their Catholic identity.  
Banks’ (2008) claimed that students need to have extensive knowledge about their own 
and others’ cultures and identities to understand how they become politicised and structure 
societies. Among the young participants, only Arab-Palestinian students demonstrated 
self-criticality and political generosity. This seems to stem from the fact that they are the 
only group that learns about different perspectives on the conflict: they are socialised into 
their community’s narratives at home whilst they are required to learn about the dominant 
Jewish-Israeli narrative in school. This equips them with a broader understanding of the 
conflict and knowledge about the ‘other’ group that allows them to understand their 
perspectives, demands, and actions.   
To humanize not only oneself but also the (former) enemy is a central aspect of conflict 
transformation (Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009). Being confronted with different perspectives 
in controversial issues discussions and challenging the hegemony might lead to more 
(verbal) conflict, but as Lederach (2014) maintained, sometimes conflict might be 
necessary for constructive change. Closing the circle, such an educational approach 
responds to the demands by post-colonial theorists for the critical examination of 
dominant cultures and narratives and frames identities as fluid products of their political 
and historical context (Hall, 2000).  
As a final note, this study has demonstrated that while citizenship for empowerment and 
transformation is possible at the margins or outside of the classroom, there tends to be a 
lack of political support for this form of citizenship education. It needs to be underpinned 
by ‘true’ political generosity and political literacy, infused with critical pedagogy to 
provide students and teachers with the space and time in the education system to practice 




citizenship for empowerment. Moreover, drawing on Giroux (1980), active approaches to 
citizenship education as outlined in this section, ironically encourage a critical 
examination of what it means to be a citizenship in a dominant social order and thus 
encourages the questioning of citizenship education itself; of how it is taught and the 
political interests sustaining it.  
Yet, it is unlikely for empowering citizenship education to emerge if this is against the 
interests of the political and economic elites. In its current state, citizenship education does 
not only distract from dealing with political conflict, the data suggest that it even 
perpetuates the conflict. This confirms to some extent Davies’ (2004) claim that schools 
in conflict-affected societies are at risk of nourishing a culture of fear, nationalism, and 
obedience (or conformity), instead of empowering young people as transformative 
citizens (Banks, 2008). This is facilitated through censor mechanisms and a level of 
ambiguity in the policy text that places an excessive burden on teachers. Banks (2015) 
even labelled political alienation, ambivalent national identities, feeling structurally 
excluded and politically separate among minorities as a form of “failed citizenship” 
(p.152).   
Therefore, there is a need for the reconstruction of citizenship education at all levels, from 
the policy and school to the classroom level. The findings of the thesis support the 
demands of other critical educators (Banks, 1994; 2015; Boler and Zembylas, 2003; 
Emerson, 2012; Ladson-Billings, 1995), suggesting that a reconstruction of citizenship 
education must entail: first, culturally relevant pedagogy that allows young people to 
engage with and develop overlapping identities (including local, national and global 
identities among others), cultures, and narratives, especially those that tend to be silenced 
in dominant discourses. Second, it requires the promotion of political generosity combined 
with a form of self-criticality that critically examines identities and how they underpin 
structures of privilege and oppression. Finally, a pedagogy of discomfort is important to 
address the emotional dimension of avoidance and can challenge benign approaches to 
multiculturalism and liberalism. In this way, citizenship education can emerge as a 
counter-hegemonic practice.  




LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
This study is limited mainly by the theoretical framework, methodological choices, and 
practicalities that have affected the fieldwork and analysis. Firstly, the research is 
restricted by the researcher values, referring to the researcher’s personal characteristics or 
behaviour that influenced the data collection, analysis, and interpretation (Onwuegbuzie 
and McLean, 2003). In addition to this personal lens that is shaped by my background, the 
research is directed by the theoretical framework of (neo)-Marxism and postcolonialism. 
Whilst a different theoretical framework would have perhaps focused on different aspects 
and even highlighted different findings, choosing this framework directed the research to 
focus on power relations and structures. To reveal this positioning, I discussed the 
researcher bias in detail in the Methodology Chapter to allow the reader to look at the 
findings against this background and framework.  
While the critical theoretical framework has helped to illuminate power relations and 
hidden ideologies that underpin citizenship education, it also has its drawbacks. It has 
been argued that critical theory and specifically critical pedagogy lack a normative base 
(Nichols and Allen-Brown, 1996; Alexander, 2018), draw on dense language and are 
difficult to access by those coming from an oppressed viewpoint (Nichols and Allen-
Brown, 1996), deal with social justice issues on a high level of abstraction instead of 
offering strategies and solutions (Nichols and Allen-Brown, 1996; Bowers, 1993; 
Elsworth, 1989), and that their apparent universalism has been traditionally dominated by 
the voices of the privileged (usually male, middle-class and white) (Burbulus and Berk, 
1999; Elsworth, 1989). Elsworth (1989) demanded that critical pedagogy needs to 
confront the question whose voices it silences for example in the classroom practice, 
where power dimensions between teacher and students and between the students might 
prevent the creation of a safe space to discuss issues of social justice and experiences of 
discrimination.  
The major problematic inherent in different approaches to critical pedagogy lies in the 
question of where it will lead to after the empowerment of marginalized and oppressed 
groups. Gur Ze’ev (1998) has elaborated on this, attacking different approaches to critical 




pedagogy (by Freire, Giroux, McLaren) for their positive utopianism and the fact that they 
tend to normalize educational violence. For example, he proposes that Freire’s claim of 
the self-evidence of the oppressed’s knowledge is dangerous and even has “terroristic 
potential” (p.467) and oversees the individual’s struggle for autonomy. Instead, he argues 
that counter-education should commit itself to negate all forms of educational violence 
and power games, whether fascist, Marxist or capitalist. This argument is also part of the 
idea of strategic essentialism (Spivak, 1988), outlined earlier and which also became 
visible in the discussion of the data where Arab-Palestinian and Catholic students 
essentialized “the other” or claim superiority by drawing on their narratives of oppression. 
Therefore, these remaining questions and contradictions inherent in critical pedagogy 
require further theoretical refinement, which has limited the contribution of this thesis.  
Secondly, the research is limited mainly by the time frame, available resources and the 
abilities of the researcher. The intention at the beginning of the doctoral research project 
was to look at all different school types in both societies, which would include integrated 
schools in Northern Ireland and bilingual schools in Israel, but this was later reconsidered 
because it would go beyond the time frame of the PhD.  
Moreover, I am aware that the chosen schools represent an incomplete picture of these 
societies and a rather simplistic account of the conflicts that are more complex as they 
involve more actors than the two largest identity groups in each society. As mentioned 
earlier in the methodology section, the partly pragmatic selection of the schools due to 
constraints regarding time, resources, and access has impacted on the findings. The fact 
that the students in Israel tended to come from a middle-class background, while the 
school population in Northern Ireland was predominantly working-class, has brought the 
role of class further to the fore in the context of Northern Ireland. Moreover, the 
circumstance that the Arab-Palestinian school is private with a majority of Christian 
students also has the consequence that some perspectives are missing or  are 
underrepresented (such as perspectives form Muslim, Bedouin or Druze students). To 
provide a complete account of citizenship education in Northern Ireland and Israel, in 
addition to the integrated/bilingual schools, I would have to include selective schools, 
schools with a majority of Muslim students, (Jewish) religious schools, urban and rural 




schools. However, including these different schools and groups would have gone beyond 
the timeframe of this PhD research and could provide a base for future research projects. 
Related to this, another compromise was the choice of depth over generalisation. The 
methodological choice of conducting a qualitative research project and drawing on a 
comparative case study approach limits the generalisations of the findings. Since the goal 
of the research was to examine the current state of citizenship education in the context of 
these four schools, it prioritised analytical depth over statistical generalisation. Therefore, 
the findings are to be interpreted against their specific settings and cannot be generalised 
across other conflict-affected societies, even though similar issues might occur in these 
contexts. 
Finally, my limited knowledge of Arabic and Hebrew has certainly impacted on the 
communication with participants in Israel. Despite the participants’ impressive fluency in 
English, a researcher who is fluent in these two languages might have gained a clearer 
insight into the descriptions by the participants. As it was already discussed in the 
Methodology Chapter, proficiency in English became unwillingly a selection criterion for 
participants. It was also difficult for me to follow the observations of citizenship lessons, 
where I relied on translations by the students. Moreover, a better knowledge of Hebrew 
would have helped to conduct a more detailed study of the documents from the education 
authorities, schools, and teachers. While I gained a glimpse from these documents about 
the state of citizenship education, a more thorough study of these documents with the help 
of a translator would have been valuable. Yet, as discussed earlier in the Methodology 
Chapter, including a translator requires to take into account the translator’s cultural 
baggage as well since they are also not ‘neutral’ as interpreters (Temple and Edwards, 
2002). Therefore, these limitations are mainly the result of choosing to engage directly 










The thesis has raised two central issues: firstly, the data suggest that there is a pressing 
need in conflict-affected societies and arguably in all societies with a violent or troubled 
history to address the past critically and from various perspectives, especially from those 
that have been silenced. Secondly, I asked earlier (page 75) whether there is a way to 
create a form of citizenship education that is generous to the multiplicity of identities 
without making them redundant in their struggle for justice.   
Regarding the first issue, I started to write this conclusion on the day of the elections for 
the German federal parliament, where for the first time after the Second World War, a 
right-wing extremist party gained enough votes to enter the parliament. Some of its 
members deny the crimes committed under the Nazi regime and appeal to strengthen 
German patriotism and nationalism as well as to abandon what they call ‘the culture of 
guilt’, which they claim dominates the consciousness of German citizens (see for example 
Am Orde, 2017; Appenzeller, 2017). Sadly, their success is reminiscent that history of 
conflict can repeat itself if we do not deal with our past seriously. It demonstrates the 
danger of silencing the past and of essentialising identities and cultures that legitimise 
racism, anti-Semitism, and sectarianism.  
In Northern Ireland and Israel, there is a need to re-assess the past, to hold political elites 
responsible for the crimes committed, perhaps in the style of a truth commission. Shriver 
(1995) argued that forgiveness can only happen after a form of what he calls “moral truth” 
(p.9) has been established, in a sense of a more accurate picture of history, representing 
different perspectives and narratives. While history and memory are often selective, there 
is a need to account for these events, to name victims and perpetrators. Whilst we can 
forgive the perpetrators by deconstructing how they themselves are also the ‘victims’ of 
hegemonic ideologies, we cannot and shall not forget, as one Arab-Palestinian student 
framed it during the interview. Young people and societies, in general, need to be 
confronted with different perspectives of the past and structural explanations to examine 
the complex picture of political conflicts.  




However, across both societies, there seems to be a lack of political will to seriously 
engage with these issues that require political support to not lead to avoidance and 
censoring. Like previous research (Agbaria, 2016b; Gilborn, 2016), this study has 
demonstrated that citizenship education is permeated by cultural hegemony expressed 
through neoliberal and identity politics that impede the development of critical political 
thinking. It is only likely that critical and transformative citizenship education will 
develop under political and economic elites that support critical pedagogies. At the 
moment, it seems that such a political change is unlikely to happen; on the contrary, the 
entrance of right-wing parties into parliament in many European countries, the Brexit, the 
election of Donald Trump as President and the continuous shift to the political right in 
Israel are all indicators of a move towards more nationalistic and authoritarian 
understandings of citizenship that function alongside the dominance of neoliberalism. 
Yet, related to the second issue there is a potential for transformative citizenship among 
minority groups, nourished through communities (even if not always in a critical manner) 
and through the efforts of individual (critical) teachers and principals. This might also 
point to directions for future research. Exploring the pedagogies of critical teachers who 
are able to promote transformative citizenship even in an uncongenial political 
environment that subtly promotes avoidance and censoring could be an insightful future 
project. Additionally, whereas most studies on citizenship education focus on the school 
context, the findings point at the influence of families, peers, the media and organisations 
outside of schools on students’ understandings of citizenship and identity. Therefore, 
another future project could be the investigation of how young people conceptualise and 
practice citizenship outside of the official education system.  
As a final note, the findings of this thesis are reminiscent of Bush and Saltarelli’s (2000) 
claim that education can be both a constructive and destructive force in conflict-affected 
societies and beyond. While structural change is the central requirement for constructive 
education, currently the burden is still placed on individual educators and learners to create 
empowering and transformative education on the small scale, becoming their own masters 
and mistresses of their identities as Kwame Anthony Appiah formulated it.   















































FIGURE 5 CITIZEN FOCUS GROUP 3, PROTESTANT SCHOOL 
 
 

























































































FIGURE 12 CITIZEN FOCUS GROUP 2, CATHOLIC SCHOOL 
 
 
































































































FIGURE 19 CITIZEN FOCUS GROUP 1, JEWISH-ISRAELI SCHOOL 
 
 













































































































FIGURE 26 IDENTITIES FOCUS GROUP 2, JEWISH-ISRAELI SCHOOL 
 
 





























FIGURE 29 CITIZEN FOCUS GROUP 1, ARAB-PALESTINIAN SCHOOL 
 




FIGURE 30 CITIZEN FOCUS GROUP 2, ARAB-PALESTINIAN SCHOOL 
 
 




FIGURE 31 CITIZEN FOCUS GROUP 3, ARAB-PALESTINIAN SCHOOL 
 




FIGURE 32 CITIZEN FOCUS GROUP 4, ARAB-PALESTINIAN SCHOOL 
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